Kevin Howard Matthews

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The police arrested the accused for an alleged breach of bail conditions, searched his vehicle incident to arrest, and found cocaine.

This discovery was used to obtain a search warrant for his home, where cash was found in a safe.

The court found the arrest was unlawful and arbitrary, the search of the vehicle was unreasonable, and the accused's right to counsel was violated.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the drugs and cash under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on a 17-year-old youth who was found guilty of sexual interference with a 13-year-old intoxicated girl.

The trial judge imposed 24 months probation with 120 hours of community service.

The Crown sought leave to appeal and argued the trial judge erred in finding the offence was not a violent offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and in treating the victim's willing participation as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit despite the trial judge's legal errors regarding the victim's participation and the provision of birth control.

Two accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter and robbery respectively, following an altercation over a bicycle that resulted in the victim's death.

The court considered sentencing ranges, pre-sentence custody credits, and Gladue principles for both Indigenous offenders.

Sentences were imposed, with the court emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, particularly for the manslaughter conviction involving a vulnerable victim.

The accused, Patrick O’Keese, was charged with second-degree murder and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The Crown alleged O'Keese murdered Brayden Moonias and then attacked Eric Lawson.

The court found that while an unlawful act caused Moonias's death, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that O'Keese committed the assault.

The court found reasonable alternative inferences regarding the timing of the Lawson attack, which impacted the interpretation of O'Keese's post-offence conduct.

Consequently, O'Keese was acquitted of murder and manslaughter but convicted on both breach of recognizance counts.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code after a Justice of the Peace denied his release pending trial on charges including kidnapping, drug trafficking, and conspiracy.

The applicant argued the Justice erred in applying the onus, relying on an alleged breach of a Manitoba recognizance, and overemphasizing an outdated criminal record.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no material change in circumstances and concluding that the Justice did not err in law or render an unreasonable decision in justifying detention on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to trial was 42 months.

The court attributed 4 months and 2 weeks to defence delay and 1 month and 3 weeks to a discrete event (court recording system failure), resulting in a net delay of 35 months and 3 weeks.

This exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to demonstrate transitional exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, citing a general lack of diligence, including a year for disclosure and 12 months for a two-day preliminary inquiry.

The court found a violation of s. 11(b) and granted a stay of proceedings.

An employer operating a sawmill was convicted of violating Section 75(b) of Ontario Regulation 851 under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to ensure that side cantors of an industrial saw machine were blocked as prescribed.

A worker suffered crushing injuries when side-heads moved during maintenance because hydraulic power was not shut off.

The trial Justice found that "blocked" requires a physical blocking mechanism, not merely shutting off hydraulic power.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Justice erred in interpreting "blocked" and that the sentence of $48,000 was excessive.

The appeal court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding no palpable error in the trial Justice's interpretation of the legislation in the context of worker safety.

The accused brought an application to quash a General Warrant authorizing covert entry onto a third party’s property and sought exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of s. 8.

The primary issue was whether the accused had standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in property owned by his brother.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis from R. v. Edwards, the court held the accused lacked sufficient possession, control, or authority over the property to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.

As a result, he had no standing to challenge the warrant.

The court further held that, even if standing had existed, leave to cross‑examine the affiant would not have been granted because the challenge raised was facial rather than sub‑facial.

Following a violent New Year's Day confrontation at a First Nation residence, the accused were tried on aggravated assault allegations arising from a group melee in a driveway.

The court found the sole direct identification evidence unreliable on the central issue of who struck the complainant, preferring other eyewitness evidence that pointed to another participant.

The court held the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that either accused directly committed the aggravated assault or was liable as a party under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

One accused was nevertheless convicted of failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour based on his participation in the disturbance.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude cannabis and cannabis resin seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant.

He argued the information to obtain failed to provide sufficient information about confidential informants' reliability and that the forced entry execution of the warrant was itself unreasonable under section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the governing search warrant review principles and the Supreme Court's section 8 jurisprudence on forced entry searches, the court held the warrant was validly issued and the police manner of entry was not shown to be excessive or unreasonable.

The application to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave before trial to cross-examine the affiant on an information to obtain a search warrant, arguing insufficient disclosure regarding the credibility and reliability of confidential informants and an alleged failure of full, frank, and fair disclosure.

Applying the Garofoli and Pires framework, the court held there was no reasonable likelihood that the proposed cross-examination would assist in determining a material issue or tend to discredit a statutory precondition to issuance of the warrant.

The court found the information to obtain, read as a whole, disclosed reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity, notwithstanding that some informant information was not borne out by the search.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a 79-year-old man charged with trafficking a large quantity of oxycodone, sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing judge found the Justice of the Peace erred in principle by failing to analyze the proposed release plan, allowing for a de novo review.

However, the judge ultimately concluded that detention remained justified on both primary and secondary grounds, citing the applicant's lack of ties to the jurisdiction, his overseas connections, the inadequacy of the proposed surety, and the high risk of continuing criminal activity associated with lucrative drug trafficking.

The young person appealed their conviction, arguing that their s. 11(b) Charter rights were infringed due to two periods of delay: time taken by the original trial judge to render a decision, and a two-month delay due to the judge's illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the time taken to craft reasons was reasonable and part of the inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also held it was not unreasonable to wait two months to see if the ill judge could resume duties before rescheduling, and noted the appellant suffered no special prejudice as they were in custody on other serious charges.