Hannah Freeman

The appellant, Antonio Ricciardi, appealed his convictions for 17 serious offences involving three women, including attempted kidnapping, confinement, criminal harassment, assault with disguise, and robbery, and his global sentence of 14 years incarceration.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair assessment of the evidence or in the global sentence imposed for the long list of criminal offences against vulnerable women.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexual assault and failing to comply with a youth court order.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on consent, alleging misapprehensions of evidence and uneven scrutiny of testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's assessment of credibility and the inferences drawn from the evidence, finding no reversible error.

The appellant, R.L.S., appealed a 9-month sentence for counseling and touching a child for a sexual purpose, seeking a reduced sentence to avoid deportation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence proportionate given the high moral culpability, breach of trust, and victim's young age, affirming that immigration consequences do not justify an artificial sentence.

The appeal against the sentence was dismissed.

However, the court varied the prohibition order to more narrowly define prohibited conduct, removing the broad "public park" restriction and refining internet/communication conditions.

The appellant sought review of a prior order dismissing his application for a s. 684 order to appoint counsel for his appeal.

The appellant argued that the reviewing judge misunderstood a ground of appeal related to Charter s. 11(b) and erred in characterizing the appeal as "barely arguable." The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding no misunderstanding of the Charter ground and no error in the characterization for the purpose of counsel appointment.

The application was dismissed, and the matter was set to be spoken to regarding the Crown's proposed response to the ineffective assistance of counsel ground of appeal.

Benham Yaali sought leave to appeal a 13-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing the sentencing judge erred by considering handgun possession as an aggravating factor and by failing to properly account for provocation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, upholding the sentencing judge's discretion in weighing factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, except for setting aside the victim impact surcharge.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for assault causing bodily harm.

He argued the trial judge improperly considered his propensity for violence during a Gardner hearing and mistakenly considered a previous conviction for assaulting his spouse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessment and confirming that the trial judge correctly considered the appellant was on probation for an offence related to the complainant, which was a valid aggravating factor.

The court found the sentence fit given the significant assault and substantial bodily harm.

The appellants, Salvatore Raia and Michael Vitello, appealed their convictions for conspiring to kidnap, sexually assault, and murder Mr. Vitello’s spouse.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of a key witness's credibility and reliability, and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which was supported by extensive corroborative evidence.

Minor errors in the trial judge's reasons were deemed peripheral and without impact on the credibility assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the 30-month sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on the trial judge's alleged uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, despite a minor misapprehension regarding the planning of the offence.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day, as the trial judge erred in finding an aggravating factor (methodical planning) that was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also considered the appellant's cognitive deficits and the appropriate sentencing range for similar offences.

This criminal trial involved three accused charged with various firearm-related offences following a shooting incident.

The Crown's case relied heavily on video surveillance, expert evidence on "characteristics of an armed person," and gunshot residue (GSR) analysis.

The court acquitted two accused, Sentoree Kamara and Shaquille Woodcock, finding that the circumstantial evidence did not establish their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly noting the limitations of the "characteristics of an armed person" evidence and potential GSR contamination.

However, the court found Shierine Shkais guilty of possession of a firearm, concluding that her questions about "minimums" while detained, combined with the firearm being found in her purse, indicated the requisite knowledge.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the victim fine surcharge totalling $900 (comprised of 7 fines).

All other aspects of the appeal were dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated May 14, 2018.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the reasons and conclusions of Justice Molloy and Justice of the Peace Wong.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for 15 offences including criminal negligence causing death, fail to remain at the scene of a collision, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the court found that while the trial judge erred in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, this error was inconsequential given the numerous other aggravating factors, particularly the appellant's extensive criminal record for similar offences.

The court upheld the sentence as fit but clarified that the s. 743.6 parole eligibility order applied only to the criminal negligence conviction, not the entire sentence, and set aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed his conviction on eight offences arising from a break and enter of a pharmacy in Sudbury on January 26, 2017, and his sentence of three years' imprisonment less 455 days pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant argued he entered through an open door and should have been convicted of unlawful entry rather than break, enter and theft, and that he was not identified at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the findings of guilt.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by failing to adequately consider as a mitigating factor the serious injuries the appellant sustained while in pre-sentence custody, including four broken ribs, two punctured lungs, and a brain injury.

The Court reduced the remaining sentence to 300 days on count 1 and 300 days on count 2 (concurrent), such that the sentence was fully served, and set aside the mandatory victim fine surcharge.

The appellant, a leader of the Galloway Boyz gang, appealed his convictions for attempted murder and firearms offences arising from a drive-by shooting in April 2004.

The Crown conceded that warrantless wiretap evidence obtained under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code breached the appellant's section 8 Charter rights.

The sole issue was whether the intercepted communications should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The motion judge admitted the evidence, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal conducted a fresh section 24(2) analysis under the Grant framework and upheld the admission of the evidence, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of three sexual offences committed against different complainants during a professional relationship and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment to be served in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions while the Crown appealed the sentence.

Following the appellant's death during the appeal process, the court considered whether to proceed with the appeals or dismiss them as moot.

The court dismissed both appeals as moot, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting departure from the general rule that an accused's death renders an appeal moot.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years' custody for domestic violence offences, including assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, forcible confinement, and criminal harassment.

The trial judge imposed a three-year global sentence with 24 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, leaving one year to serve, and a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant identified a calculation error: he should have received 33 months of credit, not 24 months.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the appellate court should increase the global sentence to three years and nine months to maintain the one-year custodial effect and allow time for correctional authorities to develop a release plan.

The appellate court granted the appeal, corrected the credit to 33 months, and reduced the remaining custodial term to three months, rejecting the Crown's argument that the sentence should be increased to accommodate administrative planning.

The appellants appealed from the dismissal of an application for mandamus challenging a Justice of the Peace's refusal to issue process arising from a private information.

The lower court found that the Justice of the Peace had acted within jurisdiction and did not deny the appellants natural justice.

The appeal was scheduled for hearing but faced adjournment requests due to the co-appellant's health concerns.

The court granted one final opportunity for oral submissions to be heard on a peremptory basis.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding a guilty plea conviction and refusing to admit new evidence to set aside the plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by applying the Palmer test when rejecting the affidavit in the application to set aside the guilty plea.

Leave to appeal was granted.

However, upon examination of the record, including the detailed plea inquiry conducted by the original trial judge, the court found that the appellant fully understood and agreed to the plea and the underlying facts.

The appellant's claim of misunderstanding regarding a mandatory weapons prohibition was rejected as the record showed the trial judge and appellant's counsel had made clear that the prohibition would be mandatory.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant failed to attend the appeal hearing or contact counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury charge by failing to sufficiently caution the jury that items linking the appellant to a particular address were relevant only to his relationship with the vehicle's passenger and did not directly support his identification as the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions clearly identified the relevance of the evidence and that the jury was sufficiently instructed on identification and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but as he had served the custodial portion, that issue was moot.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.