Daniel Michael

The accused was charged with multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, possession of proceeds of crime, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The charges arose from his role as CEO of a subsidiary company that contracted IT professionals for a bank project.

The contractors experienced delayed and unpaid invoices, which the Crown alleged the accused facilitated by lying about the reasons for the delays.

The court found that the accused reasonably relied on the parent company's CFO and operations team for financial matters and did not have actual knowledge of, nor was he wilfully blind to, the fraud perpetrated by the CFO.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession, raising various Charter issues regarding the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the search incident to arrest, and questioning after invocation of the right to counsel.

The trial judge rejected all Charter arguments.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the initial stop was lawful based on reasonable grounds, the search was a lawful incident of arrest and not unduly intrusive, and while the questioning after invocation of the right to counsel may have constituted a breach of s. 10(b), any such breach would not have resulted in exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

During a trial for first-degree murder arising from a home invasion and robbery, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the prior inconsistent statement of a co-perpetrator for the truth of its contents.

The co-perpetrator had confessed to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation but recanted parts of his confession at trial.

The court found that while the statement lacked substantive reliability, it met the test for threshold reliability based on procedural reliability, as there were adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy, including cross-examination and the use of a truth verification strategy by the undercover officers.

The application was granted and the statement was admitted.

The accused, Eric Coplin-Duran, was charged with multiple firearms and marijuana possession offences following a R.I.D.E. stop.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Coplin-Duran had knowledge of the two loaded firearms and marijuana found hidden in his vehicle's centre console and driver's side door.

The court, relying on circumstantial evidence, rejected the defence's alternative inference that the passenger secreted the items, finding it illogical given the passenger's injured hand and the manner of concealment.

The court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused had knowledge of the items, leading to convictions on all counts.

The accused was charged with obstructing a police officer by misidentifying himself.

The Crown's case relied on identification evidence from two officers: PC Perilli, who arrested the accused at a motel and later identified him in a YouTube video, and PC Gorski, who provided recognition evidence based on prior dealings with the accused.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the accused's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found significant flaws in the identification procedure, including the absence of a critical cell phone photo used for comparison, inconsistencies between officer accounts, and the poor quality of surveillance video.

The court concluded that while individual officers expressed certainty, the reliability of the identification process was compromised, leaving reasonable doubt as to identity.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police observed a known drug user meeting briefly with the accused's vehicle and subsequently stopped and arrested the accused.

A search of the vehicle following the arrest yielded 5 grams of cocaine hidden in the centre console.

The accused challenged the arrest and search on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

While the court found a section 10(b) violation occurred when police questioned the accused without first providing rights to counsel, the evidence was not excluded under section 24(2).

However, on the merits of the possession charge, the court found the cocaine was so well hidden that the driver would not have presumptively known of its existence, and there was insufficient evidence to prove the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The overall delay from arrest to trial was approximately 20 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the four-part test from R. v. Morin, finding 13 months of Crown and institutional delay, 3 months of defence delay, and 4 months of neutral intake delay.

The court found minimal prejudice to the accused and considered the complexity of the case, which involved a Charter application challenging the grounds for arrest based on historical police information.

The court concluded that the 13 months of Crown and institutional delay, while exceeding the 8-10 month guideline, was not unreasonable given the case's complexity and the minimal prejudice demonstrated.