WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
ROSENBERG, ARMSTRONG and WATT JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
and
K.O.
Appellant
Kevin Matthews for the appellant
Andreea Baiasu for the respondent
Heard and released orally: June 13, 2008
On appeal from conviction by Justice R. Lajoie of the Ontario Court of Justice dated April 4, 2006.
ENDORSEMENT
1The appellant complains about two periods of delay. First, a period of less than two months while the original trial judge adjourned the case to consider the submissions and render his decision. Second, the appellant complains about the period of two months due to the illness of the original trial judge.
2As to the first period, it was entirely reasonable, in our view, for the trial judge to take time to consider the submissions and craft his reasons for decision. This was part of the inherent time requirements of the case. The appellant has not established on this record that the adjournment was the result of lack of adequate institutional resources.
3As to the second period, in our view, it was not unreasonable to wait just under two months to see whether the original trial judge would be able to resume his duties. Once it became clear that he would not be able to return to work, the court moved promptly to attempt to reschedule the case before another trial judge. In our view, the Crown was not required to make an application to remove the original trial judge at that stage. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in R. v. MacDougall, 1998 CanLII 763 (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45 at para. 51:
Absent compelling reasons it would be improper for Crown counsel to apply to remove the judge seized of the case.
4This case had not reached the point where there were compelling reasons. This case is quite different from McDougall itself where there was a twelve-month delay as a result of the sentencing judge’s illness.
5Finally, we agree with the trial judge that there was no special prejudice in this case. While the appellant was a young offender and was in custody, on this record it appears that he was in custody as a result of serious adult charges allegedly committed while he was on bail for this offence. We agree with the trial judge that the appellant’s s. 11(b) rights were not infringed.
6Accordingly, the appeal from conviction is dismissed.
Signed: “M. Rosenberg J.A.”
“Robert P. Armstrong J.A.”
“David Watt J.A.”
