Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-70000447-0000

DATE: 20241029

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JASON GEORGOPOULOS

Defendant/Applicant

Kate Matthews, for the Crown/Respondent

Michael Bury and Tyler Alviano, for the Defendant/Applicant

HEARD: September 10, 2024

molloy j.:

REASONS FOR DECISION

A. INTRODUCTION

[1] For written reasons dated May 30, 2024, I convicted Jason Georgopoulos of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. It is now my task to sentence him for this crime.

[2] Defence counsel submits that the appropriate sentence in this case is a conditional sentence of 12 months to be served in the community or, alternatively, a sentence of 90 days to be served intermittently. He also took the position that a driving prohibition is warranted, but that 4 years was an appropriate length of time, pointing out that a driving prohibition has also been in place since the date of the offender’s release on bail in June 2021.

[3] The Crown seeks a sentence of 2 ½ to 3 years in a penitentiary, plus a driving prohibition for 10 years, and a DNA Order. Further, the Crown submits that even if I find a sentence of less than two years is warranted, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to impose a conditional sentence rather than a term of incarceration.

[4] For the reasons that follow, I find that the appropriate sentence in this case is one of imprisonment for 2 1/2 years, with a driving prohibition for 6 years after release from custody.

B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING

[5] Determining the appropriate sentence in any given case is a highly individualized process. Much will depend on the circumstances of the offender and the nature of the conduct constituting the offence. However, there are general principles that must be considered in every case. Depending on the circumstances, some of these general principles will have more weight than others in determining a fit sentence.

[6] The Criminal Code of Canada provides that, “The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.”[^1] The Criminal Code also provides a list of objectives in sentencing: denunciation of the unlawful conduct and the harm it inflicted; individual and general deterrence (of the particular offender and others in the community who might be tempted to commit similar crimes); separation of the offender from society; rehabilitation of the offender; reparation to the complainant and community; and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender, and acknowledgment of harm done to victims or to the community.[^2]

[7] A sentence is required to be “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”[^3] I am also required to take into account any aggravating or mitigating factors.[^4] The principle of parity requires that similar sentences should be imposed on similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances.[^5]

[8] Finally, it is an overarching principle that an offender only be deprived of his liberty if that is necessary to reflect other principles required to be considered. All available sanctions other than imprisonment must be considered and a sentence of imprisonment only imposed if required in the interests of justice, bearing in mind the harm to the victim and the community.[^6]

C. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE

[9] On May 12, 2021, Mr. Georgopoulos took his administrative assistant (Stefanie Backer) for a spin along Queen Street East in Toronto in his new $400,000 Lamborghini. It was a beautiful spring evening. He put the top down. The speed limit was 40 kph. He eventually reached a speed of 112 kph.

[10] For a distance of at least six blocks along the way, he was seen accelerating rapidly until reaching the vehicle in front of him. Then he would allow a distance of about 100 feet to develop between his Lamborghini and the car in front of him, and accelerate again. As he was doing this, Ms. Backer would throw her arms up in the air as if on a roller coaster.

[11] Mr. Georgopoulos then saw a streetcar ahead of him, which was going 30 kph. He decided to pass it in the right-side curb lane. He put the accelerator right to the floor. The driver of the car behind him noted this manoeuvre and also saw that there were cars parked in the curb lane. He commented to his son who was in the passenger seat that he did not think the Lamborghini was going to make it. That was an accurate assessment. Before getting past the streetcar, Mr. Georgopoulos crashed into a Jeep Wrangler parked at the curb, then hit the streetcar, and then hit a Mercedes parked in front of the Jeep. As he approached the streetcar, Mr. Georgopoulos was going 112 kph. He never applied his brakes, but did take his foot off the accelerator. His vehicle was travelling at 104 kph at the point of the first collision, one second after the peak speed of 112 kph.

[12] The Lamborghini was a complete write-off. Upon seeing the photographs of the wreck at the scene, I was shocked to learn that there had been a passenger in the front passenger seat and that she had not been killed. That did not look possible. However, Ms. Backer did survive, although she almost died at several points and has been left with permanent brain damage (a point to which I will return in dealing with the aggravating factors influencing sentencing).

[13] It is not known how fast Mr. Georgopoulos was driving when previously speeding up over a short distance and then stopping, apparently to give his passenger a thrill. The driver of the car behind him estimated the Lamborghini’s peak speed in that series of manoeuvres at between 60 and 65 kph. However, that same witness also thought the Lamborghini was doing over 80 kph at its fastest point when passing the streetcar, when in fact its fastest speed was shown from the data recorder to be 112 kph. It is reasonable to believe that the speed of the simulated roller coaster stunt was likely also underestimated.

[14] Mr. Georgopoulos’ testimony at trial was internally inconsistent, illogical, unreliable, and not credible. He claimed to have no memory of the roller coaster stunt due to the effects of the concussion he sustained. He said he thought he never went over the speed limit (40 kph) prior to attempting to pass the streetcar. However, the evidence of the driver behind him about that driving was part of an Agreed Statement of Facts at trial and I accept it as true.

[15] Mr. Georgopoulos also claimed that he did not see a car parked at the curb. There was a straight line of vision along the side of the streetcar. The driver of the car behind Mr. Georgopoulos could see the parked car. The parked car was there to be seen and Mr. Georgopoulos had to have seen it. He just thought his fancy car could go fast enough to get past the streetcar before hitting the parked car. He was wrong.

[16] Mr. Georgopoulos also claimed to have a perfect memory of the moments before the crash, stating that he chose not to apply the brakes because he was afraid his car would spin out of control and hit pedestrians. He also said that he thought the streetcar would slow down to let him pass, and that it accelerated instead. That is wrong. The streetcar did not accelerate. Also, in my reasons for convicting Mr. Georgopoulos, I rejected his evidence about his experience of streetcars routinely stopping and slowing down to let cars pass them. Mr. Georgopoulos testified that he was not used to driving the Lamborghini and it somehow slipped into an acceleration mode without him having done it purposefully. This is inconsistent with his evidence that he sped up to get past the streetcar, and the fact that he needed to do so or he would have hit the parked cars that were plainly there to be seen.

[17] Mr. Georgopoulos talked about revving his car’s engine as they drove down Queen Street and noticing the attention he was getting from people out and about on the street. He described the noise the car made as being “kind of the point” and that it “goes with the territory.” In short, he was showing off, both to his passenger and everybody on the street. This was thrill-seeking and blatant self-aggrandizing behaviour, engaged in for the sole purpose of pumping up his own ego. He decided to pass the streetcar just because he thought he could get his car to go fast enough to pull it off, without regard to the safety of anyone, including his passenger and members of the community who were out and about on Queen Street. Video of the crash shows pedestrians running for cover as the impact from the Lamborghini pushed the two parked cars up onto the sidewalk and glass, metal, and other debris flew through the air. It is pure luck that nobody was killed.

D. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER

[18] Mr. Georgopoulos was 42 years old at the time of the offence. He has been married for 18 years and is the father of three children (a 14-year-old and 11-year-old twins). He has a university degree and has had a steady work history as a mortgage broker since graduation. He owns his own mortgage-broker franchise. Approximately 16 people work there, some as employees and some as associated mortgage brokers.

[19] Twelve letters of support were filed at the sentencing hearing. One was from his wife who described how affected he has been by this event and how genuinely remorseful he is. Another was from the director of a soccer league for disadvantaged kids in Regent Park, who attested to Mr. Georgopoulos’ good character and said he has donated thousands of dollars to this worthy cause over the years. Some of the letters were from co-workers and others from long-standing friends, many of whom have been close friends since high school. There was a common theme throughout, underscoring what a “great guy” he is, a family man, devoted to his children, and always there to help his friends and co-workers in any time of need. It would appear that his life to date has been exemplary. Many of his friends said they had discussed this matter with him and described how deeply he regrets what happened and that it has affected him greatly.

[20] The defence filed material from the company that owns the mortgage business with whom Mr. Georgopoulos has a franchise agreement. Since the charges were laid, the franchise agreement has been extended on a month-to-month basis. However, they have given Mr. Georgopoulos notice that the agreement requires him to manage and operate the franchise, and that if he is incarcerated the franchise will be terminated.

[21] In her letter of support, Mr. Georgopoulos’ wife stated that their children know that the “accident” happened and that their father “faces punishment someday.” However, she said that they have tried to shelter the children from anything further and that their day to day lives, social interactions, and extra-curricular activities have been unaffected so far. However, she worries about the impact on the children if Mr. Georgopoulos is incarcerated. He has been the breadwinner and is very involved in his children’s lives.

[22] Mr. Georgopoulos has no criminal record and no relevant driving record.

E. PROPORTIONALITY

[23] The sentence I impose is required to be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Both factors point towards a significant sentence in this case.

Gravity of the Offence

[24] I wish to be very clear on this point. Dangerous driving is a criminal offence that is extremely serious, particularly when it causes bodily harm or death, which is all too frequently the case. For far too many years, we have failed to appreciate the gravity of this offence. Decades ago, the criminal nature of impaired driving was not fully appreciated by the public. Nearly 30 years ago, in R. v. Bernshaw, Cory J. underscored the seriousness of impaired driving as follows:

Every year, drunk driving leaves a terrible trail of death, injury, heartbreak and destruction. From the point of view of numbers alone, it has a far greater impact on Canadian society than any other crime. In terms of the deaths and serious injuries resulting in hospitalization, drunk driving is clearly the crime which causes the most significant social loss to the country.[^7]

[25] Seeking to curb the carnage caused by drunk drivers, Parliament increased the penalties for impaired driving. For example, in 2000 the maximum sentence for impaired driving causing death was increased from 14 years to imprisonment for life.[^8] The Supreme Court found in R. v. Lacasse that this increase in the maximum sentence signals to sentencing judges that more significant penalties should be imposed for this offence than had previously been the norm. The Court held:

The increase in the minimum and maximum sentences for impaired driving offences shows that Parliament wanted such offences to be punished more harshly. Despite countless awareness campaigns conducted over the years, impaired driving offences still cause more deaths than any other offences in Canada: House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Ending Alcohol‑Impaired Driving: A Common Approach (2009), at p. 5.[^9]

[26] In 2018, Parliament enacted legislation demonstrating that it considered dangerous driving to be an offence that should be treated as equivalent in severity to impaired driving. Prior to December 18, 2018, the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm was 10 years, and the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing death was 14 years. On this date, the Criminal Code was amended to increase those penalties to 14 years and life imprisonment, respectively. These increases brought the penalties for dangerous driving in line with the equivalent impaired driving offences. That was deliberate. The first two points listed in the Preamble of Bill C-46 (which brought in the amendments) state:

Whereas dangerous driving and impaired driving injure or kill thousands of people in Canada every year;

Whereas dangerous driving and impaired driving are unacceptable at all times and in all circumstances;[^10]

[27] At the same time, Parliament added a highly unusual provision immediately prior to the dangerous driving provisions, under the heading “Recognition and Declaration,” which states (in part):

320.12 It is recognized and declared that

(a) operating a conveyance is a privilege that is subject to certain limits in the interests of public safety that include licensing, the observance of rules and sobriety;[^11]

[28] Not only does this enactment signal Parliament’s view that sentences for dangerous driving had previously been too lenient, it also demonstrates the clear direction of Parliament to the courts that the gravity of this offence must be recognized.

[29] I think we have, as a society, come to a recognition of the criminal nature of impaired driving. We refer to someone being “killed by a drunk driver” as opposed to being “killed in an accident.” To be clear about this case, Stefanie Backer was not injured in a car “accident.” She was injured as a result of the deliberate criminal conduct of Jason Georgopoulos. He is just as much criminally responsible as he would be if his weapon was a firearm instead of a car. Indeed, in this country, cars kill more people than guns. Parliament has emphasized that operating a vehicle is a privilege. It is licensed by law, as is the possession of guns. If somebody deliberately operates a car in a manner that is dangerous to the public, that person is just as deserving of punishment as somebody who randomly discharges a firearm, reckless as to the life or safety of another person. Indeed, a person who discharges a firearm while being reckless as to the safety of another person is subject to a maximum sentence of 14 years, just as is the case for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

[30] On this point, I am in complete agreement with Caponecchia J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. Robertson.[^12] In that case, she sentenced the offender to 17 years on four counts of dangerous driving causing death, in circumstances where the conduct was more egregious than the driving in the case before me. Although the sentence is deservedly higher than would be appropriate in this case, the underlying principles still apply. Caponecchia J. referred to Mr. Robertson as having “gambled with other peoples lives,” noting that the consequences were “predictable, yet they did not deter him.”[^13] She emphasized the importance of deterrence and the necessity for trial judges to send a clear message that such conduct is criminal and will not be tolerated, and concluded as follows:

The danger created by Mr. Robertson on both June 16 and 18 is not unlike that created by a person who takes control of a different weapon and walks down a busy street firing a handgun at random. The community, quite properly, demands that the courts denounce and deter such reckless and dangerous conduct. Significant incarceration is the remedy that most emphatically achieves those goals.[^14]

[31] I agree entirely about the gravity of this offence and the importance of treating it as the criminal offence it is, rather than a mere driving violation.

[32] The other aspect of proportionality is the degree of responsibility of the offender. Mr. Georgopoulos is solely responsible for this offence. He had no reason whatsoever to act in the manner he did, other than that he was showing off his high-performance car and perhaps thrill-seeking.

F. MITIGATING FACTORS

[33] It is a mitigating factor that Mr. Georgopoulos has no criminal record to date and no relevant driving record. He also has excellent letters of support attesting to his otherwise good character.

[34] On the other hand, I agree entirely with the observation of Stribopoulos J. in R. v. Yogeswaran with respect to prior good character being a less weighty mitigating factor in cases of this nature. He held in that case:

Nevertheless, it would be an error to place excessive weight on Mr. Yogeswaran's previous good character. Unfortunately, it is often people of otherwise good character who inexplicably choose to drive recklessly on our roadways, behaving in an utterly selfish manner that is not in keeping with their behaviour in other facets of their lives. Accordingly, an offender's previous good character must be considered in context when sentencing for a driving-related offence: see R. v. Bigham (1982), 1982 3904 (ON CA), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 221 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 223.[^15]

[35] I accept that Mr. Georgopoulos is remorseful, as evidenced not only by what he said himself in court, but by many of his friends and colleagues who have discussed the matter with him since the date of the offence. However, there is a difference between being remorseful and accepting responsibility. Mr. Georgopoulos regrets the injuries to Ms. Backer, but in my opinion lacks true insight into his criminal conduct.

[36] Defence counsel argued that Mr. Georgopoulos’ trial was “akin to a guilty plea,” subject to two motions (a s. 11(b) application to dismiss for delay and a motion to stay the charges based on allegedly lost evidence). I dismissed both motions in my earlier decision and will not repeat here what I said at that time.[^16] However, there was nothing about this case that was “akin” to a guilty plea. Obviously, Mr. Georgopoulos could not deny he was the driver, as the evidence against him was incontrovertible. Likewise, the data taken from the car provided solid, objective evidence with respect to the speed of the car and the absence of braking. There was also video evidence from surveillance cameras. Although there was an Agreed Statement of Facts that rendered it unnecessary for the Crown to call some of the civilian eyewitnesses, Mr. Georgopoulos chose to testify and in the course of his evidence sought to contradict the evidence of one of those eyewitnesses. He also gave various explanations for how the crash occurred, seeking to minimize his own culpability. I rejected his testimony as being inconsistent with other evidence, not credible, and unreliable.[^17] At the close of the evidence, his counsel submitted that he should be acquitted of the charge. There is nothing at all about this that is the equivalent of a guilty plea. It was a contested trial. Mr. Georgopoulos was entitled to challenge the Crown’s case and to require the Crown to prove his guilt. That is by no means an aggravating factor on sentence. However, having done that, he clearly is not entitled to the benefit of the mitigating effect typically given to a guilty plea.

[37] Defence counsel argued that Mr. Georgopoulos was inexperienced in the operation of a motor vehicle of this nature and that this should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. I disagree. If Mr. Georgopoulos did not know how to drive his Lamborghini, it was his responsibility to learn. That should have been done in a safe, controlled space, perhaps with a professional instructor. A busy downtown Toronto street, in the midst of streetcars, pedestrians, and other vehicular traffic, and with a passenger in the front seat, is not where you go to practice driving your unfamiliar car at 112 kph. If anything, this failure to take proper training before undertaking such driving is an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor.

[38] Defence counsel also argued that Mr. Georgopoulos financially supported Ms. Backer after the collision and assisted her with getting benefits, which is to his credit. I accept that Mr. Georgopoulos kept Ms. Backer on the payroll of his business for one year, which cost the business $52,000 (although the likely deductions for tax purposes are not known). Counsel on the criminal trial stated in submissions that Mr. Georgopoulos stopped those payments on the advice of his counsel in the civil proceedings. I do not plan to go behind that. I have no idea what Mr. Georgopoulos did to “help” Ms. Backer get benefits beyond what any employer would do. She had catastrophic injuries. I doubt that any intercession by Mr. Georgopoulos had much, if any, impact on her entitlement to benefits. There was also a substantial payment to Ms. Backer as a result of the civil action, but that was paid entirely by the insurance company with no personal contribution by Mr. Georgopoulos. He gets no credit for that.

[39] I accept that in addition to the psychological impact on Mr. Georgopoulos, his conviction and any sentence imposed will necessarily have an impact on his family, business colleagues, and employees. His mortgage business is a franchise and he has been given notice by the franchisor that if he is incarcerated, the franchise will be terminated. I have not been provided with any evidence as to what the fallout from that might be, whether the employees will be offered positions elsewhere, or whether someone else might take over the franchise. I attach no weight to this speculative impact. I also have not been provided with any information about the financial circumstances of Mr. Georgopoulos’ family. Thus far, his children have not been affected, although I recognize that these proceedings and their likely outcome have been stressful for his wife. He has been described as the family breadwinner, but no information has been provided from which I could conclude that the impact of any incarceration would constitute an undue financial hardship for the family. In his CV filed on the sentencing hearing he lists “philanthropy” as one of his “Skills and Interests.” He was a half-owner of a $400,000 Lamborghini. It is a reasonable inference that his family will not be destitute as a result of his incarceration.

[40] It is always a tragedy that innocent people suffer for the crimes committed by an offender. Ms. Backer is obviously the most directly and severely impacted victim. Her family and friends have also been damaged. However, I accept that Mr. Georgopoulos’ family, friends, and co-workers will be affected by his removal from their lives to serve time for his crime. Absent severe hardship, of which there is no evidence, I do not find this to be a factor reducing the sentence which would otherwise be appropriate.

F. AGGRAVATING FACTORS

[41] The fact that the driving was dangerous and that a person was injured are essential elements of the offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The mere existence of these factors is not aggravating. However, the range of what can be dangerous driving is very broad, as is the severity of potential injuries that can be caused. It is appropriate to consider the degree of dangerousness and the severity of the injuries on a spectrum in determining whether they can be considered to be aggravating.

[42] In this case, the nature of the driving that preceded the collision is aggravating. Mr. Georgopoulos was showing off in an egregious way, and in a manner dangerous to the public. This was not a mere lapse in judgment or a moment’s inattention. It was deliberately dangerous behaviour. The fact that there were many other people in the area who could have been seriously injured, if not killed, is also aggravating.

[43] Also, the life-altering and devastating impact of Mr. Georgopoulos’ conduct on his passenger, Ms. Backer, is a seriously aggravating factor. At the time of this incident, she was 31 years old. In addition to working part-time at the mortgage broker office, she had been a paramedic for eight years. She was described by her mother in her victim impact statement as a person who was hard-working, personable, and happy in her life. She said her daughter was “vibrant, happy go lucky, motivated, determined, and independent.” All that changed.

[44] Ms. Backer suffered severe trauma to her head and other parts of her body. She had injuries to both knees, her pelvis, lower back, upper back, neck, sternum, both wrists, and right shoulder as well as a dissected carotid artery. The most serious injuries, both physical and neurological, were to her head. Ms. Backer’s brain tissue was exposed as a result of the impact from the collision, and glass from the shattered windshield was wedged into her brain and chest. In the emergency department, she experienced a hemorrhagic stroke and a neurosurgeon had to shave the brain tissue from her frontal lobe to control the bleeding. Otherwise, she would have died. As it was, she was in a medically induced coma for 15 days and had multiple brain seizures during that time. She almost died several times. It was a hellish experience for her mother, particularly as it was during COVID-19 and the restrictions in the ICU greatly limited her ability to be present with her daughter as she hovered between life and death.

[45] The trauma to Ms. Backer’s brain has left her with a permanent seizure disorder. Her career as a paramedic is now over. She has also had a dramatic change in her personality as a result of her brain injury. She experiences bouts of anger and aggression, and is irritable and quick to anger. She is unable to do many of the activities she enjoyed previously such as socializing with friends and going to the gym. She still has severe daily headaches. As a result of the neurological damage, she has lost her sense of taste and smell, and her eyesight is severely compromised. She has a heightened sense of touch, which means that she experiences constant and severe tactile pain, even for things such as bathing or being lightly touched. Her hearing is also amplified. Commonplace sounds at normal volume, even people talking, causes pain in her ears. She has no tolerance for noisy or crowded places. Because of her brain injury, she has low impulse control and will sometimes lash out physically at others. She has difficulty reading or multitasking and her memory is poor. She explained that people are unable to relate to her and this has left her feeling “very lonely and isolated.”

[46] After several bouts of neurosurgery, other doctors began the task of reconstructing Ms. Backer’s face and skull. She was severely disfigured. Surgery was required to correct the alignment and placement of her right eye. Her mother reported that her daughter “had no bones left on the right side of her face.” Further surgery is yet to come.

[47] This has also been emotionally devastating to Ms. Backer, who has at times been suicidal and now struggles with depression. Everything about her life has changed. She is no longer the fun-loving, hard-working, independent young woman she was before this happened. She now lives in pain, anxiety, and paranoia. She has no fun. She cannot work. She cannot live independently. Ironically, her driver’s license has been permanently revoked.

G. DENUNCIATION, DETERRENCE and REHABILITATION

[48] The case law is clear that for offences of this nature, the primary factors informing sentencing are denunciation and deterrence (of both the offender specifically and the public generally). The Supreme Court of Canada held in Lacasse:

While it is true that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation apply in most cases, they are particularly relevant to offences that might be committed by ordinarily law‑abiding people. It is such people, more than chronic offenders, who will be sensitive to harsh sentences. Impaired driving offences are an obvious example of this type of offence, as this Court noted in Proulx:

. . . dangerous driving and impaired driving may be offences for which harsh sentences plausibly provide general deterrence. These crimes are often committed by otherwise law‑abiding persons, with good employment records and families. Arguably, such persons are the ones most likely to be deterred by the threat of severe penalties: see R. v. McVeigh (1985), 1985 115 (ON CA), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 150; R. v. Biancofiore (1997), 1997 3420 (ON CA), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 344 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 18-24; R. v. Blakeley (1998), 1998 6218 (ON CA), 40 O.R. (3d) 541 (C.A.), at pp. 542‑43.[^18]

[49] The same principle was emphasized by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Rawn, a case dealing with dangerous driving causing bodily harm (the same offence at issue here), as follows:

General deterrence and denunciation are the most important factors in the determination of a sentence in a case such as this one: see R. v. Nusrat, 2009 ONCA 31, 244 O.A.C. 241. Other, like-minded people need to know that irresponsible use of a motor vehicle on our highways will not be countenanced. A sentence can only denounce conduct and deter others to the extent that it is punitive. The essence of general deterrence, is, therefore, punishment: R. v. B.W.P., 2006 SCC 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941, at paras. 2-4.

It is worth repeating - dangerous driving causing bodily harm is a serious offence. An appropriate sentence must give primacy to the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation. To meet the requirements of these principles, the sentence must clearly reflect the seriousness of the conduct and its consequences, both actual and potential. To meet the requirements of denunciation, it is necessary that there be absolutely no ambiguity in the message that such conduct is completely unacceptable.[^19]

[50] In this case, rehabilitation and specific deterrence are not as important as the principle of general deterrence. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Currie, this type of offence is often committed by first-time offenders of previously good character, which makes the principles of denunciation and deterrence a “paramount consideration” in sentencing.[^20] Clearly, the message must be sent to Mr. Georgopoulos that the offence he committed is far worse than a traffic accident in which somebody was injured. He is wholly to blame for what he did to Ms. Backer and the danger he represented to everyone who was out on Queen Street that night. Although he truly regrets the injuries to Ms. Backer, I am still not satisfied that he understands the criminal nature of his actions. However, the principle of general deterrence is even more important. Drivers of motor vehicles need to understand that their right to drive is a privilege that carries with it the responsibility to behave in a manner that respects the safety of the public. Many people have gotten that message about drunk driving, but do not recognize that excessive and dangerous speeds and other dangerous conduct that is a threat to public safety will receive the same kind of criminal sanctions. The public understands that young men who shoot guns in public and endanger bystanders can expect to go to jail. The public simply does not have the same attitude about middle-aged, privileged individuals who engage in equally dangerous conduct when driving a motor vehicle. Those perpetrators should also expect to go to jail. There is no reason why one should be treated differently from the other. Indeed, it is easier to understand and show some leniency towards a young person, particularly from an underprivileged community.

[51] Rehabilitation is a relevant factor, but does not have a significant role here, whether it be increasing or decreasing the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate.

H. PARITY IN SENTENCING

General Principles

[52] Parity in sentencing is a principle that is easier to describe than it is to apply. In theory, similar offenders should receive similar sentences for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. However, no two offenders are ever alike and the differences in the circumstances surrounding their crimes are infinite. Nonetheless, sentencing cannot be seen as arbitrary. Consistency is important. It is therefore useful to review cases with circumstances as close as possible to the case before me for the purposes of comparison and to take into account the sentences imposed in those cases in determining a fit sentence for Mr. Georgopoulos.

[53] As I stated earlier in these reasons, the maximum sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm was increased in 2018. Cases decided prior to that date, or which do not take the increased maximum into account, must be evaluated with care.

Defence Cases

[54] Defence counsel provided seven cases in support of his submission that the appropriate sentence for Mr. Georgopoulos would be either a conditional sentence of 1 year or a 90-day sentence to be served intermittently. In my view, the case law submitted by the defence is distinguishable from the case now before me. The cited cases are:

R. v. Coholic, 2019 ONCJ 42.

R. v. Whalen, [2018] O.J. No. 2061 (C.J.).

R. v. Markozashvili, 2010 ONCA 52.

R. v. Ryazanov, 2008 ONCA 667.

R. v. Creft, 2022 ONCJ 572.

R. v. Linton, 2022 ONCJ 197.

R. v. Beedawia, 2024 ONSC 3247.

[55] R. v. Coholic is an Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”) decision (as are Whalen, Creft, and Linton) and not binding on me, although nevertheless persuasive and relevant to the issue of parity.[^21] Coholic involved a 19-year-old offender who pleaded guilty. He had no criminal record or driving record. The case was heard on October 30, 2018 (although the reasons were released in 2019). This was before the amendments to the legislation increasing the maximum penalty and the decision therefore has less weight than would otherwise be the case. The youth of the offender and the guilty plea are mitigating factors not available to Mr. Georgopoulos. The offender also had other mitigating factors relating to prior trauma that do not apply here. Although that offender was given a 90-day intermittent sentence, I do not consider the situation before me to be equivalent.

[56] R. v. Whalen is also an OCJ decision that precedes the increase to the maximum penalty.[^22] Mr. Whalen was driving 97 kph in a 60 kph zone and attempted to pass another car driven by Mr. Sadni. Mr. Sadni was driving at about the same speed and his car was determined to be mechanically unfit. Mr. Sadni also had a blood alcohol reading of 140 (with 80 being the legal limit). Mr. Sadni lost control of his car and the two cars collided. Mr. Sadni was seriously injured (including a significant brain injury), as was the passenger in his car (who was not wearing a seat belt). Mr. Whalen failed to remain at the scene. The drivers of both cars were charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm. In separate proceedings, Mr. Sadni pleaded guilty and received a conditional sentence of 3 months. Mr. Whalen was sentenced to 90 days to be served intermittently. However, the driving in his case was nothing close to as aggravating as that of Mr. Georgopoulos and the sentence was significantly reduced because the injuries to the two people in the other car were also attributable to the dangerous driving of that driver (Mr. Sadni). The underlying facts are quite different.

[57] R. v. Markozashvili is a Court of Appeal decision, sitting on appeal from a 90-day intermittent sentence imposed by an OCJ judge.[^23] The decision is from 2010 and precedes a significant change in the law with respect to appropriate penalties for dangerous driving. This was a very brief Appeal Book Endorsement. There is very little information about the nature of the driving, except that the offender ran two red lights at well-travelled busy intersections. The appeal was dismissed, but it was an appeal by the offender, with no cross-appeal by the Crown. Therefore, the leniency of the sentence was not the subject of any comment. The offender’s appeal was simply dismissed.

[58] Likewise, R. v. Ryazanov, although also an Ontario Court of Appeal decision, is of no assistance.[^24] The two 18-year-old offenders pleaded guilty and were sentenced to conditional sentences of 2 years less a day for driving at excessive speeds of up to 140 kph on a street posted as 60 kph. A collision resulted, and one person was killed. The Crown appealed the sentence. The issue before the Court of Appeal was the fact that the Crown had undertaken to the two accused that if they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to conditional sentences, it would not appeal the sentence. Notwithstanding that undertaking, the Crown did appeal the sentences and requested that the Court of Appeal impose a penitentiary term. The Court of Appeal found that the Crown had an absolute right of appeal and was not barred from bringing the appeal. However, in all the circumstances, the Court found that the sentences were “not demonstrably unfit” but varied the terms of the conditional sentence to make it a full house arrest for the 2 years and increased the driving prohibition from 4 to 7 years. The circumstances of that case were extremely unusual and not akin to Mr. Georgopoulos’ situation. I also note that these were youthful first-offenders who pleaded guilty. This also distinguishes the case from that of Mr. Georgopoulos.

[59] The defence also relies on R. v. Creft in which the trial judge sentenced the 23-year-old offender to 7 months in jail.[^25] Although Creft was decided in 2022, the trial judge held that the normal sentencing range was up to 2 years less a day and included conditional sentences. However, she took that range from cases decided prior to the amendments in 2018 and without reference to more recent cases noting that the range is now higher.[^26] The accused in that case was 23 years old and pleaded guilty at an early stage. He did not have a driver’s license and was behind the wheel of a friend’s car, driving foolishly and recklessly in a parking garage, before losing control and hitting a pedestrian. He was also convicted of leaving the scene, which was an aggravating factor not present here. The trial judge accepted that the offender was deeply remorseful and determined to change his life. I consider this 7-month sentence to be somewhat off the usual range, perhaps because of the unusual nature of the driving and perhaps because of the failure to consider the increased maximum sentence when determining the range. I also note that the offender was young and pleaded guilty, which are mitigating factors that do not apply here.

[60] In the R. v. Linton case, the offender was sentenced in the OCJ to 2 years less a day to be served conditionally in the community but with strict house-arrest type terms.[^27] He was 27 years old with no prior criminal or driving record. On a two-lane highway with a 70 kph limit, he pulled out to pass a line of cars ahead of him while on a curve in the road, when it was not safe to do so. He reached a speed of 100 kph and collided with an oncoming car he had not seen. The driver of that car was killed, and her two sons (aged 20 and 18) sustained crippling and permanent injuries. Mr. Linton was also seriously injured. He had no memory of the collision or what led up to it. He therefore could not plead guilty but did not contest the facts. The trial judge referred to this as a brief uncontested trial that was “in essence the equivalent of a guilty plea.”[^28] In addition to his physical injuries, Mr. Linton lost his job as a mechanic and his fiancée ended their engagement. He would never be able to work as a mechanic again due to his injuries. The trial judge treated him as a “relatively youthful” first offender and noted that the offender was deeply remorseful.[^29] Although the consequences of Mr. Linton’s offence were worse than in the case before me, the nature of his dangerous driving was less serious. He also had the mitigating effect of his own injuries, his relative youth, and what was in essence a guilty plea. In my view, a harsher sentence would be required for Mr. Georgopoulos.

[61] The case cited by the defence which is closest to the circumstances here is R. v. Beedawia, in which a 27-year-old offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing the death of a four-year-old and serious injuries to the child’s mother, and sentenced to a conditional sentence of 2 years less a day followed by 3 years’ probation.[^30] The offender was driving a large commercial vehicle, which was an aggravating factor. However, he was deeply remorseful, had no prior driving or criminal record, and many people filed testimonials to his prior good character. Also, if sentenced to 2 years or more, he would face deportation, which was a factor taken into account by the trial judge. The conduct that was found to constitute dangerous driving was at the extreme low end of the scale. Mr. Beedawia was driving at the speed limit, although it was somewhat foggy and dark. He did not notice a stop sign, or the earlier signs that there was a stop sign ahead, and drove into an intersection striking an approaching vehicle. His conduct was not deliberate, and there was no element of showing off or stunt driving. He was tired and momentarily distracted. That is a far cry from the deliberate and reckless conduct exhibited by Mr. Georgopoulos. Also, Mr. Beedawia had the mitigating effect of being relatively youthful. On the other hand, a child was killed and Mr. Beedawia was driving a commercial vehicle. The cases are close when the aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against each other, but I consider Mr. Georgopoulos to be deserving of somewhat harsher punishment.

Crown Cases

[62] The Crown relied on the following sentencing cases as being comparable to the case before me:

R. v. McCool, 2024 ONCA 457.

R. v. Kalyan Trivedi, 2024 ONSC 3936.

R. v. Refaeh, 2024 ONSC 1604.

R. v. Berto, 2018 ONSC 6747.

R. v. Obermok, 2023 ONCJ 401.

R. v. Skardiute, 2023 ONCJ 10.

[63] In R. v. McCool the OCJ trial judge convicted the offender of dangerous driving and flight from police and sentenced her to 6 months in custody to be followed by 18-months’ probation and a 5-year driving prohibition.[^31] The offender was 36 years old and had a long criminal record (including a prior conviction for flight from police and several offences rooted in defying authority). She also had a driving record that included eight convictions for driving while suspended and at the time of the offences in question was again driving while suspended and also without insurance. When a police officer ordered her out of the car, she refused to comply and led police on a ten-minute high-speed chase, which culminated only when she drove into a ditch. The Crown had sought a sentence of 2 ½ years in custody, whereas defence counsel argued for either a 90-day intermittent sentence or a 12 to 24-month conditional sentence. The Crown appealed from the sentence imposed. The Court of Appeal found several errors in principle by the sentencing judge and set aside the sentence as unfit. The Court of Appeal then substituted the sentence they considered appropriate, which was an additional 18 months less a day in custody, given that the earlier 6-month sentence had already been served by the time the appeal was heard. This had the effect of keeping the offender in the provincial reformatory system, rather than sending her to the penitentiary. However, Fairburn J.A. specifically held that the Crown’s submission of 2 ½ years “would have been acceptable at the time of sentencing.”[^32]

[64] Comparing McCool to the circumstances in this case, the criminal record and driving record of Ms. McCool were aggravating, as was her flight from police. However, the only person injured was one officer who merely had bruising to one arm. The extent of the injuries to Ms. Backer is more aggravating.

[65] The Crown also relied upon my recent sentencing decision in R. v. Trivedi, in which I sentenced the 31-year-old offender to a global sentence of 5 years for one count of dangerous driving causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.[^33] I allocated the global sentence as 5 years for the “causing death” count and 3 years concurrent for the “causing bodily harm” count. Mr. Trivedi left the scene of the collision, which I considered to be an aggravating factor. However, the nature of the driving was similar. Like Mr. Georgopoulos, Mr. Trivedi had numerous glowing letters of support from friends, co-workers, and members of the community. Unlike Mr. Georgopoulos, Mr. Trivedi pleaded guilty to the charges against him. He also had an egregious driving record, which distinguishes him from Mr. Georgopoulos. The combination of the bad driving record and leaving the scene of the collision put Mr. Trivedi in a more blameworthy position than Mr. Georgopoulos, notwithstanding the similar nature of their crimes.

[66] The accused in R. v. Refaeh was engaged in a prolonged high-speed road race with another vehicle on downtown streets with other vehicles, pedestrians, and cyclists in the area.[^34] One person was badly injured when the other vehicle in the race was involved in a collision during the race. Mr. Refaeh drove away. Mr. Refaeh was 19 years old at the time and over the previous two years had amassed a driving record that included six speeding tickets. Apart from the driving record, he had led an exemplary life and had many letters of support similar to those of Mr. Georgopoulos. The trial judge held that the Crown’s position of 2 ½ to 3 years in prison did not give adequate weight to the mitigating factors of youth and the lack of a criminal record. However, he also held that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the aggravating factors. He sentenced Mr. Refaeh to 12 months for the dangerous driving and a further 3 months for leaving the scene. Mr. Georgopoulos did not have a bad driving record, and his actual driving was not quite as egregious, but he also did not have youth as a mitigating factor.

[67] In R. v. Berto, after a trial before a jury in the Superior Court, an 18-year-old was sentenced to 18 months for dangerous driving and an additional 6 months consecutive for leaving the scene.[^35] He had been involved in a dispute with a number of people in the parking lot outside a bar. When leaving, he deliberately drove his vehicle at a high speed towards a group of people standing together, with the intent of scaring or intimidating them. However, he hit one of them causing serious and long-lasting physical injuries. The Crown sought a sentence of between 2 and 3 years for the dangerous driving. The trial judge accepted that the Crown’s proposed sentence was “reasonable and within range,” but concluded that it did not adequately reflect the mitigating factors.[^36] Mr. Berto was 18 years old, and had no criminal or driving record. He had been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder as a young child, which continued into his teens. He was assessed at the time of sentencing as having Social Anxiety Disorder and Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood. He presented with “significant depression likely associated with guilt and remorse” and was functioning in a “very low range of cognitive ability.”[^37] Notwithstanding the imposition of a sentence that was under 2 years, the trial judge rejected a conditional sentence as being inadequate to address the goals of deterrence and denunciation. Comparing the Berto circumstances to the one before me, I note that the trial judge endorsed a sentence between 2 and 3 years as being reasonable and only went below that because of compelling mitigating factors. Apart from the absence of a record, those factors do not apply to Mr. Georgopoulos.

[68] In R. v. Obermok, the 56-year-old offender was sentenced by an OCJ judge to 5 years in prison for one count of dangerous driving causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.[^38] The reasons of the sentencing deal only with the global sentence, and I have no way of knowing how much of that sentence was attributable to the count involving bodily harm. The offender was driving at a speed of 105 kph on a county road, which the trial judge described as “excessive”, and drove straight through a stop sign at an intersection with a highway.[^39] Cars on the highway had no stop sign. Mr. Obermok’s vehicle collided with a car driving past on the highway. The driver was severely injured. Her two-year-old child, who was securely strapped into a car seat in the rear, was killed. Mr. Obermok also sustained severe permanent injuries. The sentencing judge noted Mr. Obermok had a history of alcohol abuse and had been drinking at the time of the collision, which he found to be an aggravating factor. However, as of the time of sentencing, Mr. Obermok had no criminal record apart from one entry for 40 years earlier. Mr. Obermok was deeply remorseful and expressed his intention to plead guilty at an early stage. He maintained that position even after the Crown resiled from an earlier agreed upon joint position on sentence and announced its intention to seek a much higher sentence. Mr. Obermok was found to have had a difficult childhood and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, a major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder, and cervical fractures at C-1 and C-2 that had been fused but were likely to cause problems in the future.

[69] Comparing the circumstances in Obermok to the case before me, the obvious difference is that the 5-year sentence was for dangerous driving causing death. Mr. Obermok was found to have been under the influence of alcohol, which was considered aggravating. However, the nature of his driving was a momentary lapse in attention, and was far less serious than the deliberately risky conduct undertaken by Mr. Georgopoulos for the sole purpose of showing off his expensive car. Further, Mr. Obermok was seriously injured himself, was deeply remorseful, took full responsibility for the offence, and pleaded guilty. The same cannot be said for Mr. Georgopoulos. That is not to say that I consider Mr. Georgopoulos to be deserving of a 5-year sentence given that there is only one victim here and she was not killed. However, given the nature of the conduct and the dire consequences for Ms. Backer, the appropriate range for his sentence, in my view, is not that much less.

[70] The offender in R. v. Skardiute[^40] was 25-years-old. She had been at the beach with her husband and their two children (aged eight and two). Her husband was too intoxicated to drive home, so she decided to drive, even though she did not have a valid driver’s license. She attempted to pass a line of cars at a spot where there were double solid lines between the north and south lanes, meaning that passing was prohibited. In the course of passing these cars, she reached a speed of 140 kph in an 80 kph zone and as she crested a blind hill, collided with a car in the oncoming lane driving at approximately the speed limit. The driver of the other car was 22 years old and was described as having “horrific life-threatening injuries.”[^41] Ms. Skardiute had a broken leg, one child had a broken hand, and the other child had minor injuries. Her husband was quite seriously hurt, largely because he was not wearing a seat belt, but he had made a full recovery by the time of sentencing. Ms. Skardiute had no record and a blameless past. Since the offence, she had undertaken therapy and was doing volunteer work with a food bank. She had two young children for whom she was the primary caregiver. She immediately accepted responsibility, was remorseful, and intended to plead guilty. The Crown sought a sentence of 15 to 18 months. The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 15 months, but held that due to the importance of deterrence and denunciation, a conditional sentence was not appropriate, notwithstanding the impact this would have by taking a mother away from her young children. Mr. Georgopoulos’ offending conduct is worse. He does not have the mitigating effect of a relatively young age, nor did he plead guilty.

I. CONCLUSION

[71] Balancing all these various factors and determining the appropriate sentence for any given offender is one of the most difficult tasks facing any trial judge. I am strongly of the view that a conditional sentence is completely inappropriate in all the circumstances here. A jail sentence is required to address the principles of deterrence and denunciation. However, it is not easy to determine the length of the appropriate sentence. For me, the most aggravating factor is the extreme disregard for the safety of others and the sense of arrogance and entitlement that accompanied this highly dangerous conduct. I am also concerned about what can be done to curb this kind of driving, which is such a threat to the safety of the community. That is why I consider the principles of denunciation and deterrence to be foremost in this exercise. Drivers of motor vehicles need to know that this kind of conduct is criminal, will not be tolerated, and will be met with jail time, not just a speeding ticket. I find the sentencing range proposed by the Crown to be fair and reasonable and in accordance with the principles of sentencing, including the principle of parity. I am therefore imposing a sentence of two and a half years in jail for this offence.

[72] A significant license suspension is also appropriate. I note that the victim of this accident, a former paramedic, will never drive again as a result of the injuries she sustained. That said, the ten-year driving ban sought by the Crown is at the high end of driving prohibitions for these kinds of offences. In my view a six-year driving ban is appropriate, to commence upon Mr. Georgopoulos’ release from prison. In effect, this is a ban of up to eight and a half years. I am not deducting anything for the driving prohibition while on bail. It was not an onerous condition in all the circumstances.

MOLLOY J.

Released: October 29, 2024

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-70000447-0000

DATE: 20241029

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

JASON GEORGOPOULOS

Defendant/Applicant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Molloy J.

Released: October 29, 2024

[^1]: R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 718 [Criminal Code]. [^2]: Ibid, s. 718 (a) - (f). [^3]: Ibid, s. 718.1. [^4]: Ibid, s. 718.2(a). [^5]: Ibid, s. 718.2(b). [^6]: Ibid, s. 718.2 (d) and (e). [^7]: R. v. Bernshaw, 1995 150 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 254, at para. 16. [^8]: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (impaired driving causing death and other matters), S.C. 2000, c. 25. [^9]: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 7 [Lacasse]. [^10]: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2018, c. 21, Preamble. [^11]: Ibid, s. 320.12. [^12]: R. v. Robertson, 2022 ONCJ 240, 2022 CarswellOnt 7117. [^13]: Ibid, at para. 107. [^14]: Ibid, at para. 117. [^15]: R. v. Yogeswaran, 2021 ONSC 5920, 2021 CarswellOnt 12438, at para. 67. [^16]: R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 2962, 2024 CarswellOnt 8234, at paras. 7-32 and 59-78. [^17]: Ibid, at paras. 41-46 and 51-58. [^18]: Lacasse, supra note 9, at para. 73. [^19]: R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, 294 O.A.C. 261, at paras. 33 and 45. [^20]: R. v. Currie, 2018 ONCA 218, 2018 CarswellOnt 3244, at para. 12. [^21]: R. v. Coholic, 2019 ONCJ 42, 2019 CarswellOnt 1231 [Coholic]. [^22]: R. v. Whalen, [2018] O.J. No. 2061 (C.J.). [^23]: R. v. Markozashvili, 2010 ONCA 52, [2010] O.J. No. 209. [^24]: R. v. Ryazanov, 2008 ONCA 667, [2008] O.J. No. 3816. [^25]: R. v. Creft, 2022 ONCJ 572, [2022] O.J. No. 5481 [Creft]. [^26]: Ibid, at paras. 16-18. [^27]: R. v. Linton, 2022 ONCJ 197, [2022] O.J. No. 2013. [^28]: Ibid, at para. 1. [^29]: Ibid, at para. 16. [^30]: R. v. Beedawia, 2024 ONSC 3247, [2024] O.J. No. 1570. [^31]: R. v. McCool, 2024 ONCA 457, 2024 CarswellOnt 8340 [McCool]. [^32]: Ibid, at para. 55. [^33]: R. v. Trivedi, 2024 ONSC 3936, 2024 CarswellOnt 10361. [^34]: R. v. Refaeh, 2024 ONSC 1604, 2024 CarswellOnt 3800. [^35]: R. v. Berto, 2018 ONSC 6747, 2018 CarswellOnt 18996 [Berto]. [^36]: Ibid, at para. 133. [^37]: Ibid, at paras. 102 and 104. [^38]: R. v. Obermok, 2023 ONCJ 401, 2023 CarswellOnt 14511 [Obermok]. [^39]: Ibid, at para. 13. [^40]: R. v. Skardiute, 2023 ONCJ 10, 2023 CarswellOnt 190. [^41]: Ibid, at para. 7.