David J. McGhee

Following a new trial where the plaintiff was successful in the main action and the third-party claim was dismissed, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in costs, noting the defendant's unreasonable failure to accept a pre-trial offer to settle.

The successful third party was awarded $15,081.60 in costs.

The court considered the defendant's status as a non-profit organization and its partial success in an earlier appeal when reducing the overall costs claimed.

The Ontario Football Conference (OFC) sued the Brampton Minor Football Association (BMFA) for unpaid fees incurred by a football club called the Bears.

The BMFA denied liability, arguing the Bears was a separate entity, and brought a third-party claim against its former president, Ian Smith, alleging he exceeded his authority in guaranteeing the debt.

The court held that the BMFA was liable for the debt based on the indoor management rule, as the OFC dealt in good faith with Smith and was entitled to assume he had authority.

The court dismissed the third-party claim against Smith, finding no evidence he agreed to be personally liable or breached his fiduciary duties, despite a perceived conflict of interest.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering it to pay $25,000 in unpaid fees to the respondent.

The appellant argued it was denied procedural fairness because the Deputy Judge failed to read its lengthy written closing submissions before rendering the decision, and that the reasons provided were insufficient.

The Divisional Court agreed on both grounds, finding a clear denial of procedural fairness and that the brief reasons provided were incapable of meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting of default entered against them.

The delay in defending the action was primarily attributed to their former counsel and the plaintiff's counsel's failure to respond to correspondence.

The court applied the test from Intact Insurance Company v. Kisel, finding that the defendants demonstrated a consistent intention to defend the action and that the plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the delay.

The motion was granted and the noting of default was set aside.

The respondents successfully appealed the lower court decision.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, fixing costs at $40,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The court found that the suit had the markings of a true SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) and did not apply the presumption in section 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act on appeal, but considered the nature of the suit in fixing costs.

The appellant, a major language services company, appealed the dismissal of its defamation action against the respondents under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondents had posted comments on an online bulletin board criticizing the appellant's business practices in the context of a federal election candidate's suitability for office.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the posts related to a matter of public interest and that the public interest in protecting freedom of expression outweighed the public interest in permitting the claim to proceed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and refused leave to appeal the costs award of $30,000 on a full indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's action due to outstanding costs awards.

The court stayed the action for six months, allowing the plaintiff time to satisfy the costs or obtain a judicial order varying them.

The court found the plaintiff's financial evidence insufficient but granted a final opportunity before allowing the defendants to renew their motion for dismissal.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend its statement of claim regarding a disputed gas supply contract, seeking to withdraw an allegation of forgery and instead plead misrepresentation and deceit.

The defendant opposed the amendment, arguing it raised a new cause of action that was statute-barred.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the fundamental issue remained the validity of the contract and the amendment did not constitute a new cause of action.

The court also noted that for limitation purposes, a new claim is commenced when the motion to amend is brought.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to add the defendant's wife as a party and assert allegations of fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent misrepresentation, and alter ego liability.

The defendant opposed, arguing lack of particulars and that some claims were statute-barred.

The court found the proposed claims were not statute-barred as the limitation period commenced upon discovery of new facts.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to amend due to insufficient particulars of the alleged fraud, but granted leave to amend the statement of claim upon providing the necessary details.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from a blog post made during a federal election.

The blog post criticized a political candidate's association with the plaintiff corporation.

The court found the expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to establish that its claim had substantial merit, that the defendants had no valid defence, or that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed with full indemnity costs awarded to the defendants.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring the respondent the legal and beneficial owner of 20% of the appellant company.

The appellants argued the respondent breached a trust agreement with his deceased father-in-law regarding a home purchase, which should block the share transfer.

The Divisional Court agreed with the application judge that the trust issue was irrelevant to the share ownership and that any claim under the trust agreement was statute-barred by limitation periods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration under the oppression remedy of the Business Corporations Act that he was the legal and beneficial owner of 20% of the shares in the respondent company.

The shares were previously owned by his deceased spouse, who died intestate.

The respondents refused to transfer the shares, alleging that the applicant and his deceased spouse had breached a trust agreement regarding a real estate transaction years earlier.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicant was absolutely entitled to inherit the shares under the Succession Law Reform Act, and that the alleged breach of trust was both unrelated to the share entitlement and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of a beneficiary of an estate, sought to secure an interest in a house bequeathed by the deceased.

The deceased had granted the beneficiary only a life interest in the house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of the claims, finding that the beneficiary had no proprietary interest in the house for the creditor to attach.

Furthermore, the Fraudulent Conveyances Act did not apply because the deceased was never indebted to the appellant.

The appeal and costs appeal were dismissed.

The plaintiff challenged a deceased testator's final will on grounds of lack of due execution, lack of knowledge and approval, lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and unjust enrichment arising from prior caregiving services allegedly exchanged for a promised house.

The court admitted the drafting solicitor's affidavit under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity and sufficient reliability despite the absence of cross-examination.

On the merits, the court held the will was duly executed, the testator had testamentary capacity and knowledge of its contents, and no undue influence or coercion was proven.

Although the court accepted that the plaintiff and his spouse had provided valuable care services and had been promised the property, it found no basis for a constructive or resulting trust and no evidentiary foundation for quantum meruit damages exceeding the $50,000 bequest already received.

Following an appeal and cross-appeals regarding new home warranty issues, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The homeowner was substantially successful overall, as Tarion lost on several policy points and the homeowner succeeded on issues relating to the kitchen floor and garage wall.

The court rejected the homeowner's claim for substantial indemnity costs and fixed partial indemnity costs at $6,500 plus disbursements, payable 90% by Tarion and 10% by the builder.

The appellants, home renovators, appealed the dismissal of their claim against the respondent home owners and the allowance of the home owners' counterclaim.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in placing the burden of obtaining building permits and licences on the contractor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the contract, scope and quality of work, extras, and the cost of remedial work were supported by the evidence, including the finding that the home owners were incorrectly told a permit was not necessary.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay compensation to the respondent for breach of fiduciary duty in a failed restaurant venture.

The trial judge found the appellant breached his duty by causing his solely owned corporation to enter into a secret lease agreement with the partnership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Partnership Act did not preclude the respondent from suing in his own right, the respondent had not elected an exclusive remedy, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding a breach of fiduciary duty or in the remedy awarded.

The Court also significantly reduced the respondent's costs claim, finding it excessive.

The appellant, a shareholder and resident in the respondent housing co-operative, appealed the dismissal of her claim to set aside levies of approximately $900.

She argued there was a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and a misapprehension of evidence regarding notice of a budget meeting.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conduct demonstrated patience and an attempt to assist an unrepresented party, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding on notice.

The appellant appealed an arbitration order that denied her further weekly income benefits and required her to pay half of the insurer's arbitration expenses.

The appellant argued she was denied a fair hearing due to the arbitrator's procedural rulings (dismissing an interpreter and refusing to consider a second accident), her counsel's incompetence, and the arbitrator's alleged bias stemming from frustration with her counsel.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the absence of an interpreter did not prejudice the appellant, the arbitrator correctly refused to hear the unmediated second accident claim, the Charter right to effective counsel does not apply to private economic disputes, and the arbitrator's frustration with counsel's delays did not amount to bias.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits until they were terminated by the insurer.

She applied for arbitration seeking ongoing weekly benefits under sections 13(1) and 13(8) of the Schedule.

The arbitrator found the applicant was not a credible witness, noting inconsistencies in her testimony and surveillance evidence showing her performing physical activities with relative ease.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant did not suffer a substantial inability to perform her essential tasks and dismissed the claim for weekly benefits, but awarded the applicant her arbitration expenses.