COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-1000030-0000
DATE: 20200930
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN and MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
– and –
SHAUN ROOTENBERG
Accused
Mitchell Flagg, for the Crown
Claudia Brabazon, Counsel for Non-Party, Ministry of the Attorney General
representing Ministry of the Solicitor-General
Bryan Badali, for the Accused
HEARD: February 10, 2020
B.A. Allen J.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON SENTENCING
BACKGROUND TO THE OFFENCES
[1] Shaun Rootenberg was arrested on June 6, 2017 and charged with one count of fraud over $5,000.00 in relation to the complainant, Victoria Smith. Following a judge-alone trial I convicted Mr. Rootenberg on May 6, 2019.
[2] Mr. Rootenberg’s relationship with Ms. Smith began when they connected on the internet dating website e-Harmony. They made their first contact on the website on July 29, 2013. By August 8th, they were communicating through their private email accounts. Mr. Rootenberg was vague in telling Ms. Smith about his employment background saying only that he was in management and finance. Ms. Smith was not aware of Mr. Rootenberg’s criminal past, that he had been previously imprisoned for fraud.
[3] Soon thereafter, Ms. Smith and Mr. Rootenberg went out on a date. Ms. Smith stated that after that date she felt they had developed a close and loving relationship. She felt it was a monogamous relationship. She was aware that Mr. Rootenberg was a divorced father of two sons. She had met his ex-wife and had grown close to the two sons.
[4] Mr. Rootenberg introduced Ms. Smith to his idea of an internet App which he called “Social Trivia” and described it as an internet game where contestants could win prizes by answering skill-testing questions about the products of sponsoring companies. He offered Ms. Smith an opportunity to invest in the Social Trivia idea and indicated she would receive dividends on her investment. Ms. Smith did not recall any misrepresentation Mr. Rootenberg made about the idea. He said it was a “great opportunity” and that he could make a place for her to invest. Ms. Smith understood that Social Trivia was an internet platform that required investments to get it off the ground. This was the beginning of Ms. Smith’s financial downfall.
[5] The Crown called other witnesses who testified about their efforts to get investor financing for Social Trivia including Myron Gottlieb, whom Mr. Rootenberg had met while serving his penitentiary term on his 2009 fraud conviction.
[6] Ms. Smith told Mr. Rootenberg that she was also interested in investing in real estate. Mr. Rootenberg suggested Ms. Smith invest in second mortgages with him because that type of investment could bring regular and stable returns. Ms. Smith was won over by Mr. Rootenberg’s enthusiasm for the idea and her romantic feelings for him. Ms. Smith agreed to invest in both of what she thought was the Social Trivia platform and second mortgages. This was the next financially fatal move Ms. Smith made.
[7] In September 2013, Ms. Smith gave Mr. Rootenberg a draft in the amount of $160,000.00 ostensibly as an investment in Social Trivia, and in October 2013, a draft in the amount of $435,000.00 ostensibly as an investment in second mortgages, for a total of $595,000.00.
[8] At trial I did not find the fraud was based on deceit or falsehood as provided under the Criminal Code. My view is that Mr. Rootenberg defrauded Ms. Smith on the basis of a third category, “other fraudulent means”, for employing her funds contrary to their agreement as to how the funds would be used. In the end, Ms. Smith received no interest in mortgages or any dividends from an investment in Social Trivia. As it turns out, an operating business never emerged. The cold reality was that Mr. Rootenberg dispersed the funds to himself, to friends and family members and to pay off loans for gambling debts.
[9] Mr. Rootenberg’s scam involved the use of multiple banking institutions. He used the TD account of a company he set up, “B-G Enterprises”, to funnel the ill-gotten funds. He also used Tangerine, BMO and DUCA Credit Union accounts to deposit and disperse funds.
[10] On October 22, 2013, the same day the second of Ms. Smith’s drafts was deposited, Mr. Rootenberg brazenly dispersed over $50,000.00 to a BMW dealership to purchase a BMW for himself. Ms. Smith spoke of the humiliation she felt when she learned it was her money that purchased the ostentatious BMW Mr. Rootenberg proudly drove her around in. On the same day another $50,000.00 was paid to an associate of Mr. Rootenberg from Ms. Smith’s money.
[11] Mr. Rootenberg made a further $50,000.00 payment from Ms. Smith’s funds to Jeffrey S. Watts in partial payment of a restitution order in the 2009 fraud conviction. Incidentally, in that fraud Mr. Rootenberg audaciously impersonated his brother, forged his signature and defrauded him and his wife of $1.8 million on a fraudulent mortgage. Adding to the unconscionability is that his brother and wife were magnanimously acting as his bail sureties at the time.
[12] Mr. Rootenberg made some payments to Ms. Smith that were referred to as “dividends” on her “mortgage investment”. He told her she would receive quarterly payments. She received five payments of about $6,000.00 each from May 2014 to June 2015 totalling $36,544.00 drawn on the Tangerine and DUCA accounts. It appears likely that those funds came from the money Mr. Rootenberg defrauded from Ms. Smith.
[13] The Crown takes the position that Mr. Rootenberg’s fraudulent scheme was sophisticated for the fact that he used various bank accounts to deposit and withdraw funds. The Crown relied on a decision of this court in R. v. Roberts where the accused, a bank manager, used her knowledge and expertise to implement a fraudulent scheme involving multiple accounts within the bank that required a lengthy and detailed internal investigation to uncover the fraud: R. v. Roberts, 2017 ONSC 1071 (Ont. S.C.J.).
[14] This is not the case with Mr. Rootenberg’s scheme. His fraud was not so complex. By saying this I do not diminish the unscrupulousness of Mr. Rootenberg’s scheme. The point I make here is that Mr. Rootenberg’s use of multiple bank accounts in different banks was not as sophisticated as the bank manager’s scheme in R. v. Roberts. In fact, it might be the case that Mr. Rootenberg’s use of various accounts at different banks would have actually piqued the suspicion of some. Receiving “dividend” cheques from two other banks, not the TD bank account set up for B-G Enterprises, might reasonably have raised red flags.
[15] The devious crowning touch to Mr. Rootenberg’s scheme is that he led Ms. Smith to believe his surname was Shaun “Rothberg”. She only learned by happenstance that his real surname was Rootenberg. An acquaintance of Ms. Smith attended a Bar Mitzvah for Mr. Rootenberg’s son. When the acquaintance’s girlfriend’s father searched the internet and learned Shaun’s real surname, he also learned about his crimes. Not until November 2014, over a year after they met, did Ms. Smith learn from the acquaintance that Shaun’s real surname was Rootenberg.
MR. ROOTENBERG’S LIFE
Criminal Record
[16] Mr. Rootenberg is 44 years of age. He has a criminal record involving fraudulent conduct and non-compliance with court orders. Mr. Rootenberg has two convictions from 2006 for uttering forged documents. In 2009 he pleaded guilty to several frauds he committed between 2007 and 2009 against several long-time friends, his girlfriend and family members, including his own brother and his wife, as mentioned above.
[17] The 2009 convictions involved forgery, fraudulent cheques, misappropriation of funds and identity fraud involving his brother. That fraud took the form of a “robbing Peter to pay Paul” type of scheme where Mr. Rootenberg’s plan was to use money he took from prospective investors to pay monies he owed to earlier investors. “Contumacious” comes to mind when I think of Mr. Rootenberg. He has been unimpeded by the constraints of the law. Some of his offences were committed while he was either on a conditional sentence or under statutory or judicial interim release. He was also charged with failure to attend court.
[18] On his 2009 fraud, Mr. Rootenberg pleaded guilty on a joint submission and was sentenced on May 14, 2009 to the equivalent of 4 years’ imprisonment. The sentencing judge accepted the joint position but commented that the 4-year sentence was on the lower end of the range.
[19] Relevant to sentencing is any similarity an accused’s past crimes have to the crimes before the court. There is little question about the similarity of Mr. Rootenberg’s past offences to the fraud against Ms. Smith.
Letters of Support
[20] Mr. Rootenberg presented letters of support from his parents, his sister, his ex-wife, his brother Jonathan, a rabbi and a friend. Except for his brother, the other references seem not to be familiar with Mr. Rootenberg’s criminal lifestyle.
[21] Mr. Rootenberg’s sister, his brother Jonathan, his parents and ex-wife say Mr. Rootenberg has been taking steps to build a pro-social life. They each point to Mr. Rootenberg’s involvement in group sessions with psychiatrist Dr. Julian Gojer from which they believe he is gaining insight into his wrongdoing. They also credit him for the caring and supportive roles he plays in the lives of his special-needs sons of ages 19 and 20 years and his elderly parents.
[22] Mr. Rootenberg submitted a letter from Dr. Gojer, not a medical report which, beyond generalities, did not provide much about the sessions. Further, Dr. Gojer seems to contradict himself by indicating in one paragraph that Mr. Rootenberg does not take responsibility for his crimes and in a subsequent paragraph stating that he does take responsibility and is remorseful. The truth is that Mr. Rootenberg’s course of conduct amply demonstrates that the former depiction accords more with reality.
[23] What I find truly remarkable is that Mr. Rootenberg’s brother Jonathan offers his unconditional support for his brother. He did not mention the impersonation or the immense $1.8 million fraud his brother committed against him and his wife. If Mr. Rootenberg is lucky for anything here it is that he has a brother with extraordinary and seemingly undying compassion for him no matter what.
[24] Mr. Rootenberg’s childhood friend offers his certainty that Mr. Rootenberg regrets what he has done. Again, this is belied by Mr. Rootenberg’s remorselessness and over-inflated sense of entitlement, the hallmarks of his character. Outstanding in all of this is his gripe that he should have been exempt from the custodial strip searches administered for good reasons on all inmates.
[25] Rabbi Grover indicates he has known Mr. Rootenberg for six years. The rabbi’s description of Mr. Rootenberg’s character as “honest”, “responsible” and “considerate” bears no resemblance to the Mr. Rootenberg who was tried before me. Perhaps, the rabbi is not aware of the cold and calculating dishonesty that marks Mr. Rootenberg’s lifestyle that has left many victims even family members in financial ruin.
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT
[26] Ms. Smith prepared a Victim Impact Statement that the Crown read in court.
[27] Ms. Smith speaks of the harrowing impact of Mr. Rootenberg’s fraud, not only financially, but emotionally and psychologically. He stole her life savings, and as she states, stole her future leaving her today struggling to make ends meet. He has stolen her children’s legacy. Ms. Smith has faced what she describes as excruciating depression and anxiety that have disabled her from getting back to any semblance of her former life. Ms. Smith says she will never be able to recoup her losses. Adding to the callousness of his actions is that Mr. Rootenberg committed the fraud while knowing Ms. Smith was caring for her dying mother.
[28] Ms. Smith speaks of her shame and embarrassment that her instincts failed her in her assessment of Mr. Rootenberg. Heightening her despair is that the embarrassing details of Mr. Rootenberg’s ploy are being played out on the public stage in mainstream and social media − Ms. Smith’s striking indictment, “My life story has been written by a villain and my grandchildren and great-grandchildren will be able to find the disgusting reality on-line forever.”
[29] Ms. Smith claims some monetary expenses from Mr. Rootenberg. She cites an expense she incurred for treatment at the Health Recovery Centre in Minneapolis, Minnesota in March 2016. The services included an outpatient mental health interview and treatment and various types of diagnostic testing. The bill in U.S. dollars is $16,995.00 plus $3,200.00 for apartment rental for a total of $20,195.00 which converted to Canadian dollars is $27,031.00.
SENTENCING PRINCIPLES
[30] Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the principles that underpin the objectives for sentencing: denunciation, deterrence and the separation of the offender from society.
[31] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other potential future offenders from committing offences; and (c) to separate offenders from society.
[32] Deterrence is paramount in fraud cases. As the Ontario Court of Appeal remarked:
[t]here are few crimes where the aspect of deterrence is more significant. It is not a crime of impulse and is of a type that is normally committed by a person who is knowledgeable and should be aware of the consequences. That awareness comes from the sentences given to others.
[R. v. Dobis, 2002 CanLII 32815 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 646, at para. 45, (Ont. C.A.)]
[33] Proportionality is also a guiding principle for sentencing. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence determined on the particular facts of the case. The narrow focus of the sentencing process is directed to imposing a sentence that reflects the circumstances of the specific offence and the attributes of the specific offender: [Criminal Code, s. 718.1 and R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA),186 C.C.C. (3d) 129, 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.)].
[34] The totality principle must be considered for some sentences. Section 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code provides “where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.” The principle is engaged where there is a sentence for multiple offences and requires the court to craft a global sentence of all offences that is not excessive: [R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42, (S.C.C.)]. If the cumulative sentence is too harsh, the court must adjust the total sentence in order that it not be out of proportion to the gravity of the offences. This principle is apposite in considering a restitution order in this case.
[35] The parity principle requires a sentence be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed under similar circumstances. Sentencing is however an individualized process which necessarily means that sentences imposed for similar offences may not be identical: [R. v. Cox, 2011 ONCA 58 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. L.M., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 163, 2008 SCC 31 (S.C.C.)].
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS
[36] Section 718.2(a) of the Criminal Code provides that “a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender”. Some aggravating and mitigating factors are set by legislation and others have been developed at common law. Under s. 718(a)(iii), crime by persons in a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim is an aggravating factor. Aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: [R. v. Larche, 2006 SCC 56, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 762 (S.C.C.)].
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS AND COURT’S ANALYSIS
Person in a Position of Trust as Aggravating Factor
[37] The Crown takes the position that Mr. Rootenberg was in a position of trust in relation to Ms. Smith. The Crown bases that position on the type of relationship Ms. Smith felt she had with Mr. Rootenberg.
[38] In the criminal context, consideration of whether a person occupies a position of trust is most commonly a concern in sexual assault cases where under scrutiny is the relationship of a sexual assault victim and the perpetrator. In that context the court takes into account the factual circumstances relevant to the characterization of the relationship between the two in order to determine whether the accused was in a position of trust or authority over the victim and whether the victim was in a relationship of dependency with the accused at the time of the offence: [R. v. Audet, 1996 CanLII 198 (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 171 (S.C.C.)].
[39] In another criminal context, the concept of position of trust has been applied to financial fraud cases where sentencing courts have taken into account the offender’s position of trust as an aggravating factor in fashioning a sentence.
[40] The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Castro, as cited below, and other case authorities I cite, take a position of trust into account. Bank managers and other bank employees, bookkeepers/accountants, accounts receivable clerks, stockbrokers and person’s with authority over charitable funds have been found to be in positions of trust in the cases I consider.
[41] Statute and equity in the family law context impose trust principles on married and common law relationships in assessing entitlements on the division of family assets.
[42] Mr. Rootenberg’s relationship with Ms. Smith is not commonly the type of relationship before courts considering positions of trust in a criminal context. There is no evidence Mr. Rootenberg was a financial investment professional. He told Ms. Smith he was in “management”, “finance”.
[43] But the Crown does not look at the relationship from that perspective. The Crown focuses on the nature of the romantic relationship between Ms. Smith and Mr. Rootenberg as viewed through Ms. Smith’s eyes. Ms. Smith considered her relationship to be close, caring and monogamous from the time of their first date. She knew Mr. Rootenberg no more than two months when she gave him the $160,000.00 and a further month when she gave him the $435,000.00.
[44] Throughout her evidence Ms. Smith stated that she trusted Mr. Rootenberg unquestioningly from the beginning. She felt no need to inquire about her investments or to do an independent investigation of B-G Enterprises and Mr. Rootenberg’s associates.
[45] The key to the Crown’s position then is Ms. Smith’s subjective trust in Mr. Rootenberg and not the objective factors in the relationship. It stands to reason in my view that the mere fact of trusting someone does not automatically place the person in a position of trust. And vice versa, a person in a position of trust like an accountant, financial advisor or bank manager can be distrusted by those dependent on them but that does not remove the position of trust status. So, there is an objective element that must be considered.
[46] The Alberta Provincial Court in R. v. Coulson addresses that point in the following passages:
It is important to understand that the aggravating feature is taken into account when the offender occupies a “position of trust” related to the victim. The issue is not simply that the victim trusted the offender. If that were the meaning, in virtually every fraud the offender is in a position of trust because in almost all frauds a victim is duped of their property by someone in whom they reposed a trust.
The determination of whether a person occupies a trust position in some circumstances can be straightforward, e.g., such as bank tellers, or store clerks. The determination in other cases is not so straightforward.
[47] Citing R. v. Audet the court went on to say:
“Position of trust” is difficult to define in the absence of a factual context. The primary meaning of “trust” is “confidence in or reliance upon some quality or attribute of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement.” The trial judge must examine all factual circumstances relevant to the characterization of the relationship to determine whether the offender occupied a position of trust relative to the victim.
[48] The Newfoundland Court of Appeal upheld the trial court and observed:
While the judge acknowledged that Mr. O. was not in a position of trust toward the four young men, as that is defined by law (e.g. he had no authority over them, they were not in a position of dependence toward him), he went on to say that the victims and their parents “trusted” Mr. O. However, being “trusted” by someone in the everyday sense of the word does not place you in “a position of trust” toward them, as the term is used in criminal law.
[R. v. O. (B.J.), 2010 NLCA 17 (NLCA)]
[49] The very short duration of the relationship before Ms. Smith gave him the funds is an objective feature in the context of the relationship that cannot be ignored. Ms. Smith had recently met Mr. Rootenberg but did not know him. Further, she was not in a dependent relationship to him when she gave over the money. She had her own assets and finances. Ms. Smith was a very trusting person. However, I do not find Ms. Smith’s trust in Mr. Rootenberg in the circumstances reasonably placed Mr. Rootenberg in a position of trust.
[50] The Crown did not establish that Mr. Rootenberg was in a position of trust and I will not consider the relationship between Ms. Smith and Mr. Rootenberg from the perspective of trust as an aggravating factor in fashioning a sentence.
Other Aggravating Factors
[51] I find the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors in this case and are as follows:
• the exploitative and opportunist way in which Mr. Rootenberg took advantage of Ms. Smith’s romantic feelings towards him in inducing her to give him $595,000.00 on the expectation of a business opportunity that did not materialize and executing his fraudulent plan while she was attending to her dying mother;
• his deception in giving Ms. Smith a false identity;
• his past criminal record involving uttering a forged document and the larger fraud against multiple victims involving both friends and family members;
• Mr. Rootenberg’s convictions for breaching of court orders while on a conditional sentence, statutory release and on bail and his non-compliance in failing to attend court;
• the fact that Mr. Rootenberg is not gainfully employed and did not hold employment after December 2018.
Mitigating Factors
[52] The mitigating factors are few:
• Mr. Rootenberg has an undergraduate university degree which could be put to use in pursuit of honest employment in compliance with the prohibition order I impose below;
• Mr. Rootenberg has support from his family even though they are aware of, and some have suffered from, his crimes; and
• Mr. Rootenberg has played a positive and supporting role in the lives of his two special needs sons and his elderly parents.
Case Authorities
[53] As I observed above, sentencing is an inherently individualized determination and as such decisions in other fraud cases are of limited assistance given the unique qualities in fraud crimes: [R. v. Downey, 2003 CarswellOnt 4672, at para. 62, (Ont. S.C.J.)]. The decisions of other courts can however be instructive. I considered the following cases:
• R. v. Allan, 2008 O.J. No. 2794 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender, no criminal record; guilty plea; administrator with Ontario Works; created false clients to which cheques were issued; fraud about $1.3 million; high level sophisticated scheme; cooperated with authorities; prison sentence 36 months down to 10 months for cooperation; restitution, $6000.00.
• R. v. Ragno, [2008] O.J. No. 4914 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender had 3 previous fraud convictions; pleaded guilty to some but not all charges; misused funds paid by customers of her interior design business to pay $140,000.00 of business deficits; breach of trust; no remorse; sentence 18 months’ prison, 3 years’ probation, stand-alone restitution order.
• R. v. Knight, 2014 ONSC 6601 (Ont. S.C.J.) – for over 12 years offender defrauded charity that serviced developmentally challenged adults; fraud $550,000.00 to $900,000.00; deliberate planning; breach of trust by employee of vulnerable people; no guilty plea; no prior convictions; sentence 4 years’ prison, restitution $200,000.00; $350,000.00 settled in civil action.
• R. v. Alves, [2015] O.J. No. 770 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender age 25, no criminal record; guilty plea; bank employee made 10 withdrawals/transfers from/to partner’s bank account; position of trust; fraud $536,000.000; $347,000.00 recovered, loss of $188,085.77; 2 years’ prison; restitution $188,080.77; forfeiture order.
• R. v. Schulz, 2018 ONSC 5449 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender accounts payable clerk forged signature of company owner on 187 cheques to herself over 8 months; breach of trust; amount of fraud $330,000.00; reformatory sentence 6 months less a day because of immigration issue; 2 years’ probation; restitution $312,827.61.
• R. v. Pavao, 2018 ONSC 4889 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender and 10 associates pretended to sell gold mining company shares; unsophisticated investors purchased $1.1 million in fictitious shares over several years; complex fraud over $1 million; many victims; no criminal record; serious heart condition; no guilty plea; 5 years’ prison; restitution $1,100,799.00; fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of fraud paid over 8 years
• R. v. Bondak, 2014 ONSC 394 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender impersonated victim; accessed his account and directed a $97,000.00 transfer to co-conspirators; previous related record; fraud planned and deliberate; money was recovered; sentence prison 3.5 years; range 3 – 5 years for this type of crime
• R. v. Williams, 2007 CanLII 13949 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 1604 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender age 60; no criminal record; no guilty plea; sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for embezzling $195,000.00 from her employer over three years; $159,000.00 restitution ordered; as result of offence, offender suffered clinical depression and loss of employment.
• [R. v. Dobis, 2002 CanLII 32815 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 646 (Ont. C.A.)] − offender, accounts manager for electrical wiring manufacturer; in position of trust; pleaded guilty to large-scale fraud over $2 million; sentenced to two years less a day reformatory sentence; restitution of $286,636.00 ordered.
• [R. v. Dwyer, 2013 ONCA 34, [2013] O.J. No. 277 (Ont. S.C.J.)] – offender falsified tax documents to obtain a mortgage from a bank; bank extended a mortgage of $663,750.00; bank recovered $426,049.00; trial judge refused to order fine in lieu of forfeiture; on appeal fine ordered in the amount of $10,700.00, an amount over which the court held the offender had control; prison sentence of 3.5 years.
• R. v. Downey, 2003 CarswellOnt 4672 (Ont. S.C.J.) – offender criminal record; repeat fraud offences; no guilty plea; fraudulent misrepresentation to 2 victims that son had been kidnapped; victims took out loans to assist offender; fraud over $200,000.00; sentence 6 years’ prison minus pre-trial custody.
• [R. v. Atwal, 2016 ONSC 3668 (Ont. S.C.J.); aff’d, 2017 ONCA 228 (Ont. C.A.)] – offender age 54; no guilty plea; no prior criminal record; retained as bookkeeper/accountant for a large company; during 8-week period offender issued 97 cheques with the forged signature of the company’s vice president totalling more than $1 million; sentence 3 years’ prison, restitution $35,000.00.
• [R. v. Vekatacharya, 2017, ONSC 1187 (Ont. S.C.J.)] – offender no criminal record; no guilty plea; large-scale fraud of over $500,000.00 involving 12 prospective borrowers who paid due “diligence fees” for non-existent loans; great impact on victims; no chance of recovering monies; show of remorse; 3 years’ prison minus pre-trial custody.
• [R. v. Reeves, 2018 ONSC 3939 (Ont. S.C.J.)] – offender no criminal record; guilty plea; financial adviser induced friends and family to commit $3.1 million to fraudulent investments; devastating effect on victims; loss of life savings by 1 victim; genuine remorse; sentence 4 years’ prison; stand-alone restitution order ($3.1 million) and fine in lieu of forfeiture for same amount.
• [R. v. Shoer, 2019 ONCA 105 (Ont. C.A.)] – offender, stockbroker; no guilty plea; no criminal record; induced 14 victims with promise of high returns on fictitious shares; sentence 4 years’ prison; stand-alone restitution orders; fine in lieu of forfeiture increased to $413,000.00 on appeal; total misappropriation, $1.8 million.
• [R. v. Nowack, 2019 ONSC 5344 (Ont. S.C.J.)] – offender, no record; no guilty plea; persuaded persons with promises of high returns to invest in fraudulent foreign exchange transactions; diverted much of the money, $2.7 million; $19 million in trading losses; restitution order $14,468,682.20; forfeiture order $15,679,087.59; 9 years’ imprisonment.
Length of Sentence
[54] The Crown seeks a 6 to 7-year prison sentence. The defence seeks a 3½ to 4-year prison sentence.
[55] The defence filed an affidavit by Mr. Rootenberg on which he was cross-examined principally regarding the conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre (“the TSDC”) and the effect of the conditions on him personally.
[56] I took account of the aggravating and mitigating factors and the guidance offered by the case authorities filed. I find a total 6-year prison sentence is a fit sentence.
[57] The cases with lower sentences tended to be earlier cases in which heavier penalties were regularly not imposed for fraud, or involved a guilty plea, a show of remorse, no criminal record or involved a lesser fraud. The sentence this court imposes takes into account separation of the offender from society, general and specific deterrence and denunciation. Below I impose a restitution order. The sentence also takes into consideration the totality principle in imposing the restitution order as part of the overall sentence.
[58] Mr. Rootenberg committed a large fraud where he exploited the genuine affections of a woman who cared for him. He has a related serious criminal record for a larger and more extensive fraud perpetrated on old friends and family alike. He has shown no remorse, and for this, he cannot benefit from the mitigation that a guilty plea and remorse would provide. Mr. Rootenberg reserves a place for toxic, self-centred entitlement where acceptance of moral blameworthiness ought to be.
[59] Ms. Smith has lost her entire life savings and her children and grandchildren their legacy. Ms. Smith has suffered emotional and psychological trauma which she has found impossible to overcome, so much so that she became suicidal and substance dependent. Once financially independent and self-sufficient, she now has difficulty staying afloat financially. Ms. Smith speaks of the desperation from being forever hounded by her story being in the media and on the internet. She feels she will never live down the shame of allowing Mr. Rootenberg to take advantage of her.
[60] Favourable to Mr. Rootenberg is that he has support from his family and a rabbi and friends. He has two sons and parents with whom he has close and caring relationships. However, his references appear not to appreciate or are unaware of the seriousness of his fraud and criminal history. They appear ignorant of or in denial that he does not in the least regret what he has done to Ms. Smith. There is no solid evidence that Mr. Rootenberg is truly being rehabilitated in Dr. Gojer’s sessions since Dr. Gojer is ambiguous as to whether he found Mr. Rootenberg to be remorseful.
[61] Mr. Rootenberg has the educational background to pursue respectable employment outside the types of employment forbidden by the prohibition order I impose below.
Credits on Sentencing
Summers Credits
[62] The Crown submits Mr. Rootenberg is entitled to 1.5:1 Summers credits for the 308 days (June 6, 2017 to January 18, 2018 and February 23, 2018 to May 14, 2018) he spent in pre-trial custody which amounts to 462 days (1 year 3 months and 1 day): [R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.)].
[63] The defence agrees with allowing credit for the 462 days. I also accept that he is entitled to that credit.
Duncan Credits and Nasogaluak Sentence Reduction
[64] The defence seeks enhanced Duncan credits for the conditions at the TSDC. The defence focuses on the lockdowns at the facility and the strip searches Mr. Rootenberg underwent: [R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 (Ont. C.A.)]. Mr. Rootenberg filed an affidavit and testified about the conditions at TSDC and the impact on him of those conditions. The defence also filed records of shutdowns from the TSDC and Mr. Rootenberg testified about the strip searches. The Crown asks the court not to allow any enhanced Duncan credits.
[65] Mr. Rootenberg’s situation at the facility does not support entitlement to Duncan credits.
[66] This is not a case where the conditions and impact of shutdowns on Mr. Rootenberg are comparable to the circumstances in the cases of other inmates who have received credit. It is no secret that the conditions at TSDC are far from ideal for every inmate jailed there. Lockdowns are frequent and are a gruelling aspect of the general conditions. However, credits are normally allotted to inmates with more extenuating experiences than Mr. Rootenberg.
[67] Cases that have allowed credit generally involved circumstances where the number of lockdowns were greater, both in terms of singular days and multiple consecutive days, than is the case for Mr. Rootenberg: [133 days R. v. Persad, 2020 ONSC 188 (Ont. S.C.J.); 42 days R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, [2016] O.J. No. 5255 (Ont. C.A.); 206 days R. v. Nsiah, [2017] O.J. No. 526 (Ont. S.C.J.); 128 days R. v. Passera, 2019 ONCA 527, [2017] O.J. No. 4381 (Ont. C.A.); 426 days’ segregation, R. v. Roberts, 2018 ONSC 4566 (Ont. S.C.J)]; 171 days, R. v. Salmon, 2019 ONSC 1574 (Ont. S.C.J.); 297 days, R. v Innis, 2017 ONSC 2779 (Ont. S.C.J.); 61 days, R. v. Sanchez, 2019 ONSC 5272; 488 days, R. v. Ward-Jackson, 2018 ONSC 178(Ont. S.C.J.)].
[68] Mr. Rootenberg was admitted to TSDC on June 5, 2017 and spent 308 days in pre-trial custody for which I have allowed Summers credit.
[69] Three weeks after he was admitted to TSDC, Mr. Rootenberg, of his own preference, chose to work on the kitchen range. He was moved from the general population range. On the kitchen range the inmates have enhanced privileges. He worked 6 days a week from 5:00 a. m. to 12:00 p.m. Other than during the 1:00 p.m. cell check period, the cells were open and inmates allowed to move about freely, to take showers, watch television, read newspapers. Mr. Rootenberg was permitted to review disclosure in preparation for his trial. When other ranges were on lockdown the inmates on the kitchen range were allowed out of their cells to work.
[70] For perfectly understandable reasons inmates on the kitchen range are strip searched before and after each shift. Knifes and other kitchen instruments could pose a risk. This means that in addition to the regular strip searches done before and after court attendances and visitations, Mr. Rootenberg actually, in effect, volunteered for many more strip searches when he chose kitchen duty. However, he only wanted the benefit without the burden.
[71] The records from the TSDC indicate there were 45 lockdowns during the period of Mr. Rootenberg’s custody. Mr. Rootenberg agreed that he spent about 12 days in lockdown himself when privileges like taking showers, speaking on the phone and leaving the cell were denied.
[72] On November 17, 2017, Mr. Rootenberg was transferred from the kitchen range to a general range. The intention with the move was to give him his own cell where he could have unfettered private access to disclosure. He also had access to a computer. He agreed he had access to disclosure but he complained that the range switch was done against his will and that while he was on transfer to the general range, he did not have sufficient time to make calls in relation to his trial. Mr. Rootenberg also grumbled that having his own cell on that range made him a target of other inmates for having special privileges.
[73] Mr. Rootenberg concedes he had no problem being an unrelenting advocate for himself while in custody and that he made a multitude of formal demands and complaints for things that he felt he was entitled to. He made many demands, all of which were satisfied, such as for interviews with persons for his trial, clothing exchanges and access to newspapers. He was only denied a request for kosher eating utensils.
[74] I do not find Ms. Rootenberg’s circumstances call for enhanced Duncan credits.
[75] As for a Nasogaluak reduction in sentence, this is not a suitable case. That case stands for the proposition that where the police or state misconduct relates to the circumstances of the offence or the offender, the sentencing judge may properly take the relevant facts into account in determining a fit and proportionate sentence without having to resort to s. 24(1) of the Charter: [R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.)].
[76] I found in a stay of proceedings application Mr. Rootenberg previously brought that state authorities at the TSDC did not violate his rights in conducting strip searches. They acted under their statutory obligation to protect the security of all inmates, the staff and public. It is for every inmate’s, including Mr. Rootenberg’s, protection that strip searches are conducted. What is also important to recall in considering Nasogaluak is that the majority of the strip searches Mr. Rootenberg underwent is a product of his own choice to take advantage of the benefits of working on the kitchen range.
[77] There is nothing that warrants a reduction in sentence in this case.
Downes Credits
[78] The defence also seeks Downes credit for the conditions Mr. Rootenberg faced while on bail release. The Crown asks the court not to allow Downes credits: [R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), 208 O.A.C. 324 (Ont. C.A)].
[79] The defence submits Mr. Rootenberg should receive some credit because of the impediments that house arrest caused for his search for employment. Mr. Rootenberg was on house arrest from May 14, 2018 where he could only leave the home with his sureties. The terms were varied in December 2018 to remove the house arrest restriction. He could not seek employment on house arrest so the variation was granted to allow him to seek employment. He was also allowed to be out of the house in the company of his sons. Mr. Rootenberg never did obtain employment.
[80] Mr. Rootenberg was on the strictest terms for 7 months. But it is fit that such terms were imposed given his criminal antecedents, his history for breaching court orders, parole and bail conditions. He has been on more lenient terms for the greatest part of his release. I find this is not a situation that calls for Downes credit.
Conclusion on Sentencing Credits
[81] Mr. Rootenberg is entitled to 462 Summers credits which amounts to 1 year, 3 months and 7 days. Subtracting those credits from the 6-year (2190 days) prison sentence, Mr. Rootenberg will serve a custodial sentence of 2190 days minus 462 days which amounts to 1,728 days which is 4 years, 8 months, 3 weeks and 2 days.
Restitution
[82] Section 738 allows the sentencing judge the discretion to order the offender to make restitution by paying the victim an amount not exceeding the replacement value of the property as of the date the order is imposed, less the value of any property returned, where the amount is readily ascertainable. The amount in the case at hand is readily ascertainable.
[83] A restitution order is part of the overall sentence. A restitution order is not to be simply tacked onto a prison sentence which is itself a suitable sentence. This would offend the totality principle in that this could result in an excessive sentence: [R. v. Castro, 2010 ONCA 718, [2010] O.J. No. 4573, at para. 23, (Ont. C.A.)].
[84] The objectives of imposing a restitution order are enumerated in R. v. Castro at para. 24, namely:
• to emphasize the sanction imposed on the offender;
• to make the offender responsible for making restitution to the victim;
• to prevent the offender from profiting from crime; and
• to provide a convenient, rapid and inexpensive means of recovery for the victim.
[85] The sentencing court may take the means of the offender into account. But s. 739.1 of the Criminal Code provides that the ability to pay does not prevent the court from ordering restitution. When determining whether a restitution order is appropriate, the court must consider, among other things, both the present and future ability of the accused to pay restitution: [R. v Yates, 2002 BCCA 583, at paras. 15 and 17, (B.C.C.A.)].
[86] R. v. Castro situates restitution orders in the overall scheme of sentencing principles:
To summarize, a restitution order is simply part of the determination of an overall fit sentence, and general sentencing principles apply. While consideration of the offender’s ability to pay and the impact of a restitution order on an offender’s rehabilitation are factors to be considered, the weight to be given to these factors will vary depending on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. When the offence involves a breach of trust, a primary consideration is the effect on the victim; rehabilitation is a secondary consideration. Furthermore, consideration of the ability to pay includes the ability to make payments from the money taken as a source of restitution.
[87] The Crown seeks a restitution order under s. 738 of the Criminal Code for the amount of the fraud, $595,000.00 plus $27,031.00 (CDN) for treatment expenses Ms. Smith incurred, totalling $622,031.00. The Crown requests the amount be paid immediately pursuant to s. 739.2.
[88] The defence does not agree that the treatment expense should be added to the restitution order. The defence points to the fact that there is no evidence that the treatment was for the conditions Ms. Smith developed as a result of Mr. Rootenberg’s fraud or that the expenses are related to the medical concerns she identifies in her Victim Impact Statement. There is no report or cover letter from the facility that explains the nature and purpose of the treatment.
[89] I accept the defence’s position on this. I note that rules of evidence are not as strictly applied on sentencing as at trial: [R. v. Campbell, 2003 CanLII 49352 (ON SC)]. While parties are not required to adduce expensive expert reports in sentencing hearings where there are medical issues, parties should provide evidence that assures the court that a medical expense is related to the offences before the court. It is not evident what Ms. Smith was being treated for. There is a $4,283.20 (CDN) expense for the rental of an apartment in Minneapolis. There is nothing explaining why Ms. Smith could not undergo in Toronto the types of testing and treatment she received in Minneapolis.
[90] The $27,031.00 will not be added to the total restitution order.
[91] The defence also submits that the $36,544.00 in “dividend” payments Mr. Rootenberg paid ostensibly on Ms. Smith’s “mortgage investment” should be deducted from restitution for the basic reason that there is no dispute that Ms. Smith did receive those payments. The Crown disagrees with that position based on the real possibility that the “dividends” likely came from the funds Mr. Rootenberg defrauded from Ms. Smith.
[92] I accept the defence’s position on this matter as well. Ms. Smith received those funds whether from her own funds or some other source. The amount was paid. So, the $36,544.00 will be deducted from the total restitution order.
[93] No amounts have been recovered. There is no evidence as to the whereabouts of the funds. The total restitution is $595,000.00 minus $36,544.00 which amounts to $558,456.00.
[94] In considering Mr. Rootenberg’s ability to pay I took into account his education and level of sophistication cognizant of the irony that this sophistication he put to nefarious use. That being said, Mr. Rootenberg is qualified to obtain respectable and remunerative employment and I find he has an ability to pay.
[95] I order Mr. Rootenberg to make payment of the full amount of $558,456.00 pursuant to s. 739.2 of the Criminal Code no more than 5 years following his release from prison.
Forfeiture Orders and Fines in Lieu of Forfeiture
[96] Section 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code at Part XII.2, and following, governs offences involving proceeds of crime. Those provisions authorize the sentencing judge to make an order of forfeiture or to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture in respect of such proceeds.
[97] Section 462.37(1) of the Criminal Code provides that where an offender is convicted of an offence involving property that is found to be proceeds of crime and an offence was committed in relation to that property, the court shall order that the property be forfeited to the Crown to be disposed of as the Attorney General directs. The overall objective of Part XII.2 is to deal with proceeds of crime separately from, and in addition to, the punishment for committing the crime: [R. v. Lavigne, 2006 SCC 10, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 392, at para. 26, (S.C.C.)].
[98] There is no dispute that Ms. Smith transferred two drafts worth a total of $595,000.00 to Mr. Rootenberg and that those funds were proceeds he used fraudulently.
[99] Forfeiture or a fine in lieu is separate and distinct from a restitution order. In contrast, as noted above, restitution orders are part of a fit sentence to be determined in accordance with general sentencing principles. Forfeiture orders and fines in lieu are not to be treated as part of the general sentencing regime. To obtain an order of forfeiture under the proceeds of crime provisions of the Criminal Code, the Crown must satisfy several conditions precedent. Once the conditions are met forfeiture is mandatory: [R. v. Angelis, 2016 ONCA 675, at paras. 72 and 73, (Ont. C.A.)]. Amounts paid in satisfaction of restitution may be subtracted from what is ordered on forfeiture.
[100] Section 462.37(2) of the Criminal Code addresses the circumstances where the property cannot be made subject to an order of forfeiture. If a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture should be made in respect of “any property of an offender”, instead of ordering the property forfeited, the court may order the offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or an interest in the property. Certain circumstances lend themselves to the imposition of a fine under s. 462.37(3). That provision applies when the property or any part of or interest in the property:
a) cannot, on exercise of due diligence, be located;
b) has been transferred to a third party;
c) is located outside Canada;
d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or
e) has been co-mingled with other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.
[101] The Crown seeks a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of the $595,000.00 Mr. Rootenberg defrauded from Ms. Smith. The defrauded funds in the case before this court most appropriately fit under section 462.37(3)(a) and (b). The whereabouts of the funds is unknown. One can only conclude the funds were dissipated given that Mr. Rootenberg spent large amounts on himself and dispersed large amounts to family, friends and other third parties.
[102] The Ontario Appeal of Court in R. v. Lavigne addresses the issue of whether the offender’s ability to pay is a proper factor to consider. Courts have looked at the question of where the sentencing court’s discretion lies under s. 462.37(3) in deciding the appropriateness and quantum of a fine in lieu of forfeiture.
[103] When imposing a fine in lieu of forfeiture, the fine substitutes for the value of the property. To be “genuine” then the amount of the fine must be equal to the value of the property for which the fine serves as a substitution. The court applies its discretion on two bases; namely, to the decision whether or not to impose a fine and to the determination of the value of the property. Once those determinations are made on the evidentiary record, the court may not take the ability to pay into account as a basis for determining either to impose a fine or to reduce the amount of the fine: [R. v. Lavigne, at paras, 30 – 35].
[104] The Court went on to conclude:
Taking the ability of the accused to pay into consideration is not compatible with the objectives of these specific provisions, which are intended to deprive the offender and the criminal organization of the proceeds of their crime and to deter them from committing crimes in the future. The effect of the word “may” in s. 462.37(3) cannot therefore be to grant the court a broad discretion, having regard to the objectives of the provision, the nature of the order and the circumstances in which the order is made.
[105] Courts have looked at how to assess the quantum of a fine in relation to property determined to be proceeds of crime.
[106] The Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Dwyer opined that a fine in lieu of forfeiture can be ordered only “where the offender has possession or control of the property or at least had possession at some time”. The Court based this interpretation on the reference in s. 462.37(3) to “any property of an offender”.
[107] Dwyer held that its determination on this point accords with the objectives of depriving the offender of the proceeds of the crime to ensure they do not benefit from the proceeds. The court determined that the amount over which bank documents showed the offender had control was the amount of the fine imposed: [R. v. Dwyer, 2013 ONCA 34, [2013] O.J. No. 277 (Ont. S.C.J.)].
[108] I agree with the Crown that a fine in lieu of forfeiture is appropriate. There is no question that Mr. Rootenberg had control over the $160,000.00 and $435,000.00 banks drafts Ms. Smith handed over to him in September and October 2013 and had control over funds once deposited into bank accounts and when he dispersed them to third parties.
[109] The amount of the fine is at issue. I do not accept that the full amount of the funds should be subject to a fine. I subtract from $595,00000 the $36,544.00 paid to Ms. Smith. The total fine imposed is $558,456.00.
[110] Section 462.37(4) of the Criminal Code addresses default penalties. It provides that where a court orders an offender to pay a fine and the offender defaults in the payment of that fine, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment the length of which depends on the quantum of the fraud.
[111] At the stage of deciding the time limit for payment, the ability to pay may be considered. Where there is default at the expiry of the time limit for payment, the court may not issue a warrant of committal unless it is satisfied the offender has refused to pay the fine without reasonable excuse. “Failure to pay because of poverty cannot be equated to refusal to pay”: R. v. Lavigne, at para. [47].
[112] The Crown requests under s. 462.37(4) of the Criminal Code that in default of the payment of the fine, Mr. Rootenberg be ordered to serve four years imprisonment consecutive to the main prison term. The Crown also seeks an order that Mr. Rootenberg be allowed five years following release from his term of imprisonment to pay the fine before being required to serve the 4-year consecutive term for non-payment of the fine.
[113] The defence seeks a 3-year prison term consecutive to the main prison term to be served in the event of non-payment of the fine and asks the court to allow Mr. Rootenberg 7 years to pay the fine after release from prison before he is required to serve the consecutive 3 years’ imprisonment for non-payment.
[114] I order Mr. Rootenberg to serve a 4-year term consecutive to the main prison term if he defaults in the payment of the fine. I allow him 5 years following release from prison to pay the fine before he is required to serve the consecutive 4-year term for non-payment.
Non-Communication Order
[115] The Crown seeks a non-communication order under s. 743.21(1) of the Criminal Code prohibiting Mr. Rootenberg from communicating with the following persons during the custodial period of his sentence: Ms. Smith, directly or indirectly, except through legal counsel or a third party designated by her for the purpose of enforcing the restitution order in this case; Ron Hulse, Jodi Jacovak, Myron Gottlieb or Jeffrey S. Watts, except through legal counsel or a third party designated to enforce the restitution order in the previous criminal case.
[116] The defence did not oppose the non-communication order. I accept that such an order is warranted in relation to those whom he has defrauded and persons once associated with him in business related to the charges in this case.
Prohibition Order
[117] The Crown also seeks a lifetime prohibition order under s. 380.2(1) of the Criminal Code prohibiting Mr. Rootenberg from seeking or obtaining or continuing any employment or becoming a volunteer in any capacity that involves having authority over real property, money or valuable security of another.
[118] There is no question, with Mr. Rootenberg’s inglorious history of repeated frauds and misappropriating the funds and his imperviousness to censure and punishment, that he cannot be placed in a position of trust over property, money or other valuables. A prohibition order is warranted.
DNA Order
[119] Fraud is a secondary designated offence pursuant to s. 487.04 of the Criminal Code and a DNA order is not mandatory with such offences. The court has the discretion to make such an order if it is in the interests of justice to do so having regard to the criminal record of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission and the impact on the offender’s privacy and security.
[120] I impose a DNA order under s. 487.051(3)(a) of the Criminal Code in view of the magnitude of the fraud in this case, Mr. Rootenberg’s criminal history involving larger frauds and other types of fraudulent acts. I also considered his history of non-compliance with court orders. I am particularly mindful of the fact that Mr. Rootenberg’s convictions include the identity-related crimes of impersonation, forgery and the use of a false name. I believe this adds an imperative element to imposition of a DNA order. I find Mr. Rootenberg’s privacy and security rights are outweighed by concerns about the nature of his criminal past and the circumstances of the crime before the court.
SENTENCE
[121] I will now pass sentence.
[122] Shaun Rootenberg, I sentence you a prison term of 6 years (2,190 days) in a federal penitentiary.
[123] I allow a credit of 462 days (1 year, 3 months, 7 days) for time served in pre-trial custody which when deducted amounts to 1,728 days or 4 years, 8 months, 3 weeks and 3 days.
[124] You shall therefore serve a term of 4 years, 8 months, 3 weeks and 3 days in a federal penitentiary.
[125] I order you to make restitution in the amount of $558,456.00 to be paid no more than 5 years following release from prison.
[126] I order a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $558,456.00 to be paid no more than 5 years following release from prison. If you default in payment you shall serve a 4-year prison sentence consecutive to your main prison term.
[127] Pursuant to s. 743.21(1) of the Criminal Code, you are prohibited during your custodial period from communicating with Ms. Smith, directly or indirectly, (except through legal counsel or a third party designated by her for the purpose of enforcing the restitution order in this sentence), Ron Hulse, Jodi Jacovak, Myron Gottlieb and Jeffrey S. Watts (except through legal counsel or a third party designated to enforce a previously issued restitution order) during the custodial period of your sentence.
[128] Pursuant to s. 380.2(1) of the Criminal Code, you are prohibited for life from seeking or obtaining or continuing any employment or becoming a volunteer in any capacity that involves having authority over real property, money or valuable security of another.
[129] Pursuant to s. 487.051(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, you are ordered to provide a sample of your bodily fluid for the national DNA data bank.
B.A. Allen J.
Released: September 30, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-1000030-0000
DATE: 20200930
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
SHAUN ROOTENBERG
REASONS FOR DECISION ON SENTENCING
B.A. Allen J.
Released: September 30, 2020