Gordon Fillmore

The court considered sentencing for G.M. following guilty pleas to two counts of sexual assault against his stepchildren.

The court rejected a joint submission for a four-year sentence, finding it inadequate given the gravity, duration, and breach of trust involved in the offences.

The decision reviews relevant case law and sentencing principles for sexual offences against children, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The court provided G.M. the opportunity to apply to withdraw his guilty plea.

The accused pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for his role in the prolonged assault and torture of a vulnerable victim in the context of the drug trade.

The Crown sought an 18-year period of parole ineligibility, while the accused sought 12 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the victim's vulnerability and the brutal nature of the murder.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years.

Two accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter and robbery respectively, following an altercation over a bicycle that resulted in the victim's death.

The court considered sentencing ranges, pre-sentence custody credits, and Gladue principles for both Indigenous offenders.

Sentences were imposed, with the court emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, particularly for the manslaughter conviction involving a vulnerable victim.

Peter Keeash was convicted of second-degree murder, uttering death threats, and forcible confinement.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility for the life sentence and the sentences for the other convictions.

The Crown sought an 18-year parole ineligibility period and consecutive sentences for the other charges, while the defence sought 12 years and concurrent sentences.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's character, and Gladue factors, including his traumatic background and the fact that two victims were Indigenous women, which required primary consideration of denunciation and deterrence.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with 14 years of parole ineligibility for murder, and concurrent sentences of five years for threats and forcible confinement of one victim, and three years for threats to another.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA submission were also made.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder, uttering death threats, and forcible confinement following the stabbing death of his brother's common-law partner.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of three highly intoxicated witnesses, which contained inconsistencies.

The court accepted the evidence that the accused had a knife, threatened the occupants, and fled the scene before police arrived.

Applying the test for circumstantial evidence, the court found that the only reasonable inference was that the accused stabbed the victim and had the requisite intent for murder despite his intoxication.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on historical sexual offence charges arising from allegations made decades after the alleged events, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

Applying the W. (D.) framework and general principles governing credibility, reliability, delayed disclosure, and the avoidance of sexual assault myths, the court found significant concerns with the reliability of the complainants' memories and with aspects of their credibility.

The court accepted the accused's evidence where it conflicted with the complainants' evidence and, in any event, held that the record left a reasonable doubt.

All counts on the indictment were dismissed.

The accused, L.E., facing charges of historic sexual assault, applied under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code for a hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning alleged prior sexual activity of one of the complainants, L.S., with other children.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to the reliability of the complainant's memories, not to support the "twin myths." The Crown conceded the evidence did not trigger the "twin myths" but argued it was inadmissible under the "collateral fact rule." The court granted the s. 278.93 application, finding that the formal requirements were met and the evidence was capable of being admissible under s. 276(2), and ordered a s. 278.94 hearing to address relevance, probative value, and the collateral fact rule.

Paul Whiteley Langis was convicted of three counts of fraud over $5,000, totaling approximately $80,000, committed against his employer (two Wendy's restaurants) through manipulation of accounting software and misuse of a corporate credit card.

The offences involved a breach of trust, planning, and sophistication, and were committed while the employer was dealing with a serious illness.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, significant impact on the victim, and lack of remorse, alongside mitigating factors including the offender being a first-time offender with a stable family and positive character references.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months' incarceration, a restitution order of $40,000, and a lifetime prohibition from employment involving financial authority over others.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code for a review of a release order granted after a justice of the peace reversed an earlier detention decision during the same bail hearing.

The Crown argued the justice committed a jurisdictional error by reversing the detention ruling without giving the Crown an opportunity to make submissions and by accepting unsworn statements from the accused.

The reviewing judge found that the failure to allow the Crown to respond constituted a jurisdictional error warranting review.

Although new medical evidence regarding the complainant’s injuries was admissible, the court held that the Crown had not established just cause to detain the accused.

The existing recognizance with strict conditions remained in effect.

The accused applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to review a detention order made on the secondary ground that his release would pose a substantial likelihood of further offences.

The defence argued there was a material change in circumstances because the proposed surety, the accused’s grandfather, testified at the review hearing although he had not testified at the original bail hearing.

The court found no error in principle in the justice of the peace’s decision and held that the evidence did not establish a material change in circumstances.

Given the accused’s extensive criminal record and repeated breaches of release conditions, the court concluded there remained a substantial likelihood of reoffending if released.

Sentencing decision following convictions for aggravated assault with a knife, assault of a child, unlawfully being in a dwelling house with intent to commit an indictable offence, and breach of recognizance.

The court applied the Gladue and Ipeelee principles to an Aboriginal offender with severe intergenerational trauma, childhood abuse, addiction, and an extensive criminal record, while emphasizing denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 because a young child was assaulted and exposed to the violence.

The court rejected the Crown's position that enhanced pre-sentence credit should be denied and applied Summers to award 1.5 to 1 credit for 388 days in remand.

A penitentiary sentence at the low end of the reasonable range was imposed, followed by lengthy probation and ancillary weapons and DNA orders.

The applicant sought review of a detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on the secondary ground.

The court held that a bail review is not a de novo hearing and requires proof of an error in principle or a material change in circumstances.

The judge rejected arguments based on the presumption of innocence, the absence of a criminal record, an asserted ladder of release, and the right to silence.

Given the strength of the Crown's allegations, the alleged repeated breaches of prior release orders, and the inadequacy of the proposed surety plan, the detention order was upheld.

Following a violent New Year's Day confrontation at a First Nation residence, the accused were tried on aggravated assault allegations arising from a group melee in a driveway.

The court found the sole direct identification evidence unreliable on the central issue of who struck the complainant, preferring other eyewitness evidence that pointed to another participant.

The court held the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that either accused directly committed the aggravated assault or was liable as a party under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

One accused was nevertheless convicted of failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour based on his participation in the disturbance.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to two counts of breach of probation contrary to s. 733 of the Criminal Code.

At sentencing, the Crown and defence made a joint submission for a one‑day concurrent sentence accounting for time served, but the trial judge rejected the joint submission and imposed a 14‑month conditional sentence order with fines.

The appeal court held that the sentencing judge failed to apply the established high threshold required to reject a joint submission and did not provide sufficient reasons demonstrating that the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the public interest.

The judge also failed to give counsel an opportunity to address the rejection of the joint submission.

The sentence was set aside and replaced with the jointly proposed disposition.

The accused was charged with making and possessing child pornography.

Police detained the accused for bizarre behavior and subsequently entered his home without a warrant, despite his explicit instructions not to do so, claiming exigent circumstances.

During the search, police discovered child pornography.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence.

The court found that the warrantless search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights, as there was no genuine urgency or threat to public safety justifying the entry.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, concluding that the serious Charter-infringing conduct outweighed the reliability of the evidence.

The accused was convicted of assault under s. 266 of the Criminal Code after violently attacking a witness in a bathroom at a public event.

The evidence showed the accused targeted the victim because the victim had previously provided information to police about a mutual acquaintance, though the court found the Crown had not proven the intent required for the separate offence of intimidation of a justice system participant under s. 423.1.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors including the victim’s status as a justice system participant and the unprovoked nature of the assault, as well as mitigating factors such as the accused’s lack of criminal record, employment stability, strict compliance with lengthy bail conditions, and strong community support.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence while considering proportionality and restraint under s. 718.2, the court concluded that incarceration was unnecessary.

A suspended sentence with probation and a fine was imposed.

The accused were charged with assault and intimidation of a justice system participant following an altercation in a washroom.

The Crown alleged the assault was retaliation against an informant who was scheduled to testify against a Hells Angels associate.

The court found the primary accused guilty of assault but acquitted him of intimidation, finding reasonable doubt that his specific intent was to impede the informant's duties rather than simply acting out of anger.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges as the Crown failed to prove he knew of the assault or intended to aid it.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The accused drove to a hospital following an ambulance after his wife suffered a serious leg injury at their rural residence.

The accused raised the common-law defence of necessity.

The court found that the defence failed on all three elements: there was no imminent peril once paramedics took charge of the wife's care, reasonable alternatives were available to the accused, and the harm of impaired driving outweighed the potential benefit of the accused's presence at the hospital.

The court found the accused guilty.

The offender was convicted after trial of aggravated assault and three counts of breach of probation arising from an unprovoked and vicious beating of a victim in February 2011, which resulted in severe traumatic brain injury and permanent cognitive and physical impairment.

The offender also pleaded guilty to common assault and two counts of breach of probation for assaulting another inmate while in custody in May 2011.

The sentencing court imposed a custodial sentence balancing denunciation and deterrence against rehabilitation, with particular consideration given to the offender's Aboriginal status, youth, and background trauma, while recognizing the serious nature of the violent offences and the significant harm inflicted on the victims.