Dr. Milan Pomichalek

The offender was convicted of manslaughter after brutally beating the victim to death in an apartment building laundry room.

The offender suffered from severe, lifelong mental illnesses, including schizoaffective disorder, and had a history of non-compliance with medication leading to violent behaviour.

The Crown sought a 16-20 year sentence followed by a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order, while the defence sought a time-served sentence of approximately 10 years.

Emphasizing the paramount need to protect the public from an offender who poses a high risk of violent recidivism when unsupervised and unmedicated, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.

Consequently, the Crown's application for a Long-Term Supervision Order was dismissed.

The appellant, Kirk Williams, sought leave to appeal his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the statutory pathways for designation were met and in assessing future harm and treatment prospects.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusions regarding the dangerous offender pathways, the consideration of medical treatments, or the assessment of recidivism risk.

The court upheld the indeterminate sentence as necessary for public protection.

The accused was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for the stabbing deaths of a father and son in their home.

The mandatory sentence is life imprisonment.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 20 years, while the defence sought 16 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, the accused's background, and the impact of pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court set the period of parole ineligibility at 18 years concurrent on each count, commencing from the date of arrest.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing incident outside a bar.

The accused raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder, arguing he experienced a dissociative episode triggered by post-traumatic stress disorder after hearing a threat to shoot.

The court rejected the NCR defence, finding the accused's evidence of dissociation and lack of memory lacked credibility, particularly given his organized post-offence conduct.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the specific intent required for murder and attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the suddenness of the attack, the single stab wounds, and the accused's intoxication and PTSD.

The accused was found not guilty of the charged offences but guilty of the included offences of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after returning to Canada from Jamaica with four tins containing the drug.

The accused admitted to importing the tins but claimed she did not know they contained cocaine, believing she was transporting non-drug items for a friend.

The defence sought to introduce expert psychological evidence regarding the accused's intellectual capacity to support her lack of knowledge, which the court ruled inadmissible as unnecessary for assessing credibility.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt about her knowledge of the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing the victim 34 times in his basement.

The defence conceded the accused killed the victim but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code due to severe paranoid delusions and schizophrenia.

The court found the accused suffered from a disease of the mind but rejected the NCR defence, concluding the defence failed to prove the delusions caused the killing or rendered the accused incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence of the accused's prior violence against women.

Finding a reasonable doubt on the element of forcible confinement required for first-degree murder, the court convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The accused applied for a mistrial during his second-degree murder trial following a violent outburst in the courtroom while the Crown was delivering its closing address to the jury.

The accused yelled profanities, damaged the prisoner's box, and had to be removed by security.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the outburst was likely a manifestation of mental illness rather than a calculated attempt to derail the trial, but that it did not cause irreparable prejudice.

The court relied on the strong presumption of jury integrity and concluded that the incident did not meet the high standard required for a mistrial.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and related offences.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record and a severe substance use disorder.

The court reviewed extensive psychiatric and psychological evidence, including risk assessments using the PCL-R, VRAG, and HCR-20.

The court found that the predicate offence was reactive rather than instrumental, and therefore did not form part of a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour required for a dangerous offender designation.

However, the court found the offender met the criteria for a long-term offender designation.

The offender was sentenced to a further 12 months in custody followed by a 6.5-year long-term supervision order.