Jennifer Armenise

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He had an extensive criminal record and was facing serious drug and weapons charges, some of which were incurred while on release.

The applicant proposed a new surety and GPS monitoring as a change in circumstances.

The court found the proposed surety lacked sufficient knowledge and influence over the applicant, and the evidence regarding GPS monitoring was inadequate.

The application was dismissed on the secondary ground due to the high risk of reoffence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for child luring and possession of child pornography.

He argued that the search of his home computers violated his section 8 Charter rights, that his section 11(b) rights were breached due to delay, and that the trial judge erred in applying the reasonable steps test and assessing the mens rea for the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient grounds for the search, no unreasonable delay under the Jordan framework, and that the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and possessed the requisite mens rea.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while impaired by drug, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, continuity issues with a urine sample, and improper use of compelled statements.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred by treating the COVID-19 pandemic as an automatic deduction for delay without analyzing the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure.

The net delay exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on statements made to a Drug Recognition Evaluator without first holding a voir dire to prove voluntariness.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL and driving while prohibited.

At trial, the sole issue was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness reliability, misapprehended evidence regarding a gap in police observation, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness identification was contemporaneous and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge made no errors in apprehending the evidence or applying the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for breach of recognizance and resisting a peace officer, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in law by placing the onus on the defence to establish a section 8 Charter breach for a warrantless search.

The appeal judge concluded that the police violated the appellant's section 8 rights by seizing his wallet to obtain identification for a CPIC check during an investigative detention.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the identity evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation against the offender for historical sexual offences committed against his children.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence indicating the offender had pedohebephilia and a moderate risk of sexual recidivism, but found he did not meet the criteria for a dangerous offender as his conduct was not intractable and the risk would decline with age.

The court instead designated him a long-term offender, imposing a sentence of 7.5 years imprisonment (with credit for pre-trial custody leaving 6 months and 1 day to serve) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The applicant, facing multiple charges including sexual assault and attempted child abduction, applied for a review of his detention after spending 911 days in pre-trial custody.

The court found that the significant passage of time, combined with the harsh conditions of pre-trial detention during the COVID-19 pandemic, constituted a material change in circumstances triggering jurisdiction for a review.

The court concluded that a stringent release plan, including house arrest, a $100,000 surety, and GPS ankle monitoring, sufficiently attenuated the risks to public safety and maintained confidence in the administration of justice.

The detention order was vacated and the applicant was released on strict conditions.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving, failing to comply with a breath demand, and dangerous driving.

At trial, she argued that her drink had been spiked, leading to involuntary intoxication.

The trial judge rejected this defence and convicted her.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard of proof, erroneously requiring the defence to establish a 'likelihood' of involuntary intoxication rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, charged with assault and sexual assault, applied to vary his bail conditions to allow him to leave his residence without his surety.

He had been on strict house arrest for seven months without any breaches, despite 50 police compliance checks.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record and the serious nature of the charges, but found that his unblemished compliance and the delayed trial date justified a modest loosening of his conditions.

The application was granted, and the release order was amended to permit the accused to leave the residence on specific days with his surety's written permission.

The accused, charged with violent offences related to a home invasion, appeared for a mandatory 90-day detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused sought release on a surety plan, arguing that the passage of time and the risks associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities justified release.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders established a substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The proposed supervision plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground concerns, and the theoretical risk of COVID-19 did not outweigh the risk to public safety.