Kristen Hallyburton Pollock

The applicant, charged with multiple sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process.

He argued that the Crown improperly adjourned his bail hearing, police violated his right to silence, and a correctional officer directed another inmate to assault him while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that while the bail adjournment was improper, it was done in good faith and did not warrant a stay.

The court also found no violation of the right to silence and insufficient evidence that the correctional officer directed the assault.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the accused was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child in the household.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and held that, although the accused withstood cross-examination and merely denying the allegations could in many cases raise a reasonable doubt, the complainant's evidence contained internally specific details and was reinforced by corroborative post-disclosure evidence.

The court also considered prior similar fact ruling context but warned itself against propensity reasoning.

On the totality of the evidence, the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired care and control of an automobile and over 80 while having care and control of an automobile arising from an incident on February 16, 2018.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically on Highway 401 during rush hour, leading to a traffic stop where the officer observed signs of impairment including the odour of alcohol, dilated pupils, and bloodshot eyes.

The accused was arrested and provided with Duty Counsel at the station.

The accused subsequently requested to call his own lawyer, which request was denied by the breath technician.

The court found no breach of Charter section 10(b) rights based on the accused's concession that he had no issue with the advice given by Duty Counsel, despite his discomfort speaking with a stranger.

The breath test readings were 152 and 149.

The court found the accused guilty of over 80 but not guilty of impaired driving, finding the indicia of impairment minimal and insufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was sentenced to a $1,000 fine with one year to pay and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with making arrangements by telecommunication to commit sexual assault against a child under 16 years of age, and making arrangements to commit a child pornography offence.

The Crown's case relied on email and text message exchanges between the accused and an undercover police officer posing as a woman named Sara with an 11-year-old daughter.

The accused claimed the communications were fantasy and roleplay with no genuine intent to arrange sexual contact with the child.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found that the accused had specifically intended to obtain Sara's agreement to engage in sexual activity with her daughter.

The charge under section 163.1 was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, but the accused was convicted on the section 172.2(1)(b) charge.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy, and arson, brought a Charter application to exclude cell phone records obtained by police through "tower dump" production orders.

The applicants argued the warrants violated their section 8 rights due to their broad scope and lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that the initial tower dump warrants breached section 8 as they were based on speculation rather than reasonable grounds.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith, the subsequent discovery of the specific phone numbers was inevitable due to a lawful "Mr. Big" confession, and society's interest in adjudicating a serious murder charge on its merits strongly favoured admission.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, jointly charged with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and arson, brought a pre-trial motion seeking leave to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The media coverage included sensationalized reports of an alleged attempted prison break by one of the applicants.

The court found that despite the passage of time, the prominence and ready access to the coverage on the internet created an air of reality that the publicity could potentially undermine a prospective juror's impartiality.

The application was granted, and specific questions were approved to be put to the jury pool.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and arson following the discovery of his wife's charred body in their garage, applied to exclude a statement he made to police.

The court found that the two-and-a-half-hour police interview constituted an investigative detention, triggering the accused's Charter rights.

The police failed to properly inform the accused of his right to silence, the reasons for his detention, and his right to counsel, resulting in serious breaches of sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statement under section 24(2), concluding that the breaches were deliberate and admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with publishing an intimate image without consent contrary to section 162.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused sent a screenshot of a video depicting the complainant engaged in sexual intercourse to the complainant's boyfriend and posted it on Facebook without consent.

The key issue was whether the image constituted an "intimate image" as defined in the Criminal Code.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the image was intimate, as it depicted nudity and explicit sexual activity, was made in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the complainant retained that expectation of privacy at the time of the offense.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking an order to permit the complainant to testify by video conference from Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, rather than attend trial in person in Oshawa, Ontario.

The defendant opposed the motion.

The court applied the test under Section 714.1 of the Criminal Code, which permits video testimony where appropriate in all the circumstances, considering the witness's location and personal circumstances, costs of physical attendance, and the nature of the anticipated evidence.

The court rejected the Crown's application, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation regarding the complainant's inconvenience and the quality of video technology, and noting that the complainant's testimony was central to the case and her credibility was crucial to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The offender was convicted of historic indecent assault against his daughter, who was between 7 and 9 years old at the time.

The Crown sought 18 months' custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children by a person in a position of trust.

The court rejected the defence's request for a conditional sentence and imposed 18 months' custody followed by two years' probation, along with SOIRA and DNA orders.

The Crown brought an application to remove the defendant's counsel of choice, Tyler Smith, on the basis of a disqualifying conflict of interest.

Smith had previously represented both the defendant and a material Crown witness, Karri Dymond, in an unrelated criminal harassment matter in 2011.

The court granted the application in part, implementing a partial disqualification model whereby Smith was excluded from the courtroom during Dymond's testimony and prohibited from conducting her cross-examination, with independent counsel Peter Bawden conducting the cross-examination instead.

The court balanced the defendant's constitutional right to counsel of choice against concerns regarding the administration of justice and public perception of the criminal justice system.

A youth charged with impaired care and control, over 80, possession of cannabis resin, and a Highway Traffic Act offence brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged breach of section 11(b) of the Charter (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The court examined the timeline from arrest in February 2012 to trial in April 2013, assessing delays attributable to the Crown, defence, and institutional factors.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that institutional guidelines for youth should mirror those for adults, holding that the shorter guidelines under the Youth Criminal Justice Act apply consistently.

The court found that while the delay exceeded the administrative guidelines of five to six months for youth, the modest specific prejudice adduced by the defendant, combined with the community's strong interest in adjudicating the matter on its merits, did not warrant a stay of proceedings.