Darren S. Sederoff

The accused applied to vary his bail recognizance to permit him to resume producing medical marijuana at an industrial premises while facing charges for drug production and related offences.

He argued that his prior personal-use production licence remained valid due to the Federal Court’s interlocutory injunction in Allard v Canada preserving certain licences under the former Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The court held that the applicant did not meet the criteria for protection under the Allard injunction or Health Canada’s transitional administrative policy because his authorization to possess had expired before the relevant injunction date.

As a result, he could obtain medical marijuana through lawful sources but could not personally cultivate it.

The application to vary the recognizance was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of over three kilograms of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge violated the parity principle because other mid-level participants received 18-month conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge expressly considered the parity principle and made no error in principle.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint first‑degree murder trial, concerns arose that the spouse of a juror had attended court proceedings and communicated limited information about the case to the juror via text messages and made comments in the courthouse hallway supportive of a police witness.

Following two judicial inquiries, the accused sought either a mistrial or the discharge of the juror on the basis of juror contamination and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court held that although the spouse’s conduct demonstrated poor judgment, there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with the spouse or was influenced by her views.

Applying the presumption of juror impartiality and the reasonable apprehension of bias test, the court found no basis to conclude the juror could not remain independent and impartial.

The mistrial application and request to discharge the juror were denied, though the spouse was excluded from further attendance at the trial.

During a criminal jury trial, information emerged that the spouse of a juror had attended the proceedings and made comments supportive of a police witness, including remarks to the investigating officer.

The court had previously conducted an inquiry after learning the juror had received text messages from the spouse about events occurring in the courtroom.

Following new evidence from a detective about additional comments by the spouse, the court considered whether further inquiry of the jury was necessary.

Applying appellate guidance on allegations of improper juror contact, the court held that the potential taint of prejudice required a supplementary inquiry.

The judge directed that limited additional questions be put to the implicated juror to determine whether the spouse’s opinions had been communicated and whether they affected impartiality.

The applicant sought a Rowbotham order directing the Attorney General or Legal Aid Ontario to fund counsel for pending criminal prosecutions involving multiple marijuana production and trafficking charges, or alternatively a stay of proceedings until funding was provided.

Legal Aid had refused coverage on financial grounds.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he lacked the means to retain private counsel, noting inconsistencies in his financial disclosure, undisclosed joint bank accounts, and evidence suggesting a potential interest in property owned by a person with whom he maintained a close relationship.

The court further held that the applicant had not demonstrated that representation by counsel was essential to a fair trial.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.

In a multi‑accused murder trial arising from a home invasion in which one victim was killed and another survived, a co‑accused sought to exclude a text message sent on the day of the offence stating “To after work ok will be game time.” The moving party argued the text was an ambiguous fragment whose meaning could only be determined through speculation and should therefore be excluded under the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis.

The court distinguished authorities dealing with incomplete overheard utterances, finding the text was a stand‑alone statement capable of interpretation when viewed alongside earlier communications among the accused.

When considered in context with prior text exchanges suggesting planning activity, the message was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity and involvement of the accused.

The court held the text possessed probative value that outweighed any prejudicial effect and declined to exclude it.

The applicants brought a motion to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence seized from their residence at 39 Patricia Avenue, North York, on the grounds that their Charter rights under section 8 were violated.

The applicants challenged both the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and the use of a telewarrant procedure.

The court found that the ITO was carelessly drafted, materially misleading, and factually inaccurate.

The court also found that the telewarrant process was not justified under section 487.1 of the Criminal Code, as it was not impracticable for the officer to appear in person.

Additionally, the court found that a supervisory officer had made an undisclosed telephone call to the Justice of the Peace that influenced the issuance of the warrant.

The court concluded that the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as the search warrant application fell far below constitutional standards.