Andrea Esson

The court ruled on the admissibility of various photographs in a second-degree murder trial where the accused admitted to killing his mother, and the sole issue was intent.

The court admitted scene and autopsy photographs, finding their probative value in illustrating the crime scene, supporting expert testimony, and detailing injuries outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, a "before" photograph of the deceased and a "harrowing" "after" photograph of her severely injured face were deemed inadmissible due to their inflammatory nature and low probative value compared to the pathologist's verbal testimony, which was considered the primary source of information regarding the extent of force used.

During a criminal trial, the judge issued a ruling regarding the Crown's closing arguments.

The Crown had invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the accused's post-arrest silence concerning the accidental nature of his mother's death.

The court found this argument to be a clear violation of the accused's right to silence, as established by a long line of judicial authority.

The judge determined that using omissions in a police statement to infer guilt directly was a serious error that jeopardized trial fairness.

Consequently, the judge crafted a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the improper Crown argument.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by a witness regarding the deceased's ambiguous response ("Oh Nadira") to a question about the accused hitting her, arguing it constituted an adoptive admission by silence.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The judge reasoned that the extra inferential step required for an adoptive admission, combined with the vagueness of the statement, significantly attenuated its probative value and posed a serious risk of wide-ranging speculation by the jury.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct to prove the mental element for murder, as the defence conceded the act of killing but disputed intent.

Applying the R. v. Handy framework, the court ruled that evidence from a long-time friend of the deceased (Ms. Dindyal) detailing the troubled mother-son relationship, disrespect, and property damage was admissible.

This evidence provided necessary context for the accused's mental state and the "reservoir of anger" leading to the killing.

However, 911 calls and testimony from other witnesses (Mr. Peters, Ms. Vella, Ms. Allen) were deemed inadmissible due to being too remote in time (accused was an adolescent), lacking sufficient probative value, or being cumulative and overly prejudicial.

The court emphasized balancing the need for historical context against the risk of prejudice, particularly from cumulative evidence.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown sought an adverse inference instruction regarding the accused's failure to call witnesses to support an alibi mentioned in his police statement.

The defence had argued in closing that the alibi was uncontradicted and raised a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge declined to give the adverse inference instruction, finding that the defence's closing submissions did not leave an unbalanced picture with the jury and that it would be unfair since the Crown had introduced the statement containing the alibi.

This is a preliminary inquiry judgment determining whether sufficient evidence exists to commit the accused to trial on firearm-related offences.

The Crown charged both accused with ten joint firearm offences, with the accused Taitt facing two additional charges of criminal negligence.

The court applied the established test for preliminary inquiries, examining whether there is any admissible evidence capable of supporting each essential element of the offences.

The court committed both accused to trial on counts involving possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and being occupants of a motor vehicle knowing a firearm was present.

The court discharged both accused on counts alleging discharge of a firearm with intent to wound specific individuals, finding insufficient evidence of the specific intent required.

The court committed only Taitt to trial on the criminal negligence charge.

In a prosecution for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application seeking admission of several out-of-court statements made by the deceased to friends and associates describing a deteriorating relationship with the accused and expressing fear that the accused and his family intended to kill him.

The court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of the statements under the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement expressing fear that the accused would kill the deceased with his own guns was admissible under the traditional state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The remaining statements describing prior disputes, business dealings, and a recent altercation between the deceased and the accused were admitted under the principled exception because necessity was established and sufficient indicia of reliability existed through corroborating evidence and contextual circumstances.

The probative value of the evidence relating to animus and motive outweighed any prejudicial effect, including concerns about prior discreditable conduct.

The accused, a Black man charged with the murder of an Asian man, brought a motion to allow multiple-choice questions to be put to prospective jurors during the challenge for cause process, arguing the standard Parks question is insufficient to uncover subconscious racial bias.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the standard question.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the proposed multiple-choice format would be an improvement over the standard Parks question, but directed that jurors be instructed they may provide detailed answers rather than just 'yes' or 'no'.

The Crown sought a ruling that an accused’s inculpatory statement made to a police officer while awaiting medical treatment was voluntary and admissible.

The statement was made after the accused had earlier invoked the right to silence during a recorded interview and after consulting counsel.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, emphasizing gaps in the officer’s notes and inconsistencies in recollection.

The court applied the contextual voluntariness analysis and concluded that uncertainties about the unrecorded portions of the conversation and the officer’s unreliable recollection raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible and the Charter exclusion argument became moot.

During a jury trial for second degree murder arising from the death of a young child, the defence sought to call a kinesiologist as a forensic expert to testify that the child’s fatal injuries could have resulted from a series of accidental falls.

Applying the admissibility framework for expert evidence set out in Mohan and Abbey, the court found the proposed witness was not properly qualified and that the proposed field of "forensic kinesiology" was not a recognized scientific discipline.

The court also found the proposed opinion relied on limited anecdotal factual foundations and reflected an advocacy-driven approach rather than objective expertise.

The probative value of the evidence was minimal and its prejudicial effect significant because it purported to address the ultimate issue of accident versus homicide.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of her three‑year‑old child following a prolonged pattern of physical abuse.

Medical evidence established multiple blunt‑force injuries of varying ages, including skull fractures and internal bleeding, culminating in a fatal head injury inflicted while the child was in the accused’s sole care.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that earlier injuries resulted from an accidental bookcase incident and found beyond a reasonable doubt that she had inflicted numerous prior assaults over weeks or months.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence in cases involving violence against vulnerable children and abuse of parental trust, the court imposed a substantial penitentiary term.

Immigration consequences were considered but given only modest weight.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder following the death of her three-year-old child from blunt force head trauma, applied for a directed verdict on both second-degree murder and manslaughter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and expert medical testimony indicating the child suffered multiple inflicted injuries of varying ages while in the exclusive care of the accused.

The court applied the Sheppard test and found sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude the accused committed an unlawful act causing death, and that she had the requisite intent for murder.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

During a trial for second-degree murder involving the death of a three-year-old child, the Crown sought to introduce graphic autopsy photographs.

The accused objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and would alienate the jury.

The court ruled the photographs admissible, finding they were necessary to demonstrate the nature and extent of the injuries, which was critical to the Crown's theory that the injuries were inflicted deliberately rather than accidentally.

The court concluded the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The Crown sought estreatment of a recognizance after the accused failed to appear in court while released on bail secured by a $5,000 recognizance consisting of a $2,500 cash deposit and a $2,500 no‑deposit pledge by a surety.

The surety had personally deposited the $2,500 cash but sought its return after attempting to be relieved as surety and reporting the accused’s breach to police.

The court considered the statutory framework governing recognizances and forfeiture under the Criminal Code and authorities addressing standing and ownership of bail deposits.

While recognizing that a surety may deposit bail money and may have standing to seek its return, the court held that in this case the recognizance and receipt clearly recorded the cash deposit in the accused’s name.

As a result, the deposit could not be returned to the surety and was forfeited upon the accused’s default.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of a handgun discovered in the trunk of a vehicle following a police stop.

Police officers testified they observed the accused place a firearm in the trunk before stopping the vehicle and conducting a search incident to arrest.

The court found significant credibility and reliability problems in the officers’ testimony, including material inconsistencies and implausible explanations, and concluded the Crown failed to establish that officers honestly believed they had seen a gun placed in the trunk.

The court held the search was unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and the detention was arbitrary under s. 9.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined the serious Charter breaches and impact on the accused’s rights outweighed society’s interest in adjudication on the merits, and the firearm evidence was excluded.