Associate Judge Jeremy Glick

The plaintiffs moved to strike the defendants' joint defence and counterclaim for failing to comply with previous orders requiring the vendor defendants to pay security into court.

The court found the vendor defendants in clear breach of the orders without a valid excuse.

The motion was granted against the vendor defendants, striking their defence and dismissing their counterclaim.

The motion was denied against the third defendant, who was not subject to the breached orders, but they were required to amend their pleading.

The defendant Kinark brought a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim and to compel the plaintiff to answer refusals from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for the production of a workplace investigation report over which Kinark claimed solicitor-client privilege.

The court first ordered the parties to obtain an order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act before further using youth records.

The court denied leave for the third-party claim, finding it was statute-barred and would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer most of the refused discovery questions, subject to obtaining a YCJA order where applicable.

Finally, the court ordered the production of the workplace investigation report, finding it was not protected by solicitor-client privilege as the lawyer who authored it was not retained to provide legal advice.

The moving party sought leave to issue and register a certificate of pending litigation against a condominium said to secure repayment of substantial advances and ongoing mortgage-related payments.

The responding party disputed any present proprietary entitlement and maintained that repayment or transfer rights would arise only on death.

The court held that the threshold on a CPL motion is whether there is a triable issue as to an interest in land, not whether the claim will ultimately succeed, and found that the pleaded constructive trust claim and evidence of payments toward the property's carrying costs met that threshold.

After weighing the equitable factors, including the risk that the property could be dealt with in a way that would leave the moving party without an effective remedy, the court granted the motion.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment and possession of a mortgaged property following the defendant's default.

The defendant did not dispute the default or the amount owed but argued that summary judgment should not be granted because he had a speculative plan to cure the arrears using funds from a mortgage broker's other pending transactions.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the defendant's plan was speculative, did not address property tax arrears, and the defendant had not properly pursued relief under section 23 of the Mortgages Act.

The motion for summary judgment and possession was granted.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for an interim order to recover possession of a vehicle financed under a conditional sales contract.

The defendant, who purchased the vehicle from a private seller and claimed to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of the bank's lien, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the bank failed to provide sufficient evidence of default or substantial grounds to establish unlawful detention by the defendant.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the defendant, who had possessed the vehicle for over three years and incurred significant costs to recover it after it was stolen.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action for failure to comply with two previous court orders requiring the plaintiff to answer undertakings and refusals, and to pay costs.

The court found that while the plaintiff had made substantial progress on the undertakings and refusals, she had failed to pay the previously ordered costs of $10,203 without a valid explanation.

The court ordered the action stayed pending payment of the costs within 60 days, failing which the action would be dismissed.

The plaintiff noted the defendant in default for a second time after the defendant failed to properly file his statement of defence, despite having served it and actively participating in the litigation.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside the noting in default, explaining that the pleading was rejected due to being submitted through the wrong online portal.

The court granted the motion, finding that default proceedings should not be used for tactical purposes when an action is actively being defended, and directed the parties to attend a case conference.

The defendants in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident brought a motion for the production of the plaintiff's tax returns, employment file from a non-party, and a third year of pre-accident medical records.

The plaintiff consented to producing tax returns but opposed the request for the additional medical records.

The court granted the motion, finding that three years of pre-accident medical records is the baseline standard in personal injury actions and proportional under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also ordered the non-party employer to produce the employment file, as it was relevant to the damages claim and necessary for a fair hearing.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court found that the default judgment was irregularly obtained because the plaintiff noted the defendant in default one day prematurely under the computation of time rules, and because the plaintiff failed to attempt personal service before using an alternative to personal service.

Alternatively, the court applied the Mountain View criteria and found it was in the interests of justice to set aside the default judgment, as the defendant moved promptly, had a plausible excuse for the default, and raised an arguable defence.

The motion was granted and the default judgment was set aside.

The plaintiff brought an action to recognize and enforce a New York judgment against the defendants.

The defendants moved for leave to amend their statements of defence, advance crossclaims against each other, and issue third party claims against another individual named in the foreign judgment.

The court granted leave for the consented amendments regarding the voluntariness of the underlying settlement.

However, the court dismissed the motions for crossclaims and third party claims, finding them legally untenable as they improperly sought to relitigate substantive issues of contribution and indemnity that were not part of the foreign judgment.

In a mortgage enforcement action, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment.

The defendants subsequently brought a motion under Rule 31.10 for leave to examine four non-parties, intending to use the evidence to oppose the summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was an abuse of process as it was brought under the wrong rule to avoid the test under Rule 39.02.

Furthermore, the defendants failed to serve the non-parties with the motion, and the cumulative test under Rule 31.10 was not met because discoveries had not yet taken place.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion, with leave, for access to a jointly owned condominium so she could reside there pending its sale, and for interim spousal support.

After a 28-year marriage, the respondent had been living in a boarding house with no kitchen access while the applicant retained exclusive possession of the mortgage-free matrimonial home.

The court addressed a threshold jurisdictional question regarding an Associate Justice's authority over real property, finding jurisdiction on the basis that the order was incidental to the support motion and did not determine property rights.

The court declined to impute additional income to the respondent beyond $32,000, finding insufficient evidence to rebut her claim of disability.

Using the applicant's income of approximately $216,000 from his 2024 Notice of Assessment, the court ordered interim spousal support of $4,500 monthly, below the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range, accounting for the respondent's ability to reside in the condominium rent-free.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's proceeding under a not-for-profit corporations statute for failure to pay a prior costs award of $33,265.90.

The self-represented applicant failed to attend two hearing dates and took no steps in the matter since July 2025.

Rather than immediately dismissing the application, the court stayed the proceeding and gave the applicant sixty days to pay both the outstanding costs award and additional motion costs of $12,880.21, failing which the application would be dismissed without further notice.

The court balanced the applicant's access to justice against the respondents' right to have court orders enforced, noting that a not-for-profit temple dependent on donations was prejudiced by the ongoing unpaid costs.

Costs decision arising from a motion to compel answers to undertakings in a wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff brought the original motion but by the hearing date the substantive issues had been resolved, leaving only costs.

The court found the motion was not the catalyst for the defendant's compliance, as the defendant had been working to address concerns before the motion was served.

The court also found the plaintiff's rigid and adversarial approach in continuing to press the motion after the issues were largely resolved did not warrant a costs award.

Applying the principle that costs generally should not be awarded where a motion is settled on all issues except costs absent exceptional circumstances, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a mortgage enforcement action from Milton to Guelph, arguing the property and defendants were located in Guelph.

The plaintiff opposed, relying on Rule 13.1.01(3) which requires mortgage actions to be commenced in designated counties.

The court held that Rule 13.1.01(3) does not bar a transfer motion under Rule 13.1.02(2).

However, the court dismissed the motion after finding the defendants brought it for an improper tactical purpose to force a settlement, constituting an abuse of process.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to amend her statement of defence, leave to file a third-party claim against the mortgage broker and brokerage, and consequential timetabling relief, on the eve of the plaintiffs' pending summary judgment motion in a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendant alleged she had recently discovered that the mortgage broker and lender were brothers, asserting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of statutory duty, and misrepresentation by omission as new defences and counterclaim grounds.

The court found the motion was not barred by a prior vexatious-litigant-style order.

Leave to amend was denied in respect of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of statutory duty under the Mortgage Brokerages: Standards of Practice, and misrepresentation by omission, as none disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the lender.

Leave was granted to expand pleadings on unconscionability and improvident bargain, and to issue the third-party claim against the broker and brokerage.

A compressed timetable was imposed to preserve the March 9, 2026 summary judgment date.

In a wrongful dismissal action under the Simplified Procedure, the defendant employer brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to produce a further and better Affidavit of Documents regarding his mitigation efforts.

The plaintiff had produced three affidavits to date, but they contained minimal documentation regarding his job search and new employment, despite mitigation being a live issue.

The court found that the plaintiff had not conducted a diligent search for arguably relevant documents and ordered him to produce a further and better sworn Affidavit of Documents within 30 days.