Darren S. Sederoff

The appellant appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed for two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving approximately 1.2 kilograms of cocaine and over 800 grams of methamphetamine.

The Crown had sought six years while the defence sought a two-year-less-a-day conditional sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erroneously relied on other seized items (cash, cocaine press, ammunition, and other drugs) to determine his level of involvement, contending these items had not been proven as separate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly considered facts from the agreed statement of facts to assess the appellant's level of involvement and imposed a fit sentence considering all circumstances, including mitigating factors and the appellant's genuine remorse.

This decision concerns the trial of Tamaal Japp and Moses Tesfay for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Uchenna Achioso.

The court reviews the evidence, including agreed statements of fact, expert testimony, and the credibility of key witnesses.

The main issues are the identity of the accused and the extent of their criminal liability.

The court finds both accused guilty of manslaughter, not murder, concluding that while they participated in an unlawful act leading to death, the evidence does not establish the intent or planning required for murder.

The appellant appealed her convictions for drug trafficking and her 4-year custodial sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter by mischaracterizing periods of delay, including those related to COVID-19 and a missing Information.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable error in the trial judge's attribution of delay to the defence and exceptional circumstances.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4-year sentence was below the established range for mid-level cocaine trafficking and the trial judge made no error in principle in rejecting a conditional sentence.

This sentencing decision addresses the possession of a loaded restricted firearm and related offences by Chadwick Francis, who was stopped at a RIDE spot-check.

The trial focused on a racial profiling claim which was dismissed.

The judge considered the social context of systemic racism and Mr. Francis’ personal history, including his victimization by gun violence, as mitigating factors.

The decision carefully balances denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and public protection, ultimately imposing a conditional sentence order (CSO) of two years less one day with strict conditions, including GPS monitoring and probation, rather than incarceration.

The case highlights the complexity of sentencing in firearm possession cases involving racialized offenders and the evolving role of social context evidence.

Chadwick Francis was stopped at a RIDE spot-check where police detected a strong odour of cannabis.

After producing an opened cannabis packet, a subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a loaded handgun.

Francis challenged the lawfulness of the search and his detention, alleging racial profiling and violations of his Charter rights (sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b)).

The court found that the cannabis was not lawfully packaged for transport under the Cannabis Control Act, justifying the search.

It also determined that there was no racial profiling and that the delay in providing counsel rights was reasonable.

Francis was found guilty of four firearms-related offences.

This decision addresses a question of law that arose during a jury trial concerning the interpretation of causation under s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to impaired driving causing death.

The Crown argued for a temporal link between the impairment/illegal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and the accident resulting in death, asserting that no causal link between the impairment itself and the accident was required.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that the offence requires a causal link, meaning the impairment or illegal BAC must be a significant contributing cause of the accident that resulted in death.

The court emphasized the need for moral blameworthiness to be connected to the serious consequences of the offence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, determining that a conditional sentence was a fit sentence, aligning with what the trial judge would have imposed had it been available.

The terms of the conditional sentence were to be prepared and released subsequently.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following the respondent's guilty plea to fraud exceeding $41 million.

The respondent had fraudulently redirected GST refunds from the Canada Revenue Agency by submitting false RC366 Direct Deposit Request Forms.

The sentencing judge struck down the mandatory two-year minimum sentence under section 380(1.1) of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional and imposed 18 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the constitutional question (with a dissent), found the sentence manifestly inadequate, and imposed a three-year sentence.

However, the court declined to re-incarcerate the respondent as he had already served the original sentence and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for break and enter and related offences.

The appellant did not contest that he was the driver of a van that neighbours observed passing a tool to the perpetrator of a daylight residential break-in.

The Court of Appeal found that the constellation of evidence at trial amply supported the inference that the driver of the van was party to a planned break and enter of a dwelling house.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the appellant abandoned his sentence appeal during oral argument.

Bail was rescinded and the intermittent sentence was ordered to resume.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

Police intercepted communications and observed the accused purchasing approximately 2985 grams of heroin with a street value between $600,000 and $900,000.

The Crown sought eight years' incarceration while the defence sought four to five years.

The court imposed a six-year sentence, giving significant weight to the early guilty plea as a mitigating factor equivalent to police cooperation.

The accused received credit for presentence custody of two years, four months, and two weeks, leaving approximately three years, seven months, and two weeks to serve.

Yuk Yuen Lee and Jing Zhang Huang were convicted by a jury of production and trafficking of cannabis.

A Gardiner hearing determined that the Crown did not prove the number of plants for mandatory minimum sentencing, but confirmed a substantial grow operation.

The Crown sought four years for Lee and two years for Huang, arguing Lee was the mastermind.

The defence sought suspended sentences or fines.

The court rejected the 'mastermind' theory, finding both individuals were lower-level participants.

Lee was sentenced to 15 months incarceration and three years probation, with no credit for speculative parole eligibility time.

Huang was sentenced to seven months and one week incarceration (net five months after pre-trial credit) and three years probation.

Ancillary orders under s. 109 of the Criminal Code and DNA orders were imposed for both.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting that commercial grow operations remain unlawful despite pending legislative changes to marijuana possession.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine the number of marijuana plants for sentencing purposes after convictions for production and possession for trafficking.

The Crown sought to engage a mandatory minimum sentence based on a plant count exceeding 500.

The defence presented expert statistical evidence challenging the adequacy of the police's sampling methodology.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the number of marijuana plants exceeded 500 due to the arbitrary sampling process, thus precluding reliance on the mandatory minimum.

However, the court accepted that it was a substantial marijuana grow operation for general sentencing purposes.

The accused applied to vary his bail recognizance to permit him to resume producing medical marijuana at an industrial premises while facing charges for drug production and related offences.

He argued that his prior personal-use production licence remained valid due to the Federal Court’s interlocutory injunction in Allard v Canada preserving certain licences under the former Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The court held that the applicant did not meet the criteria for protection under the Allard injunction or Health Canada’s transitional administrative policy because his authorization to possess had expired before the relevant injunction date.

As a result, he could obtain medical marijuana through lawful sources but could not personally cultivate it.

The application to vary the recognizance was dismissed.

The applicant sought a Rowbotham order directing the Attorney General or Legal Aid Ontario to fund counsel for pending criminal prosecutions involving multiple marijuana production and trafficking charges, or alternatively a stay of proceedings until funding was provided.

Legal Aid had refused coverage on financial grounds.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he lacked the means to retain private counsel, noting inconsistencies in his financial disclosure, undisclosed joint bank accounts, and evidence suggesting a potential interest in property owned by a person with whom he maintained a close relationship.

The court further held that the applicant had not demonstrated that representation by counsel was essential to a fair trial.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence seized from their residence at 39 Patricia Avenue, North York, on the grounds that their Charter rights under section 8 were violated.

The applicants challenged both the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and the use of a telewarrant procedure.

The court found that the ITO was carelessly drafted, materially misleading, and factually inaccurate.

The court also found that the telewarrant process was not justified under section 487.1 of the Criminal Code, as it was not impracticable for the officer to appear in person.

Additionally, the court found that a supervisory officer had made an undisclosed telephone call to the Justice of the Peace that influenced the issuance of the warrant.

The court concluded that the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as the search warrant application fell far below constitutional standards.