Kristen Hallyburton Pollock

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offences against his niece.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of evidence regarding the appellant's reaction/inaction when confronted with allegations, improper Crown submissions inviting the jury to infer the appellant lied to secure an acquittal, and failure to caution the jury on extrinsic misconduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury was not sufficiently instructed on the lack of probative value of the reaction evidence and on the impermissible reasoning regarding the appellant's motive to lie.

These errors undermined the presumption of innocence and left the jury unequipped to fairly decide the case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This is a forfeiture application brought by His Majesty the King under s. 771 of the Criminal Code against Nehemiah Campbell and his three sureties (Greg Carter, Anwar Faza, and Sandre Bascoe) due to Campbell's failure to surrender for his appeal hearing.

The court ordered the full forfeiture of Campbell's $20,000 pledge, Carter's $50,000 pledge, and Faza's $10,000 pledge.

Sandre Bascoe's $10,000 pledge was partially forfeited, with $5,000 ordered forfeited, due to her limited financial means.

The decision emphasizes the importance of surety diligence and the 'pull of bail' in maintaining the effectiveness of the bail system.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the trial judge's decision not to exclude computer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite a s. 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in the balancing of the Grant factors.

The court affirmed that the breach was not particularly serious, its impact limited, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits was high, especially given the evidence's probative value for the first-degree murder conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Mario Inacio, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, assault, threatening death, and extortion.

He argued the trial judge erred by finding a pattern of repetitive aggressive behaviour, concluding the behaviour was intractable, and imposing an indefinite term of imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly identified a behavioural pattern based on the appellant's consistent use of weapons, threats, and violence for financial gain, and that the finding of intractability was supported by compelling expert testimony regarding his high risk of reoffending violently.

The indeterminate sentence was upheld based on the totality of evidence, including the appellant's poor insight, lack of remorse, and long history of anti-social and violent conduct.

The appellant, Mario Inacio, appealed his convictions for robbery, unlawful confinement, assault, threatening death, and extortion, stemming from a dispute over a $400 rent payment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately assess the reliability of the complainant's evidence, given her admitted drug use and memory problems.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of reliability, noting that the judge was aware of the complainant's issues but nonetheless accepted her evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Joseph Donnelly, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, which stemmed from two incidents: non-consensual unprotected intercourse and non-consensual penetration with a dildo.

This was his second trial after the first conviction was overturned.

The appeal raised four grounds: errors in handling late forensic disclosure, dismissal of a s. 11(b) Charter application for delay, reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, and errors in evidence assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings on disclosure, delay (calculating net delay at 11 months, 22 days, well within Jordan limits), or judicial impartiality.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments and use of common sense, clarifying that a comment about sexual preferences was rooted in the complainant's evidence, not a stereotype.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence for four offences related to an attempted convenience store robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal the sentence.

The sentence was adjusted to mitigate unforeseen collateral immigration consequences for the appellant, a permanent resident, by re-allocating pre-sentence credit and treating restrictive bail conditions as a mitigating factor rather than a direct reduction in sentence, ensuring the effective sentence per count did not exceed 179 days.

The appellant, Vykunthan Kanthavel, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, possession of a weapon, and aggravated assault, and his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on prior statements in credibility assessment, impermissible frame-by-frame analysis of evidence, and failure to apply the principle of restraint in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings, no impermissible analysis of video evidence given the judge's self-caution, and no error in sentencing as the principle of restraint was considered.

Leave to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's fatherly responsibilities was denied as it would not have affected the outcome.

The Crown appealed the seven-year sentence imposed on the respondent for attempted murder of his pregnant intimate partner.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to adequately apply the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in a domestic context, by misunderstanding the aggravating impact of planning and deliberation, and by misidentifying the appropriate sentencing range.

The Court emphasized that rehabilitation should not outweigh denunciation and deterrence in such serious cases and that sentencing ranges evolve with societal understanding of domestic violence.

The Court also found an error in the application of "Duncan" credits, which were treated as a direct reduction rather than a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of 15 years imprisonment was substituted, less credit for time served.

The appellant, convicted of firearm-related charges, appealed his conviction.

While released pending appeal, he failed to surrender into custody as required by his release order on the day of the appeal hearing.

His counsel advised the court that his whereabouts were unknown.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal as abandoned, citing his repudiation of the court's jurisdiction by absconding and the terms of his release order.

A warrant for his arrest was issued.

The appellant, J.L., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and breach of probation, alleging errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, including undue reliance on demeanour, incorrect use of the absence of exaggeration, and misapprehension of material evidence.

He also sought leave to appeal his global sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility determinations were entitled to significant deference and that no reversible errors were made regarding demeanour, absence of exaggeration, or misapprehension of evidence.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence exceeding the Crown's recommendation without first alerting the parties and providing an opportunity for submissions.

The sentence was reduced from three years and three months to three years.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm, appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings on causation were supported by evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the three-year custodial sentence and three-year driving prohibition, finding the trial judge properly considered mitigating factors and collateral immigration consequences.

The appellant, Kevin Janeiro, appealed his convictions for robbery and having his face masked, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence, particularly regarding identity and lost security video.

The Court of Appeal found the convictions unreasonable due to material misapprehensions of evidence concerning fingerprint and DNA evidence, and the importance of the lost security video.

The court also found a Charter breach due to the negligent loss of the security video.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and verdicts of acquittal substituted.

The appellant, Richard Walker, sought leave to appeal his sentence for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available.

He raised three grounds: (i) the trial judge erred in deeming lack of insight an aggravating factor; (ii) the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the sentence due to COVID-19 collateral consequences; and (iii) these errors rendered the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that lack of insight is distinguishable from lack of remorse and can be considered for future dangerousness, the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding COVID-19's minimal mitigating impact, and the sentence was fit given the gravity and nature of the child pornography offences, particularly the egregious content and victim ages.

A minor correction to the s. 161 order was made on consent.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault committed in 1989.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of alibi evidence, an alleged piecemeal approach to evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no reversal of the burden of proof, no error in the trial judge's approach to evidence or credibility findings, and concluded that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 14 offences, including possession of stolen vehicles, operating while prohibited, failing to stop for police, drug trafficking, and firearm offences, and received a global sentence of 46 months.

He appealed the sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider mitigating factors (specifically, his guilty pleas), that the sentence was not properly individualized (lack of counselling order), and that the reasons for sentence were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge did acknowledge the guilty pleas, that the individualization argument lacked support due to no submissions on counselling, and that the reasons were sufficient when read in context.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant alleged that the accused sexually assaulted her in a laundry room.

The accused denied the allegations.

The Crown presented the complainant's testimony, corroborating evidence from her supervisor, and forensic DNA evidence (accused's DNA in saliva on the complainant's bra).

The defence argued inadequate police investigation, a motive to fabricate, and contamination of DNA evidence.

The court rejected the defence's arguments, finding the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, particularly due to the corroborating DNA evidence.

The court found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with making arrangements by telecommunication to commit sexual assault against a child under 16 years of age, and making arrangements to commit a child pornography offence.

The Crown's case relied on email and text message exchanges between the accused and an undercover police officer posing as a woman named Sara with an 11-year-old daughter.

The accused claimed the communications were fantasy and roleplay with no genuine intent to arrange sexual contact with the child.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found that the accused had specifically intended to obtain Sara's agreement to engage in sexual activity with her daughter.

The charge under section 163.1 was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, but the accused was convicted on the section 172.2(1)(b) charge.

The accused was charged with publishing an intimate image without consent contrary to section 162.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused sent a screenshot of a video depicting the complainant engaged in sexual intercourse to the complainant's boyfriend and posted it on Facebook without consent.

The key issue was whether the image constituted an "intimate image" as defined in the Criminal Code.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the image was intimate, as it depicted nudity and explicit sexual activity, was made in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the complainant retained that expectation of privacy at the time of the offense.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking an order to permit the complainant to testify by video conference from Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, rather than attend trial in person in Oshawa, Ontario.

The defendant opposed the motion.

The court applied the test under Section 714.1 of the Criminal Code, which permits video testimony where appropriate in all the circumstances, considering the witness's location and personal circumstances, costs of physical attendance, and the nature of the anticipated evidence.

The court rejected the Crown's application, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation regarding the complainant's inconvenience and the quality of video technology, and noting that the complainant's testimony was central to the case and her credibility was crucial to the truth-seeking function of the trial.