Kabir Sharma

This sentencing decision concerns Noah Anderson and Junior Jahmal Harvey, who were convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of Thane Murray and the attempted murder of Allen Uthayakumaran and Tony Nguyen.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years for first-degree murder and, after considering aggravating and mitigating factors, imposed concurrent life sentences for the two counts of attempted murder.

The reasons detail the circumstances of the offence, the profound impact on the victims and community, the backgrounds of the offenders, and the applicable sentencing principles and case law.

The court considered whether to admit expert evidence from Dr. Jabari M. Evans on the history and social context of drill rap in a criminal trial involving the use of rap lyrics as circumstantial evidence.

The defence sought to qualify Dr. Evans to provide context for the jury regarding the conventions of drill rap, arguing that a jury instruction would be insufficient, especially given the risk of racist stereotypes.

The Crown opposed, citing prejudice and confusion.

The court found that the subject matter was not complex and that a proper jury instruction would suffice.

The court held that Dr. Evans' evidence was not necessary and, even if it were, its prejudicial effect would substantially outweigh its probative value.

The evidence was excluded.

In a prosecution for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the accused brought pre-trial motions challenging the search warrants for a residence and cell phones under s. 8 of the Charter, seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought a motion to adduce extrinsic misconduct evidence, including rap lyrics and videos of firearms found on the accused's phones.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter motions, finding the ITOs sufficient and admitting the evidence despite technical breaches regarding the timing of Reports to Justice.

The court partially granted the Crown's motion, admitting the rap lyrics and firearm videos as highly probative of animus and means, while excluding certain photographs due to prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, possession of proceeds of crime, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The charges arose from his role as CEO of a subsidiary company that contracted IT professionals for a bank project.

The contractors experienced delayed and unpaid invoices, which the Crown alleged the accused facilitated by lying about the reasons for the delays.

The court found that the accused reasonably relied on the parent company's CFO and operations team for financial matters and did not have actual knowledge of, nor was he wilfully blind to, the fraud perpetrated by the CFO.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

This ruling addresses whether the defence of necessity had an "air of reality" to be presented to the jury in a criminal trial.

The accused, facing charges including robbery, kidnapping, and dangerous driving, claimed he acted out of fear for his life from police.

The court found no air of reality to the defence, concluding that the accused was not in imminent peril at the time of the later offences and had reasonable legal alternatives to committing the crimes.

The judge emphasized that lawful police actions do not constitute imminent peril for necessity, and any potential excessive force by police had dissipated.

The defendant was charged with robbery of a sex-trade worker, with the prosecution relying primarily on DNA evidence found on the complainant and a weak in-court identification.

The court found that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as there were too many unknowns regarding the DNA transfer mechanism and source, and the direct identification evidence was unreliable.

The court emphasized the high burden of proof in criminal trials, particularly in circumstantial cases requiring the exclusion of all reasonable alternative inferences to guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The applicant, E.M., sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

E.M. was charged with 31 firearms-related offences and had been in custody for over a year.

The Crown conceded the material change but opposed release primarily on tertiary grounds.

The court found that E.M. had discharged her onus on the tertiary ground, considering the strong release plan, the circumstantial nature of some charges, the significant delay caused by the pandemic, and compassionate grounds as a mother of four young children.

The court emphasized that while the allegations were serious, the public's confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by release under strict conditions, especially given the public health implications of incarceration during the pandemic.

The applicant, charged with firearm offences, brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or the exclusion of a firearm from evidence.

He alleged that police violated his s. 7 rights by using excessive force (tasering him three times) during his arrest, and his s. 8 rights by unreasonably using a breaching shotgun to enter his residence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police's use of the taser was objectively reasonable given the exigent circumstances of the applicant fleeing with a firearm and failing to comply with commands.

The court also found the use of the breaching shotgun was reasonable due to the dynamic and high-risk situation.

The court further held that even if there were Charter breaches, neither a stay of proceedings nor the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) would be appropriate.

The accused were charged with offences arising from the discovery of two handguns in a downtown Toronto hotel room.

The Crown sought to admit evidence obtained through an investigative chain that included an initial street-level drug investigation, a warrantless search of a rental car, and a warrantless entry into a hotel room.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple Charter breaches.

The court found that while there were some Charter violations, they were not sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion of the evidence.

The court admitted the evidence, finding that the officers acted in good faith, the breaches were minimal, and society's interest in prosecuting firearm offences outweighed the Charter violations.