Nicky Poon

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for oppressive conduct under the Business Corporations Act, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following their offers to settle, but the court found the offers did not comply with Rule 49 due to uncertain release terms.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the defendants' argument for elevated costs despite allegations of fraud made by the plaintiff.

The court considered the complexity of the proceeding, the amounts claimed, the rates and hours spent by counsel, and the reasonable expectations of the parties.

Three consolidated applications concerning the duty of various insurers to defend Ontario in connection with a bridge collapse in Elgin County in 2018.

Ontario sought orders requiring Aviva Insurance Company of Canada and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada to defend two related lawsuits and to share defence costs equally.

The insurers argued they had no duty to defend or, alternatively, that defence costs should be allocated on a "time on risk" basis.

The court found that Aviva and RSA owed a duty to defend based on the allegations of property damage to anchor rods occurring during their respective policy periods, despite the loss of use occurring after the policies expired.

The court rejected the "all sums" approach and adopted a "time on risk" allocation, requiring Aviva to pay 5.5% and RSA to pay 11.1% of defence costs.

The secondary applications by Aviva and RSA against AIG and St. Paul were dismissed as moot.

The plaintiff, a former consultant and minority shareholder of Kela Medical Inc., brought an action for oppression, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith against the corporation and its principals.

The plaintiff claimed he was entitled to a 33% stake in the proceeds of the sale of a related company, KAI, based on a 2013 compensation agreement.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the 2013 Agreement was a one-year contract that expired before the conditions for the plaintiff's claimed benefits were met.

The court also found no oppressive conduct or misrepresentations by the defendants.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff's claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as he knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to his claims when he resigned in 2014, more than two years before commencing the proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's Reply and Defence to Counterclaim under Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied principles of pleading, striking some paragraphs for being prejudicial, legal argument, or evidence, while allowing others deemed harmless or legitimate responses to serious allegations.

The Master emphasized that procedural motions to clean up pleadings are only warranted if they promote a cost-effective, efficient, and just resolution.

The motion was partially successful, with costs awarded to the moving party.

The Plaintiff moved to strike paragraph 19 of the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, arguing it disclosed statements protected by settlement privilege or, alternatively, pleaded evidence contrary to Rule 25.06(1).

The court declined to rule on settlement privilege, deeming it premature, but granted the motion to strike paragraph 19 on the basis that it pleaded evidence.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the Plaintiff.