Indictment No. CR-23-545
Superior Court of Justice
His Majesty the King v. Cyrus Jaison
Excerpt of Proceedings (Reasons for Sentence)
Before Justice James Stribopoulos
April 30, 2025, Brampton, Ontario
Appearances
- M. Otim, Counsel for the Crown
- H.J. Kalina, Counsel for Cyrus Jaison
Reasons for Sentence
Mr. Jaison pleaded guilty to charges of causing bodily harm while driving with excess blood-alcohol and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.
On the early evening of September 4, 2022, Mr. Jaison was driving his car at nearly 200 kilometres an hour when he drove into the back of Gina Mehta's vehicle. Subsequent breath testing determined that his blood alcohol concentration within two hours of the collision was 96 milligrams and 89 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.
The collision resulted in $60,000 worth of damage to Mr. Jaison's vehicle and $40,000 in damage to Ms. Mehta's vehicle. More importantly, Ms. Mehta sustained serious head trauma in the accident and was transported to Sunnybrook Hospital, where she remained hospitalized for seven days.
Ms. Mehta required 12 sutures to close a 15-centimetre laceration to the side of her head, which has left her with a 5-inch scar. Even more significant has been the brain injury she sustained from the trauma to her head.
Ms. Mehta's brain injury has affected her short-term memory and changed her personality, making her irritable and easily frustrated. As a result, she has experienced a sense of isolation and depression. Additionally, her ongoing health challenges have resulted in her driver's licence being subject to a medical suspension, further undermining her independence. Ms. Mehta has been unable to work since she was injured, and it is uncertain whether she will ever be able to do so again.
Even though the collision occurred in September 2022, Ms. Mehta's recovery remains ongoing. To manage her symptoms, she is required to take medication, and ongoing medical and therapeutic appointments will continue into the indefinite future. At this point, it remains unknown whether she will ever make a full recovery from her injuries.
Victim impact statements from Ms. Mehta, her husband, and her daughter attest to the profound and life-altering consequences experienced by all of them because of Mr. Jaison's offences. Since the accident, Ms. Mehta's husband and daughter have essentially put their lives on hold to become Ms. Mehta's primary caregivers. In short, Mr. Jaison's actions have forever altered their lives.
Mr. Jaison was only 19 years old at the time of his offences. He is now 22. Mr. Jaison was born in Toronto, the youngest of two siblings.
Although Mr. Jaison's upbringing was strict, there is no suggestion that his parents were anything but loving and nurturing toward him. Thankfully, his parents and his sister have stood by him since he was arrested and charged, and there is every indication that he will benefit from their continued love and support into the future.
Mr. Jaison does not have a criminal record. Except for the current offences, by all accounts, Mr. Jaison has led an exemplary life. While in high school, he participated in sports, social clubs, and student associations, and graduated on the honour roll.
At age 16, he enrolled in a co-op program with the Canadian Forces. He worked with the Canadian Forces during his summer breaks from school after that.
After graduating high school, Mr. Jaison attended Brock University in St. Catharines to study business administration. At 19, he joined the Canadian Forces as a reservist. Mr. Jaison completed three years of a Bachelor of Business Administration program at Brock.
On the date of his offences, Mr. Jaison was returning to his parents' home from St. Catharines. The night before, he had been drinking, and he drank some more that day before making his fateful decision to drive home despite being intoxicated.
After his arrest and charges, Mr. Jaison took a leave from his university studies to join the Canadian Forces full-time. He was eventually promoted to the rank of corporal and deployed to Jordan. Unfortunately, due to a seizure (I note, parenthetically, that he has struggled with recurring seizures since his early teens), he was returned to Canada to undergo medical testing. He is currently on medical leave from the Canadian Forces, and efforts remain ongoing to ascertain what is causing his seizures.
Mr. Jaison does not have any substance abuse issues. He has only tried cannabis once, and only began drinking alcohol after he turned 19. By all accounts, he only drank occasionally at social events. Nevertheless, since the collision, to his credit, he has entirely abstained from drinking alcohol.
The various character references filed on sentencing uniformly describe Mr. Jaison very favourably, commenting on his intelligence, inquisitiveness, empathy, generosity, kindness, integrity, good nature, maturity, strong work ethic, and professionalism.
Consistent with the character traits described by those who know him, Mr. Jaison is extraordinarily remorseful for his offences and the harm he has caused Ms. Mehta and her family. His decision to plead guilty reflects that, as do his comments to the court at the end of the sentencing hearing. His remarks, delivered through sobs and tears, leave no doubt that Mr. Jaison appreciates the gravity of his crimes and takes full responsibility for them and the harm he has caused Ms. Mehta and her family.
Regarding the appropriate sentence, the parties agree that the court should prohibit Mr. Jaison from driving for five years, place him on probation, and make a DNA order. However, they differ on the duration and form of the custodial sentence the court should impose.
As an aside, I note that a DNA order is unavailable given that Mr. Jaison's offences are neither primary nor secondary designated offences under section 487.04 of the Criminal Code.
For the Crown, Mr. Sarantis submitted that the gravity of Mr. Jaison's offences reflected by the speed at which he was travelling before the collision and the profound and permanent injuries suffered by Ms. Mehta should result in a sentence of two years imprisonment.
In contrast, on behalf of Mr. Jaison, emphasizing the mitigating factors, Mr. Kalina submits the court should impose an 18-month conditional sentence.
Sentencing is discretionary by nature. There is no set formula that judges can follow to decide the appropriate sentence. Instead, judges must consider the purpose and objectives of sentencing, and be mindful of the governing sentencing principles, especially the need to impose a proportionate sentence. Against that backdrop, and after accounting for the aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing judge must fashion a just and appropriate sentence.
Sentencing judges must remember the fundamental purpose of sentencing, which Parliament has identified as protecting society and contributing "to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society": Criminal Code, section 718.
Achieving that purpose requires the court to impose "just sanctions" that reflect one or more traditional sentencing objectives: see Criminal Code section 718. These include denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders from society, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community: see subsections 718(a) through (f).
Ultimately, the court must respect the fundamental principle of sentencing: that any sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender": Criminal Code section 718.1. In other words, the sentence must fit both the seriousness of the crime and the offender's level of moral blameworthiness in its commission; R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, paras 36-37; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, paras 40-43.
The principle of parity is an essential consideration at arriving at a proportionate sentence. Proportionality is a function of the circumstances of the offence and offender compared to sentences previously imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. As the Supreme Court has explained, a sentencing judge must reconcile individualization and parity to achieve a proportionate sentence: see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para 53, citing Criminal Code subsections 718.2(a) and (b). However, they do not operate in tension: "parity is an expression of proportionality": R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, para 32; see also at paras 30-33 more generally; see also R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, para 51.
Sentencing youthful first offenders such as Mr. Jaison involves unique considerations. Recently, in R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, the Court of Appeal made some general observations about the sentencing of youthful first offenders before reiterating certain well established sentencing principles that apply when doing so.
By way of general observation, the Court of Appeal in Habib noted that sentences imposed on youthful first offenders must hold them accountable, especially for serious offences like those committed by Mr. Jaison: see Habib, para 30. In such cases, the objectives of denunciation and deterrence (general and specific) remain essential: see Habib, para 30. As a result, a crime's seriousness and public safety concerns may necessitate significant prison terms even for youthful first offenders. Practically speaking, it may not always be feasible for these offenders to avoid incarceration, for sentencing judges to impose only the shortest prison terms, or a sentence at the lowest end of the applicable range: see Habib, para 30.
With the purpose, objectives, and principles of sentencing summarized, these reasons turn next to the sentencing ranges for the offences Mr. Jaison committed.
The problem of impaired drivers killing or injuring innocent members of the public has sadly long been with us. Sentencing for crimes of that nature has been the subject of extensive guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that where an impaired driver has caused death or bodily harm"courts from various parts of the country have held that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation must be emphasized in order to convey society's condemnation": Lacasse, para 5.
That is the very same message that our Court of Appeal has repeated time and time again: see R. v. McVeigh, pp. 150-151; R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488, paras 74-75; R. v. Junkert, 2010 ONCA 549, paras 46-47.
The emphasis in sentencing for impaired driving causing bodily harm on the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation has significant implications for someone like Mr. Jaison. As explained, ordinarily, when sentencing a youthful first offender, the focus would be on specific deterrence and rehabilitation, which would usually counsel against the imposition of a custodial sentence: see Habib, para 31.
However, given the very serious nature of the offence of impaired driving causing bodily harm and the resulting need for sentences that prioritize general deterrence and denunciation, a sentencing judge's options narrow considerably. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Lacasse, para 6:
While it is normal for trial judges to consider sentences other than imprisonment in appropriate cases, in the instant case, as in all cases in which general or specific deterrence and denunciation must be emphasized, the courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and law‑abiding society.
There is a wide range of sentences for impaired driving causing bodily harm. At the low end are sentences in the intermittent range: see R. v. Sinnarasa; R. v. Rooplal, 2009 ONCJ 613. In contrast, high reformatory or lower penitentiary sentences tend to mark the upper boundary of the range: see R. v. LaForme, 2014 ONCA 367 (18 months); R. v. Bulland, 2020 ONCA 318 (two years); R. v. Febbo, 2024 ONCA 267, affirming 2023 ONCJ 162 (33 months); R. v. Gomes, 2022 ONCA 247 (three years).
Similarly, the Court of Appeal has recognized that sentences for dangerous driving causing bodily harm must also prioritize the objectives of denunciation and deterrence: see R. v. Goulet, 2009 ONCA 786, para 3. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly observed that sentences for dangerous driving causing bodily harm range between a conditional sentence and two years less a day of imprisonment, with longer sentences in some cases: see R. v. Van Puyenbroek, 2007 ONCA 824, para 59; R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 47, para 43; R. v. Currie, 2018 ONCA 218, para 15; R. v. Markos, 2019 ONCA 80, para 26.
Having reviewed the sentencing ranges for Mr. Jaison's offences, it deserves mention that sentencing ranges are "guidelines rather than hard and fast rules": Nasogaluak, para 44. They help structure a sentencing judge's exercise of their discretion because they reflect the application of the objectives and principles of sentencing when it comes to sentencing for a particular offence: see Lacasse, para 57. Nevertheless, a sentencing judge may determine that a sentence below or above the established sentencing range is necessary, given that the "determination of a just and appropriate sentence is a highly individualized exercise that goes beyond a purely mathematical calculation": Lacasse, para 58; see also Nasogaluak, para 44.
In determining the appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender: see Criminal Code section 718.2(a). An inventory of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the offence and the offender is essential to evaluating the offence's gravity and the offender's degree of responsibility in its commission. They push the sentence up or down the scale of appropriate sentences within the established sentencing range: see Nasogaluak, para 43.
In this case, one significant aggravating factor bears directly upon the gravity of both offences – the devastating and life-altering consequences of Mr. Jaison's offences on Ms. Mehta and her family. Tragically, the injuries she suffered, especially her brain injury, have profoundly changed the course of Ms. Mehta's life and that of her husband and daughter.
At the same time, there are several mitigating factors. First and foremost, there is Mr. Jaison's youth. At the time of his offences, he was only 19 years old. An offender's youth is a significant mitigating factor when sentencing. Unlike older adults"young adults are more impulsive, emotionally volatile, and susceptible to negative influences and bad judgment", which "can make them less blameworthy than more mature adults": Habib, para 35.
Second, Mr. Jaison pleaded guilty to the offences, thereby sparing the administration of justice the time and expense of a criminal trial and, even more importantly, Ms. Mehta from undergoing the ordeal of testifying. As a result, Mr. Jaison's guilty plea is a significant mitigating factor.
Third, Mr. Jaison does not have a criminal record; he is a first offender. The absence of a prior criminal record is also a mitigating factor when sentencing: see R. v. Dobi, para 28.
Fourth, throughout his life, and since he committed his offences, Mr. Jaison has enjoyed the love and support of his parents and sister. Family support is a mitigating factor because it bodes well for an offender's eventual reintegration into the community and potential for rehabilitation.
Finally, there is Mr. Jaison's remorse. His guilty pleas and, even more significantly, his comments to the court at the end of the sentencing hearing convince me that Mr. Jaison fully appreciates the gravity of the harm he has caused to Ms. Mehta and her family and accepts full responsibility for his actions. His genuine remorse constitutes a mitigating factor: see R. v. Reeves, 2020 ONCA 381, para 11.
Having canvassed the principles and objectives of sentencing, the applicable sentencing ranges, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case, I turn to consider the appropriate sentence.
As noted, respecting the principle of parity is essential to arriving at a proportionate sentence. In that regard, each of the cases relied upon by the Crown, all of which involve victims who sustained catastrophic injuries, either had aggravating factors not present in this case or lack the same significant mitigating factors.
In Bulland, for example, the accused did not plead guilty, and there is no suggestion that he was youthful. The same was true in Gomes, which also involved two victims, not one. Although the offender in Febbo pleaded guilty and did not have a criminal record, he was 49 and also pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of a collision, a separate and serious offence. Finally, in R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 5922, a dangerous driving causing bodily harm case, the offender was 42 and sentenced after trial.
Similarly, most of the cases relied upon by defence counsel are not analogous. Although each involved driving offences that caused serious injuries or death, only one, R. v. Ferguson-Kellum, 2023 ONCJ 119, involved impaired driving. And, in that case, there was no suggestion that the offender's bad driving met the threshold of dangerous driving. Further, although the victim's physical injuries were most serious, they pale by comparison to the long-term and life-altering consequences that will accompany the brain injury that Ms. Mehta suffered.
As often happens, a perfectly analogous sentencing precedent has proven elusive.
Nevertheless, after considering the principles and objectives of sentencing, the sentencing ranges for Mr. Jaison's offences, the significant aggravating factor of Ms. Mehta's life-altering brain injury, and the numerous and significant mitigating factors, especially Mr. Jaison being a very youthful first offender, his guilty pleas, and the fact that he is extraordinarily remorseful, I believe the shortest possible sentence still capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence in this case would be 16 months of imprisonment.
Given that conclusion, the court must consider the appropriateness of imposing a conditional sentence. The circumstances of this case satisfy four of the preconditions for imposing such a sentence.
First, as explained, a sentence of less than two years of imprisonment is appropriate: see Criminal Code, section 742.1; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, paras 49-61.
Second, given that Mr. Jaison does not have a criminal record, has conducted himself pro-socially since being charged, has considerable insight into his offences, is genuinely remorseful, and has abstained from consuming intoxicants since the collision, I am more than satisfied that permitting him to serve a conditional sentence would not endanger the safety of the community: see Criminal Code, section 742.1(a); Proulx, paras 69-74.
Third, neither of Mr. Jaison's offences is punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, which would preclude a conditional sentence: see Criminal Code, section 742.1(b).
Fourth, neither of Mr. Jaison's offences is amongst the relatively few crimes for which a conditional sentence is unavailable: see Criminal Code, subsections 742.1(c) and (d).
The final precondition for the court to order a conditional sentence is that it be satisfied that such a sentence "would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing": Criminal Code, section 742.1(a).
In general, conditional sentences are available even in cases like this, where the pre-eminent sentencing objectives are denunciation and deterrence, and there are aggravating circumstances.
Although in Proulx, the Supreme Court recognized that conditional sentences are more effective than incarceration at achieving rehabilitation, reparations to victims and the community, and promoting a sense of responsibility, it also acknowledged that they are "a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence": at paragraph 22. That is because conditional sentences carry a significant stigma when they include punitive conditions, like house arrest: see Proulx, paras 36, 105.
Therefore, if fashioned appropriately, the Supreme Court acknowledged that conditional sentences provide "a significant amount of denunciation" (paragraph 102) and "significant deterrence" (paragraph 107).
Similarly, even in cases that involve aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, Proulx instructed that conditional sentences remain available: at paragraph 115.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Proulx also cautioned that in some cases the amount of deterrence and denunciation provided by a conditional sentence could prove insufficient. When that is the case, the only suitable way to achieve those sentencing objectives will be through incarceration: at paragraph 106.
Unfortunately for Mr. Jaison, this is such a case. In coming to that conclusion, I find the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Biancofiore, paras 18-31, instructive. There are strong parallels between the circumstances of that case and this one.
Mr. Biancofiore was found guilty of drinking and driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. At the time of his offences, Mr. Biancofiore was 23 years old. He drove his brother's vehicle, which he had taken without consent, at nearly twice the speed limit before leaving the roadway and crashing into a pole, ejecting two of his passengers from the vehicle. One of them suffered permanent serious injuries that had a devastating impact on her and her family.
Unlike Mr. Jaison, Mr. Biancofiore had a prior conviction for mischief and was found guilty after trial. Mr. Biancofiore was remorseful and had a positive work history. The trial judge had imposed an 18-month conditional sentence. After concluding that the trial judge committed an error in principle, the court went on to impose what it considered be the appropriate sentence.
Writing for the court, Justice Rosenberg noted the need for sentences that prioritize the objectives of general deterrence and denunciation when sentencing offenders for drinking and driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm: see Biancofiore, paras 18-28.
Although Justice Rosenberg noted that conditional sentences are not off-limits for such offences, he reasoned, at paragraph 29:
...that the paramount need to impose a sentence that adequately reflects the objective of general deterrence combined with the need for denunciation of this particular conduct leads me to conclude that a conditional sentence is not a fit disposition in this case.
Ultimately, Justice Rosenberg explained that a sentence of incarceration rather than a conditional sentence would be more consistent with the need for a proportionate sentence, given Mr. Biancofiore's moral culpability was high "particularly having regard to the intentional risk-taking manifested in the manner of driving and the consequential harm caused.": Biancofiore, para 31.
After considering that by the time of the appeal, Mr. Biancofiore had already served eight and a half months of his conditional sentence and had completed 20 hours of community service, the court imposed a sentence of 14 months incarceration concurrent on both charges.
To be sure, there are more significant mitigating factors in this case than in Biancofiore. Mr. Jaison pleaded guilty and does not have a prior criminal record. Nevertheless, the gravity of Mr. Jaison's offences, including the combination of his travelling nearly 200 kilometres an hour at the time of the collision and the permanent serious injuries suffered by Ms. Mehta and the resulting devastating impact on her and her family, convince me that a conditional sentence would be inadequate to the task of denouncing Mr. Jaison's offences and deterring others from committing such crimes in future. Nor would such a sentence be proportionate to the gravity of Mr. Jaison's offences and his degree of responsibility in their commission.
As a result, a conditional sentence would not be appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, for Mr. Jaison's two offences, the court imposes a sentence of 16 months of imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently.
Given Mr. Jaison's circumstances, his rehabilitation is not a live concern. As a result, I see no need to require Mr. Jaison to comply with the terms of a probation order following his release from custody.
Lastly, Mr. Jaison shall have two years to pay the victim surcharges. Given that there are two indictable offences, they total $400.
Those are my reasons. I wish you well, Mr. Jaison.
Count 1?
M. OTIM: If that could be marked withdrawn, Your Honour.
THE COURT: Count 1 will be marked withdrawn. I didn't? Oh. I somehow omitted the driving prohibition. Thank you.
Additionally, effective from today's date, Mr. Jaison will be prohibited from operating a motor vehicle for a period of five years. Thank you, Madam Registrar.
Certification
FORM 3
ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT (SUBSECTION 5 (2))
Evidence Act
I,
Daniel El Otmani
(Name of authorized person)
certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of
R. v. JAISON, Cyrus
in the
Superior Court of Justice
(Name of case)
(Name of court)
held at
7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton, Ontario
(Court address)
taken from Recording No. 3199_407_20250430_084542__30_STRIBOJ.dcr, which has been certified in Form 1.
June 22, 2025
(Date)
(Signature of authorized person)
9022075153
(Authorized court transcriptionist’s identification number – if applicable)
Ontario, Canada.
(Province of signing)
A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate. This certification does not apply to the Reasons for Sentence which were judicially edited.