Robert Calderwood

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The vendor had attempted to terminate the agreement due to increased construction costs, but did so after the contractual cancellation date.

The court found the vendor in breach and ordered specific performance, requiring the transfer of the land with an abatement of the purchase price equal to the estimated cost of construction.

The court also dismissed the vendor's third-party claim against the municipality, finding that building officials do not owe a duty of care to protect a developer's profit margins from delays in processing building permits.

The plaintiff set the action down for trial and counsel attended trial scheduling court to fix a date.

The judge convened a case conference and determined that the action, commenced in 2014 regarding a construction dispute, was not ready for trial.

Interlocutory steps including undertakings, potential refusal motions, and expert reports were incomplete, and a companion action had sat dormant.

The judge struck the action from the trial list, directing counsel to return only when the matter is truly ready for trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment after noting the defendants in default for failing to file a statement of defence in a breach of contract claim regarding a share purchase agreement.

The self-represented individual defendant moved to set aside the noting in default, citing language barriers, confusion over legal representation, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside, finding the defendant's explanations not credible and his conduct strategic and delaying.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for default judgment, awarding $204,000 based on deemed admissions and documentary evidence.

The Palmigiani defendants successfully requested an adjournment of the trial date.

A telephone case conference was subsequently held to schedule a new trial date and address the plaintiffs' request for costs thrown away.

The court found that there was minimal wasted trial preparation given the new trial date.

The Palmigiani defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs $2,100 all-inclusive for costs thrown away and trial scheduling preparation.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant corporate tenant and its principal as indemnifier for unpaid rent and future rental losses after the tenant abandoned the commercial premises.

The tenant argued there was an informal understanding to delay enforcement while a new tenant was found, and that assigning the liquor license released the indemnifier.

The court found no enforceable agreement to release the indemnifier or delay enforcement.

The landlord reasonably mitigated its damages by re-letting the premises.

Judgment was granted for the landlord for arrears and future rental losses, less the security deposit.

Multiple groups of investors and the respondents brought motions before the Ontario Securities Commission seeking to revoke Freeze Directions, allocate disgorged funds to specific investors, and facilitate the sale of frozen real property.

The respondents also sought to vary the disgorgement amount or set aside the previously approved settlement agreement.

The Commission dismissed the motions, holding that it lacks adjudicative jurisdiction to order restitution to individual investors or to vary an approved settlement agreement.

The Commission noted that the allocation of disgorged funds is an administrative function and directed Staff to apply to the Superior Court of Justice for directions on distributing the frozen funds and facilitating the sale of the real estate.

The corporate plaintiff was ordered to pay $15,000 into court as security for costs.

The sole officer and director paid the amount with his own personal funds.

The defendant later obtained judgment against the plaintiff on its counterclaim and sought an order under the Creditors' Relief Act that the money paid into court be paid out to it as an execution creditor.

The motion judge granted the order.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the order, finding that the funds were impressed with a Quistclose trust in favour of the director who advanced them for a specific purpose.

The funds never belonged to the execution debtor and were not available for distribution to its creditors.