Jessica Ann Fiore

The court considered whether Brian Buday was gifted a property by his late father, Paul Buday, despite the absence of formal transfer documentation.

The court reviewed the evidence of improvements made by Brian Buday, the intentions of Paul Buday, and the positions of other interested parties, including Glen Buday and government respondents with tax claims.

Applying the law of inter vivos gifts and the presumption of resulting trust, the court found that the property was indeed gifted to Brian Buday in 1989 and ordered that it be vested in his name.

The court dismissed Mijanur Rahman's application as frivolous under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The application sought orders reinstating and renewing various financial licenses and waiving renewal costs, but the court found that such relief was not available by application to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court held that the application lacked legal merit, was not properly brought under the cited rules or statutes, and would inevitably fail.

The decision clarifies the robust application of Rule 2.1 to prevent clearly unmeritorious proceedings from consuming judicial resources.

The court considered a motion under rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an application as frivolous and vexatious.

The registrar referred the matter to the judge following a request from counsel for FP Canada.

The court ordered that the applicant be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions before any dismissal, stayed the application pending the written hearing, and directed the registrar regarding service and filings.

The judge remained seized of the matter.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Finance's decision denying her relief from the Non-Resident Speculation Tax under s. 20 of the Land Transfer Tax Act.

The applicant missed the four-year deadline to obtain permanent residency by 10 days due to COVID-19 pandemic delays, which disqualified her from a $510,000 tax rebate.

The Divisional Court found the Minister's decision unreasonable because it failed to properly consider the pandemic as a 'special circumstance' that caused the delay.

The decision was quashed and remitted to the Minister for a fresh review.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate's decision upholding an arbitrator's rulings on interest and costs in an accident benefits dispute.

The applicant argued that interest on retroactive attendant care benefits should be calculated from an earlier date, and challenged the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the interest issue was squarely governed by the court's prior decision in Grigoroff, which held that interest runs from the date the retroactive claim form is filed.

The court also found the costs award was highly discretionary and the Delegate's decision to uphold it was reasonable.

The applicant, a First Nation person operating a tobacco distribution business on a reserve, sought judicial review of the Minister's direction requiring wholesalers to pre-collect provincial tobacco tax from her.

She argued this violated her tax exemption rights under section 87 of the Indian Act and the Tobacco Tax Act regulations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory exemption for 'exclusive use' does not apply to tobacco purchased for resale.

The court also held that the provincial pre-collection scheme is constitutional, does not conflict with the Indian Act under the paramountcy doctrine, and does not impair core federal jurisdiction under the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine.

Mary Aquino brought a motion for a garnishment hearing under Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary garnishment letters issued by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister had assessed Aquino for her common law spouse's pre-existing unpaid tax debt under the Retail Sales Tax Act (RSTA) and subsequently issued garnishment letters against her commissions and wages.

The court dismissed Aquino's motion, holding that Rule 60.08(16) does not apply to the Minister's garnishment letters issued under section 36 of the RSTA, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

The moving party, a newly established university, brought a motion for summary judgment in its appeal seeking a rebate of sales tax paid on construction.

The Minister of Finance had denied the rebate on the basis that the moving party was a 'university' under the relevant regulation, which excluded universities receiving provincial financial assistance.

The court found that during the rebate period, the moving party's authority to grant degrees came from Ministerial consent rather than an Act of the Assembly.

Therefore, it did not meet the strict statutory definition of a 'university' and was entitled to the rebate.

The Minister of Revenue appealed an order dismissing its motion to dismiss the respondent's tax appeal and granting a production order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the scope of the appeal under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

As the order was interlocutory, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant corporation appealed a decision of the Ministry of Revenue refusing to cancel deferred land transfer tax under s. 3(11) of the Land Transfer Tax Act.

The Ministry argued that registration of a development agreement constituted a conveyance or instrument evidencing the disposition of a beneficial interest in land, thereby triggering the tax.

The court held that the registered development agreement merely referenced the appellant as owner and did not identify the specific transfer of beneficial interest from the affiliated corporation.

As a result, it did not constitute an instrument evidencing the disposition under the statute.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister was directed to vacate the disallowance and return the funds.

A charitable foundation appealed a decision of the Minister of Revenue denying a refund of retail sales tax paid on prepared food products served at fundraising events where attendees paid a single ticket price.

The dispute concerned whether food provided at such events was supplied “without specific charge” under s. 12 of Regulation 1012 made under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

The court applied modern principles of statutory interpretation and concluded that the phrase requires a distinct charge for the food itself, not merely that food costs be embedded within a bundled event price.

Because the ticket price for the events did not itemize or separately allocate a charge for the prepared food products, the food was provided “without specific charge.” The foundation was therefore entitled to the exemption and the requested refund.

The appellant challenged an assessment under the Land Transfer Tax Act that included the value of nursing home licences in the “value of consideration” for land transfer tax purposes following the purchase of a licensed nursing home.

The appellant argued that the licences were personal property and their assignment was not a conveyance of land.

The court held that the statutory definition of “value of consideration” includes monetary benefits connected to the conveyance of land.

Because the licences were integral to the purchase and operation of the nursing home and formed part of the overall transaction, their value was sufficiently connected to the conveyance.

The assessment including the licence value in the taxable consideration was therefore upheld.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Revenue's decision denying their request for an extension of time to file Retail Sales Tax returns.

The applicants had been assessed for unpaid taxes and failed to file a Notice of Objection within the 180-day limitation period.

Seven years later, they requested an extension to file late returns.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it moot because the four-year limitation period for the Minister to reassess taxes had expired, meaning an extension would have no practical effect.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion because the applicants had failed to utilize the statutory remedies available to them.

The successful appellants sought costs following summary judgment motions in land transfer tax appeals.

They requested over $260,000 and argued that costs should also include work performed for additional related appeals and disputes that had been held in abeyance, as well as elevated costs based on a purported Rule 49 settlement offer.

The court declined to award costs for the additional appeals and related disputes because they were not before the court and there was no evidentiary basis to assess the work performed.

The court also held that the settlement proposal was not a valid Rule 49 offer because it addressed matters beyond the proceedings before the court and therefore did not justify elevated costs.

The parties were directed to attempt to agree on the remaining costs or provide further submissions limited to the four appeals heard.