Christopher Guang-Tsiow Tan

The plaintiff brought an urgent, ex parte motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation against a property solely owned by the spouse of the alleged fraudster.

The plaintiff claimed she was defrauded of $425,000 in a diamond investment scheme and sought to secure the property for enforcement purposes.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no triable issue regarding an interest in land, as the plaintiff was not a creditor of the property owner and a CPL cannot be used merely as pre-judgment execution for a damages claim.

The appellant appealed an order vacating its claims for a construction lien and dismissing its breach of contract claims.

The appellant argued it was a 'contractor' under the Construction Act by virtue of an undisclosed assignment agreement, rather than a 'subcontractor'.

The Divisional Court upheld the Associate Justice's finding that there was no triable issue regarding the assignment, meaning the appellant was a subcontractor whose lien was registered out of time.

The court confirmed that the Associate Justice applied the correct test for a motion under section 47 of the Construction Act and did not improperly convert it into a summary judgment motion.

This costs endorsement followed a successful appeal by the appellant, Dong Jin Qiu, regarding the quantum of damages.

The appeal resulted in the respondent, Biao Liu, owing the appellant $10,496.68.

The court determined that the appellant was the successful party at both trial and appeal, contrary to the respondent's argument for partial indemnity costs based on a forfeited deposit.

As the appellant did not request costs, no order for trial costs was made.

The moving party, who was the respondent on a previous appeal, brought a motion under Rules 37.14 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary the Court of Appeal's decision and dismiss the appeal.

The moving party argued the court erred by misreading the record regarding the interpretation of a partnership agreement.

The court found Rule 37.14 inapplicable as it pertains to specific procedural errors, and Rule 59.06 (accidental slip or omission) also inapplicable, as the submission was a re-argument of a point already considered and not supported by the trial judge's findings or the agreement's wording.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the measure of damages for breach of a joint venture partnership agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of a binding partnership agreement and its breach but found an error in the quantification of damages.

The trial judge had incorrectly awarded the respondent the extra capital he invested as damages.

The Court of Appeal clarified that damages should be limited to the cost of borrowing the additional capital incurred due to the breach, up to the date of trial, less a retained deposit.

The appeal was allowed with costs to the appellant.

The applicant, a family health team, sought judicial review of the Minister of Health's decision to terminate its funding agreement without cause.

The applicant alleged the termination was made in bad faith to cover up fraud by the applicant's former board of directors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to terminate the funding agreement was a private law contractual matter not subject to judicial review.

The court applied the Air Canada factors and concluded the decision lacked a sufficient public character.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence to support the applicant's allegations of bad faith or improper purpose by the Minister.

The successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following the dismissal of the action against her on summary judgment.

The court found that the plaintiffs had made unsubstantiated allegations of fraudulent concealment based on bare suspicion, took shifting positions on the limitation period, and rejected reasonable offers to settle.

The court concluded that this conduct was worthy of sanction and awarded the defendant $45,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis, reducing the claimed amount for proportionality.

The applicant brought an application which was heard on an expedited schedule.

The Divisional Court issued a brief endorsement dismissing the application with no order as to costs, noting that full reasons would follow in due course.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim against her on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendant fraudulently concealed her involvement in faulty renovations, delaying the discoverability of their claim.

The court found no evidence of fraudulent concealment and concluded that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of their potential claim against the defendant well before the limitation period expired.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claim against the defendant was dismissed.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's rulings in an ongoing shareholder valuation dispute pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The applicants argued the arbitrator failed to provide adequate reasons for the valuation date, acted unfairly regarding instructions to the valuator, improperly allowed the use of hindsight evidence, and erred in admitting evidence from the respondent's expert.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decisions were reasonable, adequately explained, and did not result in procedural unfairness.

The plaintiffs, having succeeded on a summary judgment motion in a real estate transaction dispute, sought costs.

The court determined the application of Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which dictates costs consequences for unaccepted offers to settle.

The defendants argued that a non-disparagement clause in the plaintiffs' offer to settle rendered it invalid for Rule 49.10 purposes.

The court found the non-disparagement provision to be clear and not unreasonable, distinguishing it from cases where an offer's terms were vague or uncertain.

As the judgment obtained by the plaintiffs was more favourable than their offer, they were awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court fixed costs at $33,039.76, considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the principle of fairness and reasonableness.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in an action for damages arising from the defendants' failure to close a residential real estate transaction.

The defendants argued the agreement was void due to issues with a power of attorney, misrepresentation of square footage, and failure to provide a survey.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability or mitigation of damages.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs for forfeiture of the deposit and damages for the loss in property value and increased commission fees upon resale.

The Plaintiff moved to strike paragraph 19 of the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, arguing it disclosed statements protected by settlement privilege or, alternatively, pleaded evidence contrary to Rule 25.06(1).

The court declined to rule on settlement privilege, deeming it premature, but granted the motion to strike paragraph 19 on the basis that it pleaded evidence.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the Plaintiff.

The applicants sought to enforce letters of request issued by a Pennsylvania court against the respondents (Royal Bank of Canada, Peter Gordon, and Minden Gross LLP) to obtain documents and information for a civil action in Pennsylvania.

The court granted the application, finding that the evidence sought was relevant, necessary for trial (including pre-trial proceedings), not otherwise obtainable, identified with reasonable specificity, not contrary to public policy, and not unduly burdensome.

The court emphasized deference to the requesting court's findings and rejected arguments regarding pre-trial use and solicitor-client privilege.