Sarah Rosales Zelaya

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming their treating psychiatrist's finding that they were incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication and electroconvulsive therapy.

The appellant, who suffers from treatment-refractory schizophrenia, experienced somatic delusions, including a belief that they were pregnant and that the treatments would harm their babies.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant's inability to recognize they were affected by the manifestations of a mental illness rendered them unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent moved to lift the stay of a Consent and Capacity Board decision pending appeal.

The CCB had confirmed the appellant's involuntary status and his incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The appellant, appearing self-represented with an amicus curiae, opposed the motion and sought to expedite the appeal instead.

The court applied the four-part test under section 19 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and found that all criteria were satisfied.

The court granted the motion to lift the stay and authorized treatment with Paliperidone pending final disposition of the appeal, while also ordering the appeal to be expedited and heard on October 3, 2025.

The appellant, J.A., appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice upholding a finding by the Consent and Capacity Board that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, upholding the dismissal of the appellant’s adjournment request and the application of the relevant legal principles regarding capacity and consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Douglas Naus, appealed an order confirming a Consent and Capacity Board decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment and subject to a community treatment order (CTO) requiring antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal from the incapacity finding was moot, but exercised its discretion to decide the CTO issue, holding that the Board and appeal judge erred in interpreting the statutory preconditions for a CTO.

The Court held that the Mental Health Act requires successful treatment to have occurred during a prior hospitalization, not the current one, before a CTO can be issued.

The CTO was quashed.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The court held that the applicable standard of review was palpable and overriding error for the challenged application of the governing legal test, and found that the Board properly distinguished disagreement with diagnosis from inability to appreciate the manifestations of a mental condition.

The court rejected submissions that the Board had engaged in a best interests analysis, had acted unfairly, or had overlooked concerns about side effects and fertility.

The appeal was dismissed and no costs were ordered.

L.L. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The Board had determined that L.L. met the criteria for involuntary detention and lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision about treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications, primarily due to a mental disorder (likely bipolar I with psychotic elements).

The Superior Court dismissed L.L.'s appeal, upholding the Board's finding of incapacity and its procedural fairness.

The court also addressed the admission of fresh evidence and the Board's decision not to appoint amicus curiae, finding no error in either.