Hannah Freeman

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He also argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to credibility and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment fair and balanced, the fresh evidence incapable of affecting the verdict, and trial counsel's performance competent.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own motion to quash and that there was no prejudice to the appellant.

The young person appealed findings of guilt for robbery, weapons dangerous, and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the robbery conviction, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable based on the appellant's proximity to the robbery, flight from police, and recent possession of stolen property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to apply the Kienapple principle, staying the findings of guilt for weapons dangerous and possession of stolen property to avoid multiple convictions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of 12 months in jail, a restitution order of $213,084.61, and a fine of $110,000 in lieu of forfeiture for two counts of fraud over $5,000.

He argued the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence, not giving sufficient weight to the 10-year delay, and in the quantum of the restitution and fine.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the trial judge properly treated the offences as large-scale fraud and adequately considered the delay and the appellant's circumstances.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an octogenarian with medical issues, appealed his concurrent 12-month custodial sentences for historical sexual assault, interference, and exploitation of a child.

He argued the sentence should be served conditionally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was below the usual range for prolonged sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, and that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence despite the appellant's medical difficulties.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years less a day for aiding and abetting by renting a car used in the offence.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences from circumstantial evidence were reasonable.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred in treating the home invasion aspect as an aggravating factor when there was no evidence the appellant knew it would involve a home invasion.

The sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence and breach of a recognizance.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the principal Crown witness and that the imitation firearm conviction was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessment and concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the object used was an imitation firearm.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which found she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and could not be managed by a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions were reasonable and supported by evidence, particularly given the appellant's ongoing major mental illness, medication non-compliance, and lack of insight.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

During the hearing, the Court of Appeal discovered the Crown had proceeded summarily at trial, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction.

Because the court had already publicly dismissed the appeal on its merits, a panel judge was authorized under s. 13 of the Courts of Justice Act to sit as a Superior Court justice to hear the matter as a summary conviction appeal.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but the sexual assault count was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the SOIRA order was varied to 10 years.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the sentencing judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The appellant was granted 1.5 to 1 credit for all pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 5 months of credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing identification evidence, resolving inconsistencies regarding the colour of his pants, and applying the burden of proof under W. (D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the investigating officer's identification was corroborated by ample circumstantial evidence and that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and the dangers of uncorroborated identification evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in the treatment of pre-sentence custody.

The Crown conceded the appeal based on a companion case.

The Court of Appeal accepted the concession and varied the sentence from 46 months to 36 months imprisonment by increasing the pre-sentence custody credit from 20 months to 30 months.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against young children and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender, leaving the public interest as the sole issue.

The Court of Appeal found the applicant's appeal grounds to be weak, particularly his arguments regarding the trial judge's credibility findings and use of prior consistent statements.

Balancing the weak appeal against the serious nature of the offences and the lengthy sentence, the court concluded that the public interest favoured immediate enforcement of the sentence.

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and mischief.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on eyewitness identification, that he was not being 'pursued' by police when boxed in, and that there was no mens rea for mischief when he reversed into a police cruiser.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence, correctly interpreted 'pursuit' to include the police's actions to capture him, and reasonably inferred recklessness for the mischief charge.