CITATION: R. v. Knowles, 2025 ONSC 3465
BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-04-00AP
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
THOMAS KNOWLES
Counsel:
Jennifer Armenise, for the Respondent/Appellant
Alan D. Gold and Ellen C. Williams, for the Appellant/Respondent
HEARD: June 9, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION ON SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL
LEIBOVICH J.
1Mr. Knowles is a police officer. He was convicted of careless storage of a firearm and given an absolute discharge. The firearm was his police issued weapon. He received permission to store it at home if done in accordance with certain police policies. Mr. Knowles did not follow those policies, and he stored his firearm in an unlocked plastic junk drawer in his bedroom closet. Mr. Knowles appeals from his conviction and the Crown appeals from the sentence imposed. For the reasons set out below, both appeals are dismissed.
Conviction Appeal
2Counsel for Mr. Knowles submits that the trial judge erred in law by applying a standard of perfection to the requirements of "careless" storage. Counsel submits that the offence requires that there be a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable prudent person and that the trial judge erred in convicting Mr. Knowles because the method of storage that he used was not perfect.
3I disagree. The trial judge did not apply a standard of perfection. Rather, the trial judge clearly articulated that legal test and found that Mr. Knowles’ conduct of storing his work-issued firearm in an unlocked plastic drawer in his bedroom closet to be a marked departure from the standard of care required.
4I note that no issue has been taken with the trial judge’s articulation of the legal test. The trial judge said:
With respect to mens rea or the fault element for careless storage under section 86(1), the section requires more than mere negligence. Instead, what is required is that there be "a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances". (See: R. v. Finlay, 1993 CanLII 57 (SCC), [1993] SCJ No 86, R. v. R.H.S., 2007 ONCA 311 at 2, and R. v. Penner, 2019 BCCA 76 at 30).
5The trial judge properly stated that the fact that Mr. Knowles stored his firearm contrary to the regulations of his employer, the Toronto Police Services, was not determinative but was a factor to consider:
While evidence about various police policies and procedures may be helpful, they are not in and of themselves determinative on the issue of whether or not a firearm was stored in a careless manner. The Toronto Police policies do not override or superimpose elements to the offence. Compliance or lack of compliance is not the deciding factor on whether the offence has been made out. Instead, it may be one of a number of factors to be considered. (See: R. v. Gouliaeff, 2012 ONCA 690 at 7).
6The description of where the firearm was placed was set out by the trial judge in his reasons as follows:
Scene photographs of the walk-in closet and storage drawer became exhibits at the trial. The drawers that Mr. Knowles said he used were plastic, semi-transparent drawers which sat in a floor unit beneath a wardrobe rod where his clothing hung. The drawers appeared to be of cheap construction and had no locking mechanism. The drawers could be opened by manually sliding the drawer in and out. Overall, the unit was flimsy and ill-suited to secure important items.
Photographs depicting the contents of the drawer confirmed how unserious the drawers were. Inside the drawer, which contained the handgun, was an assortment of miscellaneous items; goggles and a furry garment which had been referred to as a Viking hat. The drawer looked like a place where random odds and ends were stored.
7The only factual dispute at trial was whether the ammunition was stored in the same drawer as the firearm or a drawer below. The photographs depict them in the same drawer. Mr. Knowles testified that they were in separate drawers. Counsel for Mr. Knowles submitted that the trial judge did not specifically reject Mr. Knowles testimony on this issue. That is incorrect. The trial judge found:
I also reject Mr. Knowles' evidence when it came to how he stored the related ammunition. To be blunt, I do not believe him when he testified that he stored his firearm in one drawer and ammunition in another.
8The trial judge gave detailed reasons why he rejected Mr. Knowles’ testimony. The trial judge’s conclusions in this regard were well within his purview.
9The trial judge properly noted that the accused did not have exclusive possession of the house, as others lived and visited there from time to time. The trial judge also noted that the gun was ready to be used:
….it is worth pointing out that Mr. Knowles did nothing to the gun itself that would have made the gun less effective should it have fallen into the wrong hands. He did not affix a trigger lock to the gun or take steps to make it immediately unusable. On the contrary, the firearm sat loosely in the drawer ready for use.
10The trial judge concluded that:
I have no doubt that Mr. Knowles stored his restricted firearm in an extremely careless and frankly dangerous manner. In my view, no reasonable person would think that storing an unencumbered handgun with ammunition close by in what amounted to a plastic junk drawer in a bedroom would be an appropriate way to store a police sidearm. I find that Mr. Knowles' choice to store his firearm as he did to be exceedingly beyond "a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances".
11The trial judge did not apply a standard of perfection to Mr. Knowles conduct. Rather, the trial judge was properly outraged at how Mr. Knowles chose to store his firearm and found that his actions were a marked departure. The trial judge’ conclusions were entirely reasonable and, in my view, inevitable given the circumstances of the case.
12The appeal from conviction is dismissed.
Appeal from Sentence
13On appeal, the court is not to interfere with a sentencing decision because the appellate court would have imposed a different sentence or weighed relevant factors differently: R. v. W.V., 2023 ONCA 655, 169 O.R. (3d) 68 at para. 26. Rather, the court can only intervene where the sentencing judge made an error in principle, failed to consider a relevant factor or erroneously considered an aggravating or mitigating factor and it appears that such an error had an impact on the sentence. In addition, an appellate court can intervene where the sentence imposed is “demonstrably unfit”, “clearly unreasonable”, “clearly or manifestly excessive”, “clearly excessive or inadequate”, or representing a “substantial and marked departure”; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, 3 S.C.R. 1089 at paras. 42-52; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 26-28.
14The Crown submits that the trial judge abdicated his responsibility by deferring to the Toronto Police Service Board and the upcoming discipline proceedings against Mr. Knowles under the Police Services Act. The Crown points to the following passages:
When I consider the mitigating and aggravating facts along with the different sentencing principles, I find that this is an appropriate case to grant an absolute discharge. I find that it is in Mr. Knowles' best interest and not contrary to the public interest. I say this keeping in mind that the parallel Police Services Act charges have been held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Criminal Code charges. I understand from counsel that the Police Services Act charges will recommence upon completion of this sentencing.
In my view, the public interest is best served by holding Mr. Knowles to account under the Police Services Act. At this juncture, I find that it is the best and most appropriate forum for the imposition of suitable consequences.
My expectation is that Mr. Knowles will be dealt with sternly under the Police Services Act. I urge those involved with the Police Services Act charges to follow up with them at the earliest opportunity.
I have explicitly not imposed any sanctions with the expectation that the Police Services Act charges can proceed without hindrance.
Furthermore, I decline to make an order under section 110 and prefer to leave it to the Toronto Police and the Police Services Act to determine what restrictions, if any, are to be placed on Mr. Knowles with respect to his access and use of firearms. I trust that authorities will review the trial findings and recognize that Mr. Knowles thumbed his nose at his obligations and duties.
15I appreciate the Crown’s submissions and while perhaps the trial judge could have phrased his reasons differently, in my view, the trial judge was simply considering the collateral consequences that will continue to follow Mr. Knowles, which he was required to do; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496, at para. 46.
16The trial judge, earlier in his reasons, noted the collateral consequences that Mr. Knowles had already suffered. The trial judge stated:
Mr. Knowles has experienced several collateral consequences as a result of his arrest on these charges. He was removed from the Homicide Unit and his police career was put into neutral. He was frozen from future promotions and lost the ability to earn extra income through overtime.
17In my view, the impugned section simply reflects the reality that Mr. Knowles would be subject to further collateral consequences as he will be subject to discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act.
18The Crown further submits that the sentence itself is demonstrably unfit. I agree that the sentence is extremely lenient, but my task is not to substitute my view for that of the trial judge. “Trial judges stand in the best position to understand the factors that go into the balance and, therefore, are granted a wide berth when exercising their discretion in determining a fit sentence;” R. v. Darosa, 2025 ONCA 232 at para. 12.
19The trial judge had a good understanding of the aggravating and mitigating factors at play and the sentence he imposed was open to him.
20The appeal from sentence is dismissed.
Date: June 10 2025
The Honourable Justice H. Leibovich