S. O’Brien

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting the victim and subsequently dismembering and destroying the body.

The Crown sought a 23-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 14 years with a further reduction for Charter breaches related to prolonged administrative segregation.

The court found the egregious post-offence conduct and the offender's extensive criminal record warranted a 20-year parole ineligibility period.

The court also found that the offender's prolonged administrative segregation violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter, granting a 3-year reduction.

The final period of parole ineligibility was fixed at 17 years.

The applicant, on trial for first-degree murder, sought disclosure of police records relating to recent murder charges against a key Crown witness.

The records were held by a different police force and Crown office than those prosecuting the applicant.

The court determined that the third-party records regime under O'Connor applied, rather than the first-party Stinchcombe regime, because the prosecuting Crown did not have possession of the records and they were not 'obviously relevant' to the applicant's case.

Applying the O'Connor test, the court found the records were likely relevant to the witness's credibility and ordered their production to the defence.

In a pre-trial ruling for a second-degree murder case, the court determined the appropriate jury selection procedure following the enactment of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory challenges.

The defence proposed combining the challenge for cause and stand-aside inquiries.

The court rejected a combined approach but permitted a limited expansion of the challenge for cause questions.

The court established a procedure where, after the challenge for cause, a specific question is asked to assess juror competence, allowing counsel to make submissions on whether the judge should exercise the enhanced stand-aside power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused, Jeremy Hall, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application (KGB application) to admit two police statements from a deceased witness, Tracey Friesz, for their substantive truth.

The defence argued for both procedural and substantive reliability of the statements.

The Crown conceded necessity but disputed reliability, highlighting Friesz's motive to protect her then-boyfriend, her history of dishonesty, and the lack of corroborative evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that procedural reliability was not established due to the absence of an oath and ineffective warnings, and substantive reliability was not met as the statements were not inherently trustworthy, given the declarant's motive to lie and lack of corroboration.

The court concluded that the probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

The accused, Mato Josipovic, applied for judicial interim release (bail) pending a new trial for second-degree murder, citing the potential lethal impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in detention and probable trial delays.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

While the primary ground (flight risk) was satisfied, the court found the Crown's case to be overwhelming and the gravity and circumstances of the offense (a public, brutal execution involving multiple shots and danger to bystanders) necessitated detention on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The specific risks posed by COVID-19 in the detention centre were not found to be higher than in the general population, and potential trial adjournments were deemed uncertain at the time of the application.

The bail application was denied.

The Crown applied to admit a recanted police statement from a material witness (Carol Ann Eaton) for substantive use in a first-degree murder trial against Jeremy Hall, under the "KGB application" framework.

The defence opposed, arguing lack of procedural and substantive reliability due to alleged coercion and the witness's recantation and claimed memory loss.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that procedural reliability was established through the sworn, video-recorded statement and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination of the witness at trial, despite her claims of coercion and memory lapse.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding police misconduct and the witness's credibility.

Two accused charged with first degree murder applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on extensive circumstantial evidence, including surveillance footage, eyewitness accounts of the shooting, cell phone records, and DNA evidence linking the accused’s vehicle to the victim.

The court found the Crown’s case to be overwhelming and concluded there was a high probability of conviction.

The proposed sureties, largely family members, were found inadequate to provide meaningful supervision or ensure compliance with bail conditions.

Detention was ordered on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, including concerns about flight risk, potential interference with the administration of justice, and maintaining public confidence in the justice system.

The moving party sought an order transferring an action from Newmarket to Toronto and assigning it to be heard with related proceedings arising from a large construction project.

The responding party challenged the jurisdiction of a master to order a change of venue and opposed the transfer.

The court held that Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction on a master to order a venue transfer, distinguishing authority concerning consolidation and stays under s. 107 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Applying the Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) factors, the court found that the events, subject matter, and related litigation were centred in Toronto and that transferring the matter would promote efficiency and avoid inconsistent findings.

The motion for adjournment was denied and the venue transfer ordered, while requests to have the action tried with other proceedings or referred to the master for trial were adjourned to be determined by a judge.

In a proposed class action alleging a price‑fixing conspiracy in the optical disc drive (ODD) market contrary to common law and s. 45 of the Competition Act, the plaintiff sought leave to amend the claim to add eighteen additional corporate defendants.

The defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that limitation periods under the Limitations Act and s. 36(4) of the Competition Act had expired.

The court held that at the pleadings amendment stage it was inappropriate to make definitive findings on discoverability or the expiry of limitation periods where the evidentiary record was incomplete.

Although the plaintiff’s evidence regarding due diligence was thin, the court concluded it would be unfair to refuse the amendment solely on the deficient record.

The motion was adjourned to permit the plaintiff to file additional evidence addressing discoverability and diligence.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence from several witnesses that would disclose prior criminal conduct and other discreditable acts by the accused in a murder prosecution.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, the relationship between the accused and witnesses, and consciousness of guilt, including allegations that the accused plotted to eliminate a key witness.

The court applied the established rule that evidence of disreputable conduct is presumptively inadmissible unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The court held that most of the proposed evidence formed part of the narrative explaining the motive and relationships surrounding the alleged homicide and was therefore admissible with limiting instructions.

Certain evidence, including alleged assaults on a spouse, buried firearms, and an ante‑mortem statement attributed to the deceased, was excluded as marginally relevant and of questionable probative value.

The applicant, a clinic providing services to victims of domestic violence, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the federal government's repeal of the long-gun registry under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The respondents moved to strike the application under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The applicant moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the destruction of the registry data pending the hearing of the application.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion to strike, finding the claims were not plainly and obviously doomed to fail given the novelty of the issues.

However, the court also dismissed the applicant's motion for an interlocutory injunction, concluding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the evidence of irreparable harm was weak and the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in the enacted legislation.