Cindy-Lynn Clementina Afonso

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export cocaine and sentenced to five and a half years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instruction on the element of conspiracy, specifically regarding the formation of an agreement.

The appellant argued the instruction was confusing and failed to adequately direct the jury to consider what the agreement was for and whether discussions about exporting cocaine crystallized into an actual agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge, read as a whole, clearly left all elements of conspiracy for the jury's consideration and properly framed the legal framework.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was within the appropriate range and the trial judge had properly considered the duration of the conspiracy.

Christopher Bryan was on trial for importing cocaine.

The Crown sought to admit Jennifer McGrath's passport application to corroborate her testimony and to show Bryan acted as guarantor in furtherance of a conspiracy.

The defence opposed, arguing hearsay, late notice under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), and prejudice.

The court ruled that Ms. McGrath's statements on the first page of the application were admissible as she adopted them in testimony.

However, the full passport application and affidavit were not admissible under s. 30 CEA due to late notice and resulting prejudice to the defence.

Section 2, the "Declaration of Guarantor" allegedly completed by Bryan, was admissible under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule, with concerns about the unsavoury witness (McGrath) going to weight, not admissibility.

The defence's request for a mistrial was denied.

The respondent, facing a first-degree murder charge, subpoenaed a federal Crown counsel who had previously stayed a drug charge against him.

The respondent sought to question the Crown counsel about his reasons for staying the charge to support an abuse of process argument regarding the admission of disreputable conduct evidence.

The Crown counsel brought a certiorari application to quash the subpoena.

The Superior Court held that while the court clerk properly issued the subpoena based on defence counsel's representations, the subpoena must be quashed because the respondent failed to establish that the Crown counsel likely had material evidence to give, as prosecutorial discretion is presumed to be exercised properly absent evidence of bad faith.

The appellant was convicted of two offences under the Customs Act and received a conditional discharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the sentence, finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the mens rea requirement.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal judge misapprehended the trial judge's comments, which were directed at whether the conduct was planned and deliberate for sentencing purposes, not mens rea.

The trial judge's sentence was restored, and a request for a Kienapple stay was declined.

The Crown brought an application for a ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the accused at Primary and Secondary Inspection at Pearson International Airport, and during an RCMP interview following his arrest for importing marijuana.

The court found that the accused was not detained during routine questioning at Secondary Inspection prior to the discovery of the drugs.

The court also found that the accused's subsequent statements to the RCMP were the product of an operating mind and made voluntarily, without fear, oppression, threat, or inducement.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging a breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The overall delay from charge to anticipated trial was approximately 70 months.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin, the court analyzed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

Significant portions of the delay were found to be waived by the defence or attributable to inherent time requirements, with only 14 months of unwaived institutional and Crown delay.

Although some prejudice was inferred from the length of delay, the court found the prejudice modest and concluded the delay was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the police officer's search of the vehicle's glove box and console violated her s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the search constituted a s. 8 violation, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Applying the Grant factors, the court noted the officer acted in good faith, the appellant's privacy interest in the vehicle was minimal, and the seized evidence was central to the charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended the trial judge misapprehended evidence by reconciling the arresting officer's identification with defence witnesses who testified that a re-enactment showed it was impossible to identify the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including informant information and the officer's recognition of the appellant's distinctive hairstyle, which had been altered before the defence simulations.

The appellant was stopped for speeding and arrested for breaching his recognizance curfew.

During a search of the vehicle incident to that arrest, the officer smelled raw marihuana, leading to a second arrest for possession and a further search of the trunk, which revealed 18.1 pounds of marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest, the search of the front of the car was justified for officer safety, and the officer's testimony regarding the smell of marihuana was credible, making the subsequent search of the trunk lawful.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marihuana, and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable as they were based merely on his proximity to concealed drugs and money in a rental car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including the quantity and value of the drugs, the appellant's continuous cell phone use, and the location of the contraband, supported the trial judge's inference that the appellant had knowledge of and control over the drugs and money.

The appellant was arrested on the street and found in possession of cocaine, marijuana, and cash.

At trial, the judge found there were grounds to detain and eventually arrest the appellant, and convicted him of drug offences.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by conflating the grounds for detention with the grounds for arrest.

The Court held that the arresting officer lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant based merely on observing a hand gesture and the appellant holding his hand closed.

Finding a breach of section 9 of the Charter, the Court applied the Grant framework and excluded the drug evidence under section 24(2), quashing the convictions and entering acquittals.

The accused was sentenced following a jury conviction for trafficking nearly three kilograms of cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $54,000.

Wiretap evidence demonstrated the accused’s ongoing and significant role in a multi‑kilogram cocaine distribution network, including negotiating price, quantity, and delivery.

Although the accused had no relevant criminal record and presented numerous mitigating personal circumstances, the court emphasized the seriousness of multi‑kilogram cocaine trafficking and the need for general deterrence.

Relying on Ontario appellate authorities establishing higher sentencing ranges for large‑scale cocaine trafficking, the court concluded that a penitentiary term within the 8–10 year range was appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing his arrest was unlawful and merely a ruse to search his backpack.

He also argued the trial judge failed to provide clear reasons for accepting one officer's evidence over another's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly rejected the appellant's position and had a legitimate basis for the arrest.

The Court further held that there was likely no section 8 Charter breach regarding the backpack search, and even if there was, the evidence was properly admitted under section 24(2) applying the Grant framework.

The appellant, a criminal defence lawyer who represented himself at trial, appealed his conviction for providing drugs to an inmate at the Don Jail.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a jail guard suspected of drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not undermine the trial judge's critical factual findings, which included the inmate being searched before and after the meeting, an officer observing their hands touching, and the appellant hiding an incriminating envelope.

The court also rejected arguments regarding trial fairness, reasonable apprehension of bias, and the trial judge's handling of a letter received about the appellant.

The appellant, a lawyer convicted of supplying narcotics to an inmate client, brought a motion for the production of third-party records in the possession of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

The records related to allegations that a correctional officer had smuggled contraband into the jail.

Applying the McNeil framework, the Court of Appeal balanced the appellant's right to access potentially relevant material for a fresh evidence application against the privacy interests of the correctional officer.

The court ordered the production of edited versions of the documents, subject to a non-publication order.