Shanna Ferrone

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder alongside a co-accused, applied for severance under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a joint trial would violate his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time, as the co-accused's counsel was unavailable until six months past the Jordan ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the strong public interest in joint trials for co-accused alleged to have acted in concert outweighed the anticipated delay, which was partially justified by the complexity of a multi-accused trial and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of possessing two loaded handguns while bound by a firearms prohibition.

The reviewing judge found that the addition of a new surety and clarification of the sureties' financial assets constituted a material change in circumstances, and that the original justice of the peace erred in law by concluding the sureties had no reasonably recoverable assets.

However, upon conducting a full review, the judge dismissed the application.

The judge found that the circumstantial evidence strongly suggested the accused was involved in drug trafficking, which elevated the risk to the public.

The proposed supervision plan, while better than most, was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground risks associated with the combination of drugs and loaded firearms.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry justice committed jurisdictional error by relying on insufficient circumstantial evidence of identity.

The reviewing judge found no jurisdictional error, concluding that the preliminary inquiry justice properly engaged in a limited weighing of the evidence, including DNA on a glove, video surveillance, clothing similarities, and association with the co-accused, to determine that a reasonable inference of guilt was available.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the plea and sentencing could proceed by audioconference rather than in person or by video.

The accused had been in custody since March 2019 and wished to plead guilty expeditiously.

The court ruled that both subsection 650(2)(b) and section 715.23 of the Criminal Code provided authority for the plea to proceed by audioconference, distinguishing the case from R. v. Candelaria on the basis that the accused was represented by counsel and had expressly waived his right to appear in person or by video.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

Following a search warrant execution, police seized computers and external hard drives containing video files.

The Crown proceeded on four accessible movies depicting young Asian girls in swimsuits and various clothing.

The central issue was whether three of the movies met the statutory definition of child pornography under section 163.1(1)(a)(ii), which requires that the dominant characteristic be the depiction of a sexual organ or anal region of a person under 18 years for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on one movie (as conceded by defence) but acquitted on the three contested movies, finding that while they could possibly meet the definition, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the dominant characteristic was the depiction of sexual organs or anal regions.

The defendant brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home and personal computer, arguing that there were no reasonable grounds for the warrant's issuance and that the search violated his Charter rights under section 8.

The defendant raised three grounds: typographical errors in the Information to Obtain, staleness of information due to a two-month delay, and insufficient corroboration of the evidence.

The court found that the errors were inadvertent and correctable, that the delay was not fatal given the nature of digital evidence and forensic retrieval capabilities, and that sufficient corroboration existed.

The motion was dismissed and the warrant was upheld as valid.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various photographs in a second-degree murder trial where the accused admitted to killing his mother, and the sole issue was intent.

The court admitted scene and autopsy photographs, finding their probative value in illustrating the crime scene, supporting expert testimony, and detailing injuries outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, a "before" photograph of the deceased and a "harrowing" "after" photograph of her severely injured face were deemed inadmissible due to their inflammatory nature and low probative value compared to the pathologist's verbal testimony, which was considered the primary source of information regarding the extent of force used.

The accused was charged with robbery and unauthorized use of a stolen credit card arising from a home invasion.

Following a voir dire on the admissibility of a video-recorded statement, the court found the statement was involuntary and excluded it from evidence.

The court also found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights due to police denigration of defence counsel's advice.

The court applied the Grant test and determined that exclusion of the statement was necessary to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.

During a criminal trial, the judge issued a ruling regarding the Crown's closing arguments.

The Crown had invited the jury to draw an adverse inference from the accused's post-arrest silence concerning the accidental nature of his mother's death.

The court found this argument to be a clear violation of the accused's right to silence, as established by a long line of judicial authority.

The judge determined that using omissions in a police statement to infer guilt directly was a serious error that jeopardized trial fairness.

Consequently, the judge crafted a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the improper Crown argument.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by a witness regarding the deceased's ambiguous response ("Oh Nadira") to a question about the accused hitting her, arguing it constituted an adoptive admission by silence.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The judge reasoned that the extra inferential step required for an adoptive admission, combined with the vagueness of the statement, significantly attenuated its probative value and posed a serious risk of wide-ranging speculation by the jury.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown applied to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct to prove the mental element for murder, as the defence conceded the act of killing but disputed intent.

Applying the R. v. Handy framework, the court ruled that evidence from a long-time friend of the deceased (Ms. Dindyal) detailing the troubled mother-son relationship, disrespect, and property damage was admissible.

This evidence provided necessary context for the accused's mental state and the "reservoir of anger" leading to the killing.

However, 911 calls and testimony from other witnesses (Mr. Peters, Ms. Vella, Ms. Allen) were deemed inadmissible due to being too remote in time (accused was an adolescent), lacking sufficient probative value, or being cumulative and overly prejudicial.

The court emphasized balancing the need for historical context against the risk of prejudice, particularly from cumulative evidence.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown and defendant proceeded to trial on January 15-17, 2018, approximately 18.5 months after the charges were laid on July 2, 2016.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

After deducting approximately three months of defence delay, the net delay was approximately 15.5 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to establish meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown abandoned the over 80 charge due to inability to establish the two-hour presumption of identity.

The defence challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, alleging section 8 and 9 violations based on lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge found the arresting officer had ample reasonable and probable grounds based on the serious collision, witness identification, vehicle registration, and observable signs of impairment.

The court convicted on the impaired charge based on the totality of evidence including poor driving, admissions on the breath room video, breath readings, and observations of impairment.

Moyi Wang was found guilty of two counts of possession of child pornography.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the nature of the images, and mitigating factors, such as his youth at the time of the offence, lack of criminal record, strong family support, and willingness to undergo treatment.

The court imposed a sentence of nine months incarceration, credited with seven days for time served, followed by three years of probation with specific conditions.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, forfeiture of seized computers, and registration on the National Sex Offender Registry for twenty years, along with a five-year prohibition under s. 161 of the Criminal Code, but declined a further internet prohibition under s. 161(d) as disproportionate.

The applicants, Aaron Kennedy and Sean McDermott, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court applied both the R. v. Morin and the new R. v. Jordan frameworks for assessing delay.

While acknowledging significant Crown delay due to late disclosure, the court found that the total delay, after accounting for defence-attributable delays (such as Mr. McDermott's vacation choice), fell below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court also considered the prejudice to the accused, noting Mr. Kennedy's continued detention, but ultimately dismissed both applications, finding no Charter breach.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and touching for a sexual purpose a person under the age of 16 contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offences occurred on or about May 25, 2014, involving a three-year-old complainant.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the complainant, her brother, and their mother.

The accused provided a statement to police denying the allegations and offering an alternative account of events.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the accused's guilt based on inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, the plausibility of the accused's alternative account, and concerns about the reliability of evidence from a very young child at a late hour.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code and touching for a sexual purpose of a person under the age of 16 contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code, relating to alleged conduct on or about May 25, 2014.

A voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the statement on the grounds of improper inducement and alleged violation of the right to counsel.

The court found that the Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, rejecting the defence's arguments regarding both inducement and the right to counsel violation.