Raymond Kam Kwan Wong

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements from a deceased declarant, Lori Parker, against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who is charged with manslaughter and other offences.

The court considered two material aspects of Parker's statements to her then-husband, Robert Parker: (1) that she gave the accused information about the victim, Henrietta Knight, having money and plotted with him to steal it; and (2) that the accused threatened her family if she disclosed this.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the first statement substantively reliable due to a lack of motive to fabricate and strong corroboration from the accused's own statements to an undercover officer.

Consequently, the first statement was admitted for the truth of its contents.

However, the second statement regarding threats was deemed unreliable due to a plausible motive for fabrication (to prevent Robert Parker from going to the police) and lack of corroboration, and was therefore admitted only for the fact that it was said, not for its truth.

The Crown applied for an order to protect the identities of a civilian police agent and an undercover officer involved in the investigation of a criminal case against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who faced charges including manslaughter, first-degree murder, robbery, and arson.

The application was brought under sections 486.31(1) and 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused did not oppose the order, and no media intervened.

The court granted the order, finding it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the safety and security of the police agent and undercover officer from intimidation or retaliation, while balancing this need with the open court principle and freedom of expression.

The order specified terms for pseudonyms, non-disclosure of identifying information, publication bans, and restrictions on recording and access to exhibits.

Siaka Camara was found guilty by a jury of multiple firearms offences, carrying a weapon for a dangerous purpose, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of prohibited firearms, and assault.

He also pleaded guilty to fraudulent personation and four counts of breaching firearms prohibition orders.

The court considered sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and public protection as primary, with rehabilitation as a secondary factor.

Aggravating factors included his criminal record, illegal return to Canada, and the serious nature of the firearms offences.

The court imposed a global sentence of nine years, less 4.5 years for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 4.5 years to be served, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, forfeiture, and no-contact orders.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various photographs in a second-degree murder trial where the accused admitted to killing his mother, and the sole issue was intent.

The court admitted scene and autopsy photographs, finding their probative value in illustrating the crime scene, supporting expert testimony, and detailing injuries outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, a "before" photograph of the deceased and a "harrowing" "after" photograph of her severely injured face were deemed inadmissible due to their inflammatory nature and low probative value compared to the pathologist's verbal testimony, which was considered the primary source of information regarding the extent of force used.

During a criminal trial, the judge issued a ruling regarding the Crown's closing arguments.

The Crown had invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the accused's post-arrest silence concerning the accidental nature of his mother's death.

The court found this argument to be a clear violation of the accused's right to silence, as established by a long line of judicial authority.

The judge determined that using omissions in a police statement to infer guilt directly was a serious error that jeopardized trial fairness.

Consequently, the judge crafted a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the improper Crown argument.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by a witness regarding the deceased's ambiguous response ("Oh Nadira") to a question about the accused hitting her, arguing it constituted an adoptive admission by silence.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The judge reasoned that the extra inferential step required for an adoptive admission, combined with the vagueness of the statement, significantly attenuated its probative value and posed a serious risk of wide-ranging speculation by the jury.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct to prove the mental element for murder, as the defence conceded the act of killing but disputed intent.

Applying the R. v. Handy framework, the court ruled that evidence from a long-time friend of the deceased (Ms. Dindyal) detailing the troubled mother-son relationship, disrespect, and property damage was admissible.

This evidence provided necessary context for the accused's mental state and the "reservoir of anger" leading to the killing.

However, 911 calls and testimony from other witnesses (Mr. Peters, Ms. Vella, Ms. Allen) were deemed inadmissible due to being too remote in time (accused was an adolescent), lacking sufficient probative value, or being cumulative and overly prejudicial.

The court emphasized balancing the need for historical context against the risk of prejudice, particularly from cumulative evidence.