Ontario Land Tribunal
Tribunal ontarien de l’aménagement du territoire
ISSUE DATE: April 30, 2026
CASE NO(S).: OLT-25-000614
PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER subsection 34(11) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended
Applicant/Appellant: Frances Sparano
Subject: Application to amend the Zoning By-law – Refusal of application
Description: to permit a kennel use as a home industry in an existing agricultural barn
Reference Number: Z02/25
Property Address: 462220 Concession Road 24
Municipality/UT: Georgian Bluffs/Grey
OLT Case No.: OLT-25-000614
OLT Case Name: Sparano v. Georgian Bluffs (Township)
Heard: January 27 to January 28, 2026 by video hearing, and February 17, in writing
APPEARANCES:
| Parties | Counsel |
|---|---|
| Frances Sparano | Conner Harris, Brynn Leger, Lauren Walsh-Greene |
| Township of Georgian Bluffs | Laura Dean |
DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL DELIVERED BY G.A. CROSER
Link to Order
INTRODUCTION
1The matter before the Tribunal arises from an appeal filed by Frances Sparano (“Appellant”) pursuant to s. 34(11) of the Planning Act (“Act”) with respect to the refusal by the Township of Georgian Bluffs (“Township”) to permit a Zoning By-law Amendment (“ZBLA”) for the property known municipally as 462220 Concession Road 24 (“Property”). The ZBLA was required to allow the housing of 13 dogs within a barn located on the Property. Having heard and considered the oral evidence, supporting documentation, and written closing submissions, and for the reasons set out herein, the appeal is dismissed.
BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL
2The Appellant’s dog, a German Shepherd, had a litter of puppies and the decision was made to keep all of them; the Appellant now has 13 dogs and does not plan on selling any of them.
3In December 2024, the Appellant looked at properties for sale in the Township and made inquiries with the Township about what would be required to bring all their dogs with them to a property in the Township. The Appellant was informed that a kennel license was required to own more than 3 dogs and to obtain a licence the Property would first have to be zoned to allow a kennel use. The Appellant purchased the Property in January 2025 and then submitted an application to permit a kennel use to be located within the existing barn on site (“Application”). It proposed rezoning the portion of the Property where the dogs would reside from Rural (RU) Zone to Rural Exception 97 (RU-97).
4The Township engaged a planner, David Welwood, to conduct an analysis of the Application and to provide a recommendation (“Welwood Report”). In the Welwood Report, dated May 7, 2025, Welwood recommend the approval of the ZBLA with limitations on the gross floor area. The Application was considered at a Township Council Meeting on June 11, 2025, to receive comment on the proposed ZBLA. Four members of the public raised concerns and opposed the Application. County of Grey (“County”) Planning and Development staff requested that a noise study be conducted. The Appellant provided an Environmental Noise Impact Study (“Noise Study”), which concluded that the housing of 13 dogs on the Property would conform with noise guidelines if mitigation measures were implemented. Welwood then prepared an updated report for Township Council for its meeting on July 2, 2025 (“Updated Welwood Report”, and collectively with the Welwood Report “Staff Reports”). The recommendation in the Updated Welwood Report was for the approval of the ZBLA with conditions, including site plan control to implement the mitigation measures proposed in the Noise Study. Township Council refused the ZBLA, citing in the Notice of Decision that “the proposed kennel is not in keeping with the local character of the neighbourhood and may pose undue hardship on neighbouring properties”.
PROPERTY AND SURROUNDING CONTEXT
5The Property has a total area of approximately 18.6 hectares (“ha”), with frontage along Concession 24 of approximately 140 metres (“m”). The Property contains an existing single detached dwelling, a separate barn, and several detached accessory structures. Surrounding land uses include a rural residential dwelling to the west (“Bruin Property”) and other rural and agricultural properties and uses to the north, east, and further to the west. The context was described to the Tribunal as rural land uses on larger lots with natural heritage features, such as woodlands, interspersed within and amongst the uses.
6The Property is composed of three areas: 1) a non-farm area adjacent to Concession 24, occupied by the single detached dwelling and barn; 2) the Hazard Land Area, immediately south of the non-farm area and situated around Gleason Brook; and 3) the Rural Area, located south of the Hazard Land Area, which is approximately 14.3 ha. The southerly portion of the Property is covered with woodland, with an area of approximately 5.5 ha located between the woodland and the barn that has been farmed for hay.
7Although the Property is located within the Township, it is within an area identified in the Township’s Official Plan as “Subject to the County of Grey Official Plan” (“County OP”). In the County OP, the Property is primarily designated as “Rural”, with a section of the Property also designated as “Hazard Lands” and is partly covered by a “Core Area” for Natural Heritage System Core Areas and Linkages. In the Township’s Zoning By-law No. 2020-020 (“ZBL”), the majority of the Property is zoned Rural (RU) Zone, with the exception of the portion of the Property bisected by the Gleason Brook, which is zoned Environmental Protection (EP) Zone.
APPLICATION
8The ZBL explicitly states that kennels are not permitted anywhere in the Township.
9The proposal is to amend the ZBL from Rural (RU) Zone to Rural Exception 97 (RU-97) Zone to permit a “private kennel” as a Home Industry in the existing barn on the Property. The proposed RU-97 Zone would include a provision to permit the maximum gross floor area dedicated to the kennel to be 115 square metres (“sq m”). While the indoor kennel will be limited to the floor area of the existing barn, the proposed plan, as outlined in the Noise Study, shows two large outdoor “dog run areas” that will occupy part of the open space around the residential dwelling. The combined area of the exercise run areas and barn would be under 2,000 sq m.
HEARING EVENT
10The Appellant called two expert witnesses, Omar Rahal and Mike Crough, who were qualified by the Tribunal to provide expert opinion evidence in acoustical engineering and land use planning, respectively. The Appellant also called two witnesses under summons, Michael Benner, Director of Development and Infrastructure for the Township, and David Welwood, the planner who prepared the Staff Reports. The Township called one expert witness, Michael Barton, who was qualified by the Tribunal to provide expert opinion evidence in land use planning. The County did not attend the Hearing or request status.
11One request for Participant status was made at the Hearing. The Parties confirmed that they had received the Participant Statement request in advance of the Hearing and neither Party opposed the request for status. Consequently, Participant status was granted to Laurie and David Bruin (“Bruins”), who own the property directly abutting the Property to the west. While the Bruins’ Participant Statement (“Bruin Statement”) was also signed by other neighbours, status was only granted to the Bruins as they had completed the necessary Tribunal form and provided the accompanying statement. Fifteen Exhibits were marked at the Hearing. A list of them is attached to this Decision as Attachment 1.
Legislative Requirements
12In making its decision, the Tribunal must have regard for matters of provincial interest, as set out in s. 2 of the Act, and, as set out in s. 3 of the Act that the Application must be consistent with the Provincial Planning Statement, 2024 (“PPS”). The Application must conform to the County OP and be consistent with the intent of the ZBL. In addition, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the Application represents good planning that is in the public interest. While part of the Property is designated Woodlands in the Niagara Escarpment Plan, the barn and area intended for the exercise paddocks are outside of the Woodland designation. As such, the Niagara Escarpment Plan is not applicable to this appeal.
13A great deal of time at the Hearing was spent on how the Appellant would be “controlled” in the use of the Property for housing, caring for, and exercising 13 large breed dogs. These matters do not fall within the parameters of s. 34 of the Act and this Decision is strictly related to the zoning of the Property. The Tribunal has referenced the Township’s Kennel By-law No.81-2010 (“Kennel By-law”) to provide context; however, the focus of this Decision is the zoning of the land rather than operational concerns.
Position of the Appellant
14Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the appeal was the product of the Appellant’s love for their dogs. The ZBLA was called “modest, reasonable, and appropriate” and that this was a “narrow exception” to the ZBL to permit a kennel as a home industry on the Property. The use was compatible with rural lands, and the use would be secondary to the primary residence and agricultural uses of the Property. Mike Crough, the Appellant’s planning expert, explained that zoning is a use permission rather than a user permission and this approach framed his opinion in this appeal. In his opinion, zoning is based on definitions and terms, granting permission for rights and responsibilities based on those points. Crough’s uncontested evidence was that the ZBL cannot regulate the number of dogs permitted on the Property, and specifics concerning the user, in this case the Appellant, would be dealt with through other mechanisms, such as licensing and animal control by-laws, or site plan control.
Position of the Township
15The Township submitted that the proposal “would impose undue hardship” on neighbouring properties and would not build upon the existing rural character of the Property. The Township further submitted that the proposed use did not meet the definition of “on-farm diversified use” as it would be the primary use of the Property and because the use would not be secondary to any primary agricultural use of the Property.
Participant Statement
16The Bruin Property is approximately 37 m from the barn on the Property. Their main concerns related to safety, noise, and environmental matters. They noted that German Shepherds are a large dog breed and they raised concerns with respect to public safety if the dogs escaped their enclosures. With respect to noise, the Bruins explained that their dwelling was near the barn and raised concerns with respect to constant noise with respect to managing the dogs’ daily care and exercise. They also raised potential issues surrounding the supply of well water and summer shortages as well as potential contamination of the nearby Brook. The Bruins Statement explained that the barn on the Property was utilized by the previous owner as storage for their plumbing business, and therefore, should not be considered as an ‘agricultural barn’ as it was not used for farming purposes.
17The Tribunal takes note of a statement on page 3 of the Bruin Statement, which states that the “gentleman who used to cut hay from the back fields, did not this past summer, as the fence the neighbours put in prevents a tractor from accessing the field”. The Tribunal takes this to mean that part of the Property is no longer being actively farmed. The weight given to this statement must be measured against the fact that it was not given under oath or subjected to the rigour of cross-examination. With that said, Rule 7.7 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, and s. 17 of the Ontario Land Tribunal Act, 2021 permits participation in a proceeding as a non-party and does not specifically require a written participant statement to be witnessed by a notary or require an attestation with respects to the accuracy of the statement provided. The Tribunal is not implying that the Bruins provided a false or misleading statement, merely that the veracity of said statement must be carefully considered and weighed against the evidence provided at the Hearing.
TRIBUNAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Noise Study
18Omar Rahal was retained by the Appellant to conduct the Noise Study in favour of the Application. The Tribunal was informed that the Township does not have a noise by-law addressing dog barking or kennel-related noise. While there is an Animal Control By-law and Kennel By-law, these do not reference sound level criteria, and the County does not maintain a county-wide noise by-law. As such, the NPC-300 Environmental Noise Guidelines (“NPC-300”) established by the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks (“MECP”), prevail. The Noise Study categorized the Property as being located within a Class 3 (Rural) Area, which reflects a quiet rural acoustical environment with low ambient sound levels.
19In Rahal’s opinion, the proposed location for housing and exercising the dogs was an “acoustically appropriate use of space" and that “noise cannot be eliminated, only controlled”. Rahal explained to the Tribunal that the Noise Study was based on a conservative approach, using the “worst case of any average”. Outdoor barking was assessed as being within the accepted range. The modelling assumed that barking would occur outside intermittently for 15 minutes every hour between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m., and was based on eight dogs outside at one time. Indoor barking was “assessed with all 13 dogs housed in the barn vocalizing during sensitive evening and nighttime periods”. The Noise Study found that, with no acoustic upgrades to the barn, sound levels from indoor barking would exceed the applicable Class 3 criteria, and as such, would require architectural upgrades to the barn (“Mitigation Measures”). The Noise Study predicted that, under mitigated conditions, the predicted sound levels at the two receptors, being the second storey window of the closest neighbour and the adjacent outdoor area, would comply with MECP criteria.
20The Township argued that compliance with technical standards does not equate to zero impacts and that NPC-300 is a quantitative, rather than a qualitative guideline. However, the Township did not produce evidence from an independent acoustical engineering perspective. As such, the Tribunal finds that in the absence of contrary expert evidence, that the findings of the Noise Study are presumptively accurate.
[Section 2](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-p13/latest/rso-1990-c-p13.html#sec2_smooth) of the [Planning Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-p13/latest/rso-1990-c-p13.html) – Matters of Provincial Interest
21The Appellant’s land use planner testified that the Application did have regard for such matters, highlighting s. 2(b) of the Act, regarding the protection of agricultural resources, noting that no prime agricultural lands would be affected by the Application and that there would be no impact on the farmed area of the Property. With respect to s.2(o) of the Act, regarding protection of public health and safety, Crough opined that concerns raised by community members were addressed through limits to the size and scale of the operation and through the implementation of the mitigation measures outlined in the Noise Study. Crough also noted that, although the proposed amendment to the ZBL was a modification to the land use, it was not a physical development of the Property, and as such, would not change its overall character. The Township’s planner, Michael Barton, opined that the ZBLA did not have appropriate regard for s. 2(p) of the Act, being the appropriate location of growth and development, and s. 2(r) of the act, being the promotion of a built form that is well designed and encourages a sense of place.
Tribunal Analysis and Finding
22At the beginning of their oral testimony, Crough acknowledged that he had visited the Property, which he explained was “not unusual”. The Tribunal is concerned that a portion of the Property may no longer be actively farmed, and that while no prime agricultural land is lost, it remains unknown as to whether there is a permanent impact on the farmed area of the Property. As the Appellant’s planner did not visit the Property, Crough would have no knowledge of any recent limitation on the farming of the hay field on site. Further, Barton’s Witness Statement noted that there was “no active agricultural uses on the Subject Property”, although, Barton provided no oral evidence on this point at the Hearing.
23With respect to public safety, the Tribunal was provided no substantive evidence to suggest that the dogs posed a threat to public safety. The Act’s requirement for a well-designed built form in this matter would relate to the proposed fenced in areas for exercising the dogs rather than the existing barn structure. As the Tribunal was not provided any planning rationale for why the Appellant in this matter could not fence part of the Property to exercise their dogs, the Tribunal finds that the proposed fencing of portions of the front of the Property does not disregard s. 2(r) of the Act.
Provincial Planning Statement, 2024
24The Parties’ approaches to Section 2.6 of the PPS, entitled ‘Rural Lands in Municipalities’, differed. According to this Section of the PPS, permitted uses in rural lands includes (among others): residential development; agricultural uses; on-farm diversified uses (“OFDU”); home industries; and “other rural land uses”. While kennels, home occupations, and home industries are not defined terms in the PPS, “on-farm diversified uses” is defined and reads as follows:
On-farm diversified uses: means uses that are secondary to the principal agricultural use of the property, and are limited in area. On-farm diversified uses include, but are not limited to, home occupations, home industries, agri-tourism uses, uses that produce value-added agricultural products, and electricity generation facilities and transmission systems, and energy storage systems.
25The Appellant’s position was that the proposal would be an OFDU, noting the enterprise would be small-scale as the ZBLA included controls for scale and size. Further, the use would be secondary to the primary rural uses of the Property; being the residential dwelling, farmed area, and woodland. It was also noted by the Appellant that there would be no required expansion of infrastructure to repurpose the barn as it would be supported by existing rural services in accordance with Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 of the PPS. Crough’s opinion was that land uses in the PPS were not “strict definitions”, and that, whether the OFDU was secondary in nature was an analysis that must take the entire Property into account. In his view the large use of the Property was “farming for hay” and the woodland, which is zoned rural. In this calculation, the barn and paddocks were “less than the other uses of the property”.
26Welwood, the author of the Staff Reports, testified was that a home industry was not always a subset of an OFDU, and pointed out ‘home industry’ is not defined in the PPS, and that one would typically look at an official plan or zoning by-law for a definition of a ‘home industry’. The Appellant submitted that the proposed kennel would also qualify as being permitted in rural lands under “other rural land use”, as set out in Section 2.6.1(g) of the PPS. It was their position that the kennel would be appropriate in a rural area due to the larger lot sizes and available space.
27The Township did not disagree that a kennel could be an OFDU; however, it was their position that this proposal did not meet the PPS definition as the housing and exercising of 13 dogs would be the primary use of the Property. Alternatively, the Township posited that this use would not be secondary to any primary agricultural use of the Property. Barton drew the Tribunal’s attention to Section 2.5.1 of the PPS which directs that viable rural areas should be supported by building upon rural character and leveraging rural amenities and assets. Barton also referenced Section 2.6.1 of the PPS, testifying that the proposed kennel use would not build upon the existing rural character of the surrounding community, which are primarily single detached dwellings and accessory structures associated with agricultural operations.
Tribunal Analysis and Finding
28The PPS permits OFDU on rural lands and prime agricultural lands. The PPS definition of an OFDU clearly states that the use is “secondary to the principal agricultural use of the property and are limited in area”. ‘Agricultural use’ is defined in the PPS as follows:
[Meaning] the growing of crops, including nursery, biomass, and horticultural crops; raising of livestock; raising of other animals for food, fur or fibre, including poultry and fish; aquaculture; apiaries; agro-forestry; maple syrup production; and associated on-farm buildings and structures, including, but not limited to livestock facilities, manure storages, value-retaining facilities, and housing for farm workers, when the size and nature of the operation requires additional employment.
The Tribunal disagrees with the Appellant’s submission that the residence on the Property is an ‘agricultural use’. The Property is not located on prime agricultural lands, which, as set out in Section 4.3.2(4) of the PPS, permits a dwelling “as an agricultural use”. Section 2.6.1(c) of the PPS permits residential development as a permitted use on rural lands; however, that does not equate to an ‘agricultural use’ as set out in this policy.
29The Tribunal also disagrees with Barton’s suggestion that farming on a property must be active year-round to qualify as farming. Hay is a forage crop and does not require year-round attention, neither do other crops such as corn, or pasture for grazing; however, all are properly considered to be an ‘agricultural use’. The Tribunal finds that in this matter it is more appropriate to consider whether the proposed OFDU would impact or hinder ongoing farming operations on the Property or in the surrounding area. If access to the hay fields is prevented due to new fencing, as claimed in the Bruin Statement, then that area is no longer being actively farmed. In the absence of clarity with respect to ongoing farming operations at the Property, the Tribunal finds that, based on the uncertainty of whether the Property is still being actively farmed, there is insufficient evidence to make a determination on whether the proposed kennel would constitute an OFDU.
30However, the Tribunal accepts Crough’s evidence that the housing of multiple dogs could be considered an ‘other rural land use’ that is permitted in Section 2.6.1(g) of the PPS; a broad and flexible category. The Tribunal finds that the Application is consistent with Policy 2.5.1 of the PPS in that a kennel would not necessarily detract from a rural character in an area comprised of large lots. Based on the visual evidence provided at the Hearing, it is evident that the existing vegetation along Concession Road 24 would shield the paddocks from public view. The Tribunal was provided no evidence to contradict Crough’s opinion with respect to Section 2.6.2.3 of the PPS and finds that, overall, the Application is generally consistent with the PPS.
County of Grey Official Plan
31The Planners’ evidence at the Hearing focused on the kennel as an OFDU. Crough testified that a ‘kennel’ and ‘home industry” were specifically listed as examples of an OFDU found in Table 7 of the County OP, titled ‘Permitted Use Examples in Agricultural and Rural Land Use Types’. Crough used this as basis for his opinion that the proposal for the Property was in conformity with the County OP as both a kennel and a home industry. The Appellant’s planner mentioned Section 5.2.2(19)(a) of the County OP that requires a new OFDU to “not interfere with, or generate offsite adverse impacts, and will be compatible with surrounding uses”. It was his opinion that the repurposing of the barn and exercise areas would not create any adverse impact that could not be addressed through mitigation measures. Crough also referenced the Guidelines on Permitted Uses in Ontario’s Prime Agricultural Areas, published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (“Guidelines”). These Guidelines include ‘Kennel’ as an example of a home occupation, and the Appellant submitted that the list of home occupations in the Guidelines was not randomly chosen, that it was “made up of uses that are most likely compatible in an agricultural designation”. Crough opined that the kennel, as an OFDU, conformed to the County OP, and was compatible with the surrounding area and Guidelines.
32The Township also referenced Section 5.2.2(19)(a) of the County OP. Barton pointed out that the Noise Study demonstrated that the kennel use would introduce a level of noise that, if left unmitigated, would not comply with the standards for Class 3 areas in NPC-300. Further, the proposed canine activities would generate off-site adverse impacts, including noise, which would not be compatible with the Bruins’ neighbouring residential use. The Township drew the Tribunal’s attention to Section 5.2.2(19)(d) of the County OP, which states that the scale of an OFDU “is secondary to the active agricultural use of the farm property, and appropriate to the site and surrounding area”. Barton’s evidence was that utilization of part of the front section of the Property for the use and care of 13 dogs would constitute the primary use of the Property based on the intensity of the use.
33The Welwood Report stated that the residence on the Property was “an existing non-farm use”, and as such, the kennel would be considered a home industry per Section 3.2.6 of the County OP. Neither Party retained planning expert opined on this Section of the County OP. Welwood testified that the proposed kennel was appropriate for rural land, noted the larger lot sizes in the area and that the use would not result in the removal of any agricultural land. Welwood also commented that he “did not initially think of [the kennel] as a diversified farm use” but overall agreed with the County’s comments on the Welwood Report.
Tribunal Analysis and Finding
34There was disagreement between the retained experts with respect to the maximum permitted size of an OFDU on rural lands. Table 8 of the County OP, titled ‘On-farm Diversified Use Size Criteria’ identified the maximum for a ‘Rural’ land use as the lesser of “2% of the total size of the Property” or a “maximum combined area of the use of 2,000 Square metres”. The Appellant submitted that the total area dedicated to the kennel would not exceed 2,000 sq m. Barton’s position was that the scale of the proposed kennel area would render it as the primary use of the Property. The Tribunal preferred the evidence of Crough on this point and finds that, as written, the County OP directs that the entire Property is to be utilized in such a calculation. As there was no disagreement with respect to the overall size of the proposed kennel, the Tribunal accepts Crough’s point that Table 8 would be satisfied. With respect to Section 5.2.2(19)(d) of the County OP, the footprint of the barn and exercise runs are limited in area when considering the entirety of the Property, and no prime agricultural land would be displaced by the proposed use. Barton is correct that the activity and intensification of use of the lands at the front of the Property would be increased; however, the Tribunal accepts Welwood’s viewpoint that the principal use of the Property would continue to be the residential dwelling and that the kennel would be subordinate to the principal use.
35The Tribunal cannot make a decision on whether the kennel would constitute an OFDU without clarity as to whether farming operations are ongoing at the Property and whether the proposed set up of the kennel operation would hinder the ability of the Property to be farmed. If farming operations remain ongoing at the Property, then the Tribunal is cognizant of Section 5.2.2(19)(a) and the potential for impacts to the Bruins created by the housing of 13 dogs near their residence. While the Noise Study sets out Mitigation Measures, the Tribunal was provided no substantive evidence that any upgrades to the barn had been completed. Michael Benner acknowledged during cross-examination that the Kennel By-law requires that no part of the kennel establishment shall be closer than 46 m from the property line of any property other than that of the licensee. Benner found it “a little bit problematic” that the Bruins residence is only 37 m from the barn. His evidence to the Tribunal was that this would either require an amendment to the Kennel By-law or construction of a kennel that complied with the requirements of the Kennel By-law.
36A Tribunal decision is based on the written and oral evidence provided to it by the Parties. The Parties guide the Tribunal through the evidence and it is not the Tribunal’s role to go off the beaten path, as it were, to find alternative strategies or solutions. In this matter, the Tribunal is unclear if the proposed kennel would qualify as an OFDU. However, the Tribunal finds that the categorization of the ‘Kennel’ in the policies of the County OP is of secondary importance to the location of the proposed kennel. The Tribunal finds that the utilization of the barn for housing 13 dogs is too close to the Bruin Property, creating the potential for interference with the Bruins use of their residence. Although the area is characterized by large lots, the proximity of the Bruin’s residence to the proposed use of the barn create a possibility for adverse impacts that were not denied by the Appellant. While a kennel may be an appropriate use on rural lands, that is not to say that all rural lands are equally suitable. As the Tribunal was not provided with an alternative proposal for constructing a purpose-built facility on the easterly property line, the Tribunal finds that the Application does not conform to the County OP.
Township of Georgian Bluffs Zoning By-law
37Dog owners in the Township are permitted to keep up to three dogs, as of right. Crough testified that he did not find 13 dogs to be “a significant departure from 3 dogs”. The Tribunal disagrees and finds that an increase in dog ownership of over 400% is significant. Although ‘kennel’ is not defined in the PPS or County OP, it does have a definition in the ZBL, which reads as follows:
Kennel means an establishment where dogs, cats or other small domestic animals or household pets are bred or raised primarily for the purpose of sale, or are trained or boarded for gain or profit, but does not include a veterinary clinic.
38As the Appellant has been clear that they do not intend to sell any of their dogs, and as no evidence was proffered that the Appellant’s dogs are trained for performance work, conformation shows, or that the Appellant intended to board dogs owned by other individuals, the definition in the ZBL has not been met. Benner stated that, although the ‘kennel’ definition had a “commercial component”, it was not a requirement. In Benner’s view, the commercial component was “inferred as the municipality cannot force someone to operate a business”. The solution utilized by Benner was to create a new definition of ‘private kennel’ into the ZBL to distinguish the Appellant’s proposed use of keeping 13 dogs as pets from commercial kennel operations. Benner called this a “slightly different nuance to a kennel use”.
39The Welwood Report stated that, based on ZBL definition and provisions for a ‘Home Industry’ use and definition of ‘kennel’, a kennel would not be considered a ‘Home Industry’ and that a site-specific exception would be required to permit the kennel use. The Tribunal was provided no evidence at the Hearing to contradict this statement.
40The Tribunal heard evidence that the two commercial kennels in the Township that have previously received zoning by-law amendments. It was evident from the aerial imagery and oral evidence that the two kennels are distinguishable from the proposed use at hand, particularly with respect to the distance to the nearest neighbouring residences.
41While Benner ‘s point with respect to forcing operation of a business is noted, the Tribunal takes the view that there is an additional component to the commercial nature of a kennel, as defined in the ZBL, that the number of dogs on site is usually transitory. The Township permits its residents to own three dogs as of right, thirteen dogs is a significant increase for pet ownership at a single address. As a kennel is explicitly prohibited in the ZBL, and there is no indication that the Appellant is engaged in a canine enterprise for gain or profit, the Tribunal finds that the Application is not consistent with the intent of the ZBL.
ORDER
42The appeal is dismissed.
“G.A. Croser”
G.A. CROSER Member Ontario Land Tribunal
Website: www.olt.gov.on.ca Telephone: 416-212-6349 Toll Free: 1-866-448-2248
The Conservation Review Board, the Environmental Review Tribunal, the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal and the Mining and Lands Tribunal are amalgamated and continued as the Ontario Land Tribunal (“Tribunal”). Any reference to the preceding tribunals or the former Ontario Municipal Board is deemed to be a reference to the Tribunal.
ATTACHMENT 1
Exhibit List for 25-000614
- Affidavit of Service
- Joint Document Book
- a. Michael Barton Witness Statement b. Visual Evidence of Michael Barton c. CV & Acknowledgement of Expert Duty for Michael Barton
- Appellant Witness Statement Book
- Mike Crough Reply Statement
- Visual Evidence of the Appellant
- David Welwood CV
- NPC-300
- Definition section of ZBL
- Google Map imahe of Haliday Hill Kennels
- Participant Statement of Laurie & Dave Bruin
- Township of Georgian Bluffs Animal Control By-law No. 79-2013
- Township of Georgian Bluffs Kennel By-law No. 81-2010
- OMAFRA Guidelines
a. Google Map aerial view: 462220 Concession Rd 24 b. Google Map aerial view: County Self-Storage c. Google Map aerial view: AJS Metals Inc. d. Google Map aerial view: Step Move Car Removals e. Google Map aerial view: Klunders

