Shahen Armen Alexanian

Following the dismissal of a commercial lease application at the landlord's request, both the landlord and the personal respondent sought costs.

The court denied costs to the personal respondent, despite the presumptive entitlement on an abandoned application, due to his vexatious and abusive conduct throughout the proceedings.

The court also denied the landlord's request for costs against the tenant and the personal respondent, finding the tenant was not responsible for the personal respondent's actions during the relevant period and the landlord was not substantially successful against the personal respondent personally.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiff auto repair facility claimed $9,898.80 in storage fees from the defendant insurer after a customer's vehicle was towed to its premises and remained there for 73 days.

The defendant refused to pay, arguing the plaintiff was not certified to provide vehicle storage services under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021 (TSSEA).

The Small Claims Court dismissed the claim, finding that by receiving and holding a towed vehicle, the plaintiff provided vehicle storage services within the meaning of the TSSEA.

Because the plaintiff sought to charge a fee for these services, it was not exempt from the TSSEA and was prohibited from charging or collecting storage fees without holding a vehicle storage certificate.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The moving parties, who were previously declared vexatious litigants, brought multiple motions within an appeal seeking broad procedural and substantive relief.

The motions were brought without obtaining leave from a Superior Court judge, as required by the vexatious litigant order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions, holding that while a vexatious litigant order can be appealed without leave, any motions brought within that appeal proceeding still require leave.

This appeal addressed the application of the discoverability doctrine to the limitation period for income replacement benefits (IRBs) under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The appellant insurer, The Personal Insurance Company (TPIC), argued that the Divisional Court erred in finding that the insured's application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) was not limitations-barred.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the doctrine of discoverability applies to IRB claims, consistent with its prior decision in Tomec.

It held that a pre-emptive denial of benefits by an insurer does not trigger the limitation period if the insured was not yet eligible for or had not applied for the benefits.

The Court found that the LAT adjudicator had not made an implicit factual finding regarding when the insured applied for benefits, thus allowing the Divisional Court to draw its own inferences.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the Divisional Court's decision to remit the matter to the LAT for a new hearing on the substantive merits of the IRB claim.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the appellants to pay full indemnity costs to the respondents in the amount of $25,973.05, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The decision was made after the appeal from a Superior Court of Justice judgment.

The appellants appealed a provisional summary judgment order made against them in a mortgage action.

They had defaulted on a syndicated mortgage loan and alleged fraud against the lenders, including the respondents.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial and no evidentiary basis for the fraud claims against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision.

The court held that the motion judge correctly applied summary judgment principles, including the holistic approach and the "best foot forward" rule, and properly exercised discretion regarding necessary parties and the risk of inconsistent findings with a related fraud action.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying his claim for income replacement benefits on the basis that it was barred by the two-year limitation period.

The appellant had returned to work immediately after the accident but stopped working 16 months later, at which point he applied for benefits.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the adjudicator erred in law by failing to apply the doctrine of discoverability.

Following Tomec, the court held that the limitation period could not begin to run before the appellant became eligible for the benefits.

The appellant, Antonio Doria, appealed the dismissal of his action against the respondents, which was brought after he had already received and collected an arbitration award for the same damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), finding that the plaintiff was attempting to re-litigate damages claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that Section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act does not confer an absolute right to pursue separate actions against jointly liable parties if it constitutes an abuse of process, especially when a full opportunity to adjudicate the claim has already occurred and the award collected.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's request for leave to appeal the costs award.

The Receiver of a deceased personal injury lawyer's professional corporation brought a motion seeking to impose a 'Sliding Fee Structure' on new counsel who took over the deceased lawyer's client files.

The Receiver argued this was necessary to efficiently realize on the estate's interest in the files.

The court dismissed the request to impose the fee structure, finding it would inappropriately override the clients' statutory rights under the Solicitors Act to receive and assess a bill.

However, the court ordered new counsel to provide the Receiver with 'Determinable Information' about the files to assist the Receiver in rendering accounts, subject to a privilege protocol.

The plaintiff rented his home for a film production, during which his floor was scratched.

He previously arbitrated a claim for $680,000 against the production company and was awarded $49,668.38.

Dissatisfied with the award, the plaintiff commenced a new action against different defendants (Warner Bros. entities) seeking over $500,000 for the same damage.

The defendants moved to strike the claim as an abuse of process.

The court granted the motion, finding that section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act does not permit a plaintiff to relitigate a fully adjudicated claim simply because they are dissatisfied with the damages awarded in the first proceeding.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice in a personal injury action.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, civil jury trials in the Central East Region were suspended until well into 2022.

The court granted the motion, finding that the prejudice to the plaintiff caused by further delay outweighed the defendants' right to a jury trial, especially given the age of the case and previous adjournments.

The applicant law firm sought to pay settlement funds into court due to a dispute between its former client and a litigation lender over loan repayment.

The lender sought summary determination of its claim.

The former client disputed the debt, alleging misrepresentation, incapacity, and improper legal advice from the applicant.

The court found no triable issues regarding the client's indebtedness to the lender, noting the small amount in dispute and the lack of a legal defence.

The court ordered the applicant to pay the lender from the trust funds, extinguishing the client's and the applicant's liability to the lender, but preserved the client's right to pursue claims against the applicant.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's trust claim regarding a 46.5-acre property.

The plaintiff alleged that the property, initially transferred to her minor daughter and later sold in two parts to the defendants' father, was held in trust for her.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, noting the plaintiff's lack of detailed supporting evidence, inconsistencies in her claims, and contradiction by documentary evidence and the third party's (the daughter's) testimony.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, concluding that the defendants' narrative, supported by independent documentation and consistent evidence, was credible.

The plaintiff brought an action under the Occupiers' Liability Act after falling on a rubber fingertip mat in the vestibule of the defendant's premises.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the defendant met the standard of care, as the mat was a standard commercial mat, in good repair, and subject to reasonable seasonal and daily inspection protocols.

Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's expert evidence and found the plaintiff failed to prove that the mat caused her fall, noting she was wearing high wedge-heeled shoes and the video evidence contradicted her account.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The court issued an endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion on a mortgage guarantee.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion and the plaintiff's subsequent request for a mini-trial or expedited trial.

The court reserved the costs of the summary judgment motion to the trial judge, finding it more just given that the claims and defences remained live and the work done would reduce trial costs.

The plaintiff's request for a mini-trial was denied, as it would not allow for proper development of defences due to prior evidentiary deficiencies and lack of discovery.

The court reiterated the need for a case conference to address the action's progress, particularly in light of a key individual's failing health, and to consider an expedited trial.

The plaintiff, 2383431 Ontario Inc., sought summary judgment against individual defendants who guaranteed a mortgage for Rose of Sharon (Ontario) Retirement Community.

The defendants argued the guarantee was limited to interest only and raised equitable defences related to construction defects and the relationship between the original mortgagee (IWOK) and the builder (Unimac).

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the complex factual matrix, including the disputed scope of the guarantee and the relationships between the parties, presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

The judge emphasized that the record did not allow for confident findings of fact or a proportionate resolution of the dispute.

The appellant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle collision and sued for damages.

At trial, the jury awarded $25,000 in general damages and $5,000 for future health care, but the trial judge granted the respondents' threshold motion under the Insurance Act, reducing the damages to zero.

The appellant appealed the threshold ruling, the trial judge's refusal to put the loss of income claim to the jury, and the jury charge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the threshold analysis, agreeing there was insufficient evidence to support a loss of income claim, and concluding the jury charge was appropriate.

Following a jury trial where liability was admitted, the jury awarded the plaintiff $30,000 in damages.

However, the court granted the defendants' threshold motion, finding the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory exceptions under the Insurance Act, resulting in a nil judgment.

Both parties sought costs.

The court held that because the plaintiff obtained a nil judgment, the cost consequences of Rule 49.10 did not apply.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court awarded the successful defendants their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $32,500.

Following a motor vehicle collision, the defendants admitted liability and the jury awarded general damages and future health care expenses.

While the jury was deliberating, the defendants brought a threshold motion under the Insurance Act seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory exception for permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.

The court accepted that the plaintiff had chronic pain and that his condition was permanent, but held the evidence did not establish a serious impairment causing substantial interference with regular training or most usual activities of daily living.

The plaintiff's ability to complete ESL training and continue household activities undermined the claim that the threshold was met.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.