Jennifer Hodgins

The Union filed a policy grievance claiming that its bargaining rights extended to the PRESTO division of Metrolinx, arguing that PRESTO was functionally integrated into Metrolinx and that certain positions within PRESTO performed bargaining unit work.

The Employer maintained that the Union's bargaining rights were restricted to the GO Transit division, as explicitly stated in the collective agreement.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the grievance, finding that the collective agreement clearly restricted bargaining rights to GO Transit and that PRESTO existed as a legitimate, identifiable division without sufficient functional integration to extend the bargaining unit.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision declaring them 'related employers' under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The union had argued that the employer's use of independent contractors eroded bargaining rights.

The Divisional Court found the OLRB Vice Chair's decision unreasonable because it failed to consider the history of collective bargaining, the collective agreement, and letters of understanding regarding the employer's longstanding practice of contracting out work.

The court held that this failure led to a decontextualized analysis of the employer's control over the contractors.

The court set aside the OLRB decision and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing before a different Vice Chair.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability.

The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the application should be dismissed due to delay.

The Tribunal found that the application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

As the applicant failed to provide a good faith explanation for the delay, the Tribunal dismissed the application as untimely under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a policy grievance concerning the employer's amendment to its photo identification policy.

The amendment discontinued the practice of allowing non-management employees to bring an occasional visitor on transit vehicles without paying a fare.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable, as the plain wording did not require consideration of past practice.

The Court also found that the arbitrator reasonably concluded the employer's past practice did not give rise to an estoppel, as there was no representation by the employer that the practice would continue.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

One respondent also requested dismissal of the termination allegation under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing it was dealt with in a prior Employment Standards Act claim.

The Tribunal refused the s. 45.1 request because the ESA claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and did not deal with the substance of the allegations.

The Tribunal also refused the requests for a summary hearing and deferred the issue of delay to the hearing on the merits.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board arbitration award that ordered rectification of a collective agreement's recognition clause.

The Board found that exclusionary language regarding office and technical staff had been inserted by mistake.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for an arbitrator's application of the equitable doctrine of rectification is reasonableness.

The Court upheld the Board's decision to rectify the agreement by removing the mistakenly inserted language.

However, the Court found the Board's subsequent interpretation of the rectified clause and its order for the parties to draft new language to be unreasonable, and set aside that portion of the award.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to set aside a Registrar’s administrative dismissal of the action for delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test and that no palpable and overriding error was shown in the exercise of discretion.

The court also found the explanation for the very significant delay in bringing the motion after the administrative dismissal to be unsatisfactory.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.