Holly Kathryn Chiavetti

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit similar fact evidence across multiple counts in a multi-count indictment involving allegations of physical and sexual abuse by parents against their children.

The court reviews the legal principles governing similar fact evidence, including the need for the Crown to clearly articulate the evidence, issues, and purposes for which such evidence is proffered, and the requirement that its probative value outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The court also considers the timing and form of the Crown's application, the potential for collusion or inadvertent tainting among witnesses, and the appropriate instructions to the trier of fact.

Ultimately, the court finds that the probative value of the similar fact evidence is high and the prejudice is low, granting the Crown's application to admit the evidence across counts.

The Crown brought a voir dire application under R. v. Khan to admit an audio recording of a child, M., disclosing alleged sexual abuse by her parents.

The court found that while the necessity criterion for hearsay admissibility was met, the reliability criterion was not.

Factors undermining reliability included the absence of confirmation of M.'s understanding of the importance of telling the truth, the inability to assess her demeanor (audio only), lack of contemporaneous cross-examination, incomplete disclosure of prior statements, and evidence of potential influence or motive to lie.

The court also exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial value outweighing its probative value, given that other reasonable inferences could be drawn from the child's statement.

The application was dismissed, and the audio recording was deemed inadmissible.

Sentencing of a youthful first offender who pleaded guilty to multiple online exploitation offences involving 12 victims, including luring adolescents for child pornography, transmitting and possessing child pornography, obtaining intimate images by false pretences, publishing intimate images without consent, and mischief to data.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives, particularly for offences involving victims under 18, while still giving significant weight to youth, guilty plea, remorse, rehabilitation, family support, and restraint.

Applying the sequential sentencing approach and the totality principle, the court found that a conditional sentence was unavailable and unfit, and reduced an aggregate eight-year structure to a fit global sentence of five years' imprisonment.

Ancillary DNA, SOIRA, non-communication, and s. 161 orders were also imposed.

The Crown brought a mid-trial application (voir dire) to determine the admissibility of observations made by S.O., an aunt/caregiver, regarding the behaviour of four child complainants (M., G., L., and H.).

These observations were made months after the children were removed from their parents' care and after the father's arrest.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to allow the court to draw common sense inferences confirming the children's accounts of abuse.

The defence opposed, arguing the observations lacked a temporal nexus to the alleged abuse, were inadmissible hearsay/expert evidence, and were not relevant as narrative.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the observations were inadmissible as they lacked a sufficient temporal connection to the alleged abuse and did not qualify as narrative evidence without expert testimony to establish a causal link.

The Crown sought to admit 17 video-recorded police statements from 7 child complainants under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault, assault, and threatening trial.

The defence objected on grounds of unreasonable delay, lack of description of acts, and suggestive questioning leading to tainting.

The court reviewed the purpose of s. 715.1, the "reasonable time" requirement, and factors affecting admissibility, including the "Archer principle" for prolonged abuse.

The court admitted some statements in part, but excluded others, particularly the 2021 statements concerning sexual misconduct, due to concerns about tainting from third-party influence (relatives, CAS) and highly leading/suggestive police questioning that undermined the truth-seeking function and proper administration of justice.

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit hearsay statements from a deceased declarant, Lori Parker, against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who is charged with manslaughter and other offences.

The court considered two material aspects of Parker's statements to her then-husband, Robert Parker: (1) that she gave the accused information about the victim, Henrietta Knight, having money and plotted with him to steal it; and (2) that the accused threatened her family if she disclosed this.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court found the first statement substantively reliable due to a lack of motive to fabricate and strong corroboration from the accused's own statements to an undercover officer.

Consequently, the first statement was admitted for the truth of its contents.

However, the second statement regarding threats was deemed unreliable due to a plausible motive for fabrication (to prevent Robert Parker from going to the police) and lack of corroboration, and was therefore admitted only for the fact that it was said, not for its truth.

The accused was charged with multiple historical offences spanning 1995 to 2001, including manslaughter, bank robbery, car bombing, and two counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on confessions the accused made to an undercover officer and a police agent during a 'Mr. Big' operation in 2018-2019.

The court carefully assessed the reliability of these confessions, finding them compelling, detailed, and corroborated by independent evidence.

The accused was found guilty of the robbery of Henrietta Knight (but acquitted of her manslaughter due to a gap in medical evidence regarding causation), the TD Bank robbery, the car bombing of David Allan's vehicle, and the first-degree murders of Richard Kimball and Stephen St. Denis.

During a trial for robbery, the defence sought to cross-examine a police officer about other suspects identified early in the investigation to raise a reasonable doubt about identity.

The Crown objected, arguing the defence needed to establish relevance and admissibility first.

The trial judge ruled the questioning impermissible, finding the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance and invited mere speculation.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held that the defence must establish a sufficient connection between the crime charged and the third-party suspect before pursuing such cross-examination.

The Crown applied to admit hearsay statements from the deceased victim and the post-mortem report of an unavailable pathologist in a manslaughter trial.

The court admitted the victim's statements, finding they met the criteria for spontaneous utterances and the principled exception to the hearsay rule, with sufficient markers of threshold reliability.

However, the court excluded the pathologist's report, concluding that the inability to cross-examine the expert on his baldly stated opinion regarding the cause of death would cause significant prejudice to the accused, outweighing its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit statements made by the accused during a nine-month undercover police investigation involving a police agent and an undercover officer.

The accused was charged with three homicides, a bank robbery, and a car bombing.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Hart and found that the statements met the threshold for reliability, their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect, and the police conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The Crown applied for an order to protect the identities of a civilian police agent and an undercover officer involved in the investigation of a criminal case against the accused, Michael Wentworth, who faced charges including manslaughter, first-degree murder, robbery, and arson.

The application was brought under sections 486.31(1) and 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused did not oppose the order, and no media intervened.

The court granted the order, finding it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the safety and security of the police agent and undercover officer from intimidation or retaliation, while balancing this need with the open court principle and freedom of expression.

The order specified terms for pseudonyms, non-disclosure of identifying information, publication bans, and restrictions on recording and access to exhibits.

The applicant, facing fourteen charges including domestic assault and multiple breaches of release conditions, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary grounds.

He argued that the passage of time, a revised release plan involving his mother and stepfather as sureties, and his completion of programs in custody constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the upcoming trial date mitigated the passage of time, the proposed sureties could not exert meaningful control given the applicant's history of breaches, and the program completions were not shown to reduce his risk of reoffending.

The accused was charged with three counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his intimate partner.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found the accused guilty of all three assault charges, rejecting his claims that the physical contact was accidental or unintentional.

On the sexual assault charge, the court found that the accused engaged in sexual activity with the complainant while she was asleep.

Applying the principle that advance consent to unconscious sex is invalid under the Criminal Code, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault.

The accused, an animal rights activist, was charged with breaking and entering a mink farm with intent to commit mischief.

He admitted to trespassing and surreptitiously videotaping the animals to publicize their living conditions, but denied intending to commit mischief.

The Crown argued that the videotaping and subsequent publication of the farmer's personal information constituted mischief.

The court found that the surreptitious videotaping of a commercial property did not interfere with the lawful use of the property and caused no harm to the animals.

The accused was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove the intent to commit mischief.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, sought to confirm his right to a trial by judge and jury.

The Crown argued that the accused must be tried by judge alone because the Crown had not expressly consented to the accused's re-election to a jury trial at the assignment court.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the Crown's conduct at the assignment court, where the Crown Attorney actively participated in scheduling a jury trial without objection, constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural requirement for express consent.

The court confirmed the accused's right to a trial by judge and jury.

The appellant, Joshua Bennett, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, and his sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical assumptions about female behavior, failed to apply the Kienapple principle to the assault conviction, and misapprehended evidence regarding the sexual assault sentence.

The court dismissed the appeal against the sexual assault conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or sentencing.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the assault conviction, staying it under the Kienapple principle as it was part of the same transaction as the sexual assault.

The accused, Faye Ibbitson, was acquitted of sexual assault charges.

The Crown, on behalf of the complainant, applied to lift a publication restriction order previously made under section 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused opposed this application.

The court determined whether it could deny a complainant's request to lift a publication ban due to the accused's opposition, even after acquittal.

The court concluded that it lacks discretion to deny such a request, as the purpose of the ban is to protect the complainant, not the accused, and an acquitted accused has no standing to oppose its lifting.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call into evidence and in finding his driving amounted to dangerous driving.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the 911 call was admissible as part of the res gestae and did not constitute oath helping.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's erratic operation of a transport truck on a highway was objectively dangerous and a marked departure from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person.