Holly Kathryn Chiavetti

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit similar fact evidence across multiple counts in a multi-count indictment involving allegations of physical and sexual abuse by parents against their children.

The court reviews the legal principles governing similar fact evidence, including the need for the Crown to clearly articulate the evidence, issues, and purposes for which such evidence is proffered, and the requirement that its probative value outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The court also considers the timing and form of the Crown's application, the potential for collusion or inadvertent tainting among witnesses, and the appropriate instructions to the trier of fact.

Ultimately, the court finds that the probative value of the similar fact evidence is high and the prejudice is low, granting the Crown's application to admit the evidence across counts.

The Crown brought a voir dire application under R. v. Khan to admit an audio recording of a child, M., disclosing alleged sexual abuse by her parents.

The court found that while the necessity criterion for hearsay admissibility was met, the reliability criterion was not.

Factors undermining reliability included the absence of confirmation of M.'s understanding of the importance of telling the truth, the inability to assess her demeanor (audio only), lack of contemporaneous cross-examination, incomplete disclosure of prior statements, and evidence of potential influence or motive to lie.

The court also exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial value outweighing its probative value, given that other reasonable inferences could be drawn from the child's statement.

The application was dismissed, and the audio recording was deemed inadmissible.

The Crown brought a mid-trial application (voir dire) to determine the admissibility of observations made by S.O., an aunt/caregiver, regarding the behaviour of four child complainants (M., G., L., and H.).

These observations were made months after the children were removed from their parents' care and after the father's arrest.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to allow the court to draw common sense inferences confirming the children's accounts of abuse.

The defence opposed, arguing the observations lacked a temporal nexus to the alleged abuse, were inadmissible hearsay/expert evidence, and were not relevant as narrative.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the observations were inadmissible as they lacked a sufficient temporal connection to the alleged abuse and did not qualify as narrative evidence without expert testimony to establish a causal link.

The Crown sought to admit 17 video-recorded police statements from 7 child complainants under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault, assault, and threatening trial.

The defence objected on grounds of unreasonable delay, lack of description of acts, and suggestive questioning leading to tainting.

The court reviewed the purpose of s. 715.1, the "reasonable time" requirement, and factors affecting admissibility, including the "Archer principle" for prolonged abuse.

The court admitted some statements in part, but excluded others, particularly the 2021 statements concerning sexual misconduct, due to concerns about tainting from third-party influence (relatives, CAS) and highly leading/suggestive police questioning that undermined the truth-seeking function and proper administration of justice.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements from a deceased declarant, Lori Parker, against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who is charged with manslaughter and other offences.

The court considered two material aspects of Parker's statements to her then-husband, Robert Parker: (1) that she gave the accused information about the victim, Henrietta Knight, having money and plotted with him to steal it; and (2) that the accused threatened her family if she disclosed this.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the first statement substantively reliable due to a lack of motive to fabricate and strong corroboration from the accused's own statements to an undercover officer.

Consequently, the first statement was admitted for the truth of its contents.

However, the second statement regarding threats was deemed unreliable due to a plausible motive for fabrication (to prevent Robert Parker from going to the police) and lack of corroboration, and was therefore admitted only for the fact that it was said, not for its truth.

The Crown applied for an order to protect the identities of a civilian police agent and an undercover officer involved in the investigation of a criminal case against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who faced charges including manslaughter, first-degree murder, robbery, and arson.

The application was brought under sections 486.31(1) and 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused did not oppose the order, and no media intervened.

The court granted the order, finding it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the safety and security of the police agent and undercover officer from intimidation or retaliation, while balancing this need with the open court principle and freedom of expression.

The order specified terms for pseudonyms, non-disclosure of identifying information, publication bans, and restrictions on recording and access to exhibits.

The appellant, Joshua Bennett, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, and his sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical assumptions about female behavior, failed to apply the Kienapple principle to the assault conviction, and misapprehended evidence regarding the sexual assault sentence.

The court dismissed the appeal against the sexual assault conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or sentencing.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the assault conviction, staying it under the Kienapple principle as it was part of the same transaction as the sexual assault.

The accused, Faye Ibbitson, was acquitted of sexual assault charges.

The Crown, on behalf of the complainant, applied to lift a publication restriction order previously made under section 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused opposed this application.

The court determined whether it could deny a complainant's request to lift a publication ban due to the accused's opposition, even after acquittal.

The court concluded that it lacks discretion to deny such a request, as the purpose of the ban is to protect the complainant, not the accused, and an acquitted accused has no standing to oppose its lifting.