Carol Letman

The accused, Faith Chinwendu Uzondu, was charged with importing heroin, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and two counts of conspiracy related to heroin.

The heroin was found in a package delivered to her home.

The accused admitted involvement in various fraudulent activities but denied knowledge of the package's drug contents, claiming she believed it contained fraudulent credit cards or passports.

The court rejected the accused's testimony due to numerous lies and inconsistencies.

While acquitted of the importation and conspiracy charges due to reasonable doubt regarding her involvement at the time of importation and lack of evidence linking her to other packages, she was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court concluded that the accused was willfully blind to the package's contents, or had actual knowledge, given her anxiousness to dispose of the package and her general indifference to the nature of illegal items as long as she was paid.

The accused, Brandon Cleland, was charged with the robbery of a taxi driver, Tahir Khan, in Mississauga.

The primary issue was the proof of identity, as the victim did not identify the accused in court.

The Crown relied on photographs from a malfunctioning in-car taxi camera system, police recognition of the accused from these images, and comparison with the accused's Facebook photos and physical appearance.

The defence challenged the occurrence of a robbery and the reliability of the identification evidence.

The court found the victim's testimony credible and, despite the camera malfunction, gave significant weight to the images due to corroborating factors.

The court concluded that the images depicted the accused, supported by police recognition, facial features, tattoos, and accessories, and found the accused guilty of robbery.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for failing a roadside screening device test.

A police officer found a bag containing 42.5 grams of cocaine on the ground near the passenger side of the accused's vehicle.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove possession.

The court found that the evidence, including the dampness of the bag and the fact that the area was a busy intersection, did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the only person who could have possessed the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The offender was convicted of trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of cocaine.

The offences occurred while the offender was on bail for a previous trafficking charge.

The Crown sought a sentence of four to five years, while the defence sought two to two and a half years.

The court balanced the aggravating factors, including the nature and quantity of the drugs and the offender's related criminal record, against mitigating factors such as a positive pre-sentence report, family support, and efforts to upgrade his education.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 24 months in custody, after credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by two years of probation.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and with failing to appear in court contrary to the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case for possession rested solely on the arresting officer's claim to have detected the smell of marijuana emanating from the accused's vehicle.

The court found the officer's testimony regarding the strength and permeability of the odour to be implausible and internally inconsistent.

The court concluded that the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and violated the accused's Charter rights against arbitrary detention and unreasonable search.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

On the fail to appear charge, the court found that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, as the accused's testimony regarding his mistaken belief that his lawyer had rescheduled the trial date raised a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing approximately 1.568 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the established sentencing range for cocaine importation of roughly three to five years for quantities around one kilogram, noting the seriousness of the offence and the societal harm caused by cocaine trafficking.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and personal circumstances.

After considering the quantity of cocaine and the early guilty plea, the court determined that a fit sentence before credit would be just under 39 months.

Applying enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio for 176 days served, the effective sentence imposed was 30 months’ imprisonment, along with a weapons prohibition order and a DNA order.

Two offenders were sentenced after a jury conviction for importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Each offender attempted to import nearly four kilograms of high‑purity cocaine concealed in luggage after travelling from Panama.

The court reviewed the established six‑to‑eight‑year sentencing range for first‑offender couriers importing multiple kilograms of cocaine, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Arguments that potential immigration consequences for one offender should justify a sentence below the range were rejected as speculative and inconsistent with proportionality principles.

Considering mitigating factors including lack of criminal records, the court imposed custodial sentences near the low end of the range.

During a pre-charge conference in a trial for importing cocaine, the moving party requested a jury instruction based on the Schell principle.

The requested instruction would direct the jury to acquit both co-accused if they were satisfied one committed the offence but could not determine which one.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the Schell principle only applies where there is no evidence the accused acted together.

Because there was ample evidence of joint participation and the accused were alleged to be joint principals, the instruction had no air of reality.

The accused were charged with importing cocaine after returning from Panama with new suitcases containing the drug.

At the close of evidence in their jury trial, the Crown requested that the jury be instructed on wilful blindness as a substitute for actual knowledge.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence, including the accused's interactions with a suspicious individual who helped them buy the luggage, and their failure to inspect the bags.

The court concluded there was no air of reality to the doctrine of wilful blindness on the facts, as the circumstances were not so inherently suspicious as to suggest deliberate ignorance.

The Crown's request was denied, and the jury was to be instructed only on actual knowledge.

The accused was charged with production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and theft of hydroelectricity contrary to the Criminal Code.

He was arrested at a residential property where a substantial marijuana grow operation was discovered.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence of the grow operation, arguing the search was illegal.

The Crown raised a threshold issue of standing, contending the accused could not demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched.

The court found the accused had not established on a balance of probabilities that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search.

The accused was arrested after police stopped a vehicle in which he was a passenger and found him in possession of crack cocaine, marijuana, and oxycodone.

Police officers, acting on suspicion of a drug transaction observed at a known drug house, conducted an investigative detention.

During the detention, the officer forcefully removed the accused from the vehicle and threw him to the ground, exposing narcotics in his underwear.

The central issue was whether the officer's actions violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), and if so, whether the evidence should be excluded.

The court found that the officer's conduct constituted a de facto arrest without reasonable and probable grounds, an unreasonable search, and a violation of the right to counsel.

The evidence was excluded, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements overheard by a border officer while the accused was speaking on a cell phone in an airport baggage area.

The defence argued that admission of the statements would infringe the accused’s privacy rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court reviewed jurisprudence on expectations of privacy and investigative practices at border crossings.

It held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell phone in a public airport area where the conversation could be overheard.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

The accused was arrested at Pearson International Airport after returning from Panama when customs officers discovered approximately two pounds of cocaine hidden in four health care product bottles in her checked luggage.

The accused claimed she was an innocent courier who had been tricked by her travelling companion into carrying the bottles.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as implausible and inconsistent, finding that her demeanour and actions at the airport, including attempting to abandon her suitcase and hiding baggage tags in her bra, demonstrated guilty knowledge.

The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly imported the cocaine and found her guilty.