C.F. de Sa

The applicant developer brought a motion under Rule 49.09 to enforce a purported settlement agreement regarding a land dispute that was blocking a subdivision development.

The applicant argued that the parties had agreed on the essential terms of a land sale in exchange for the withdrawal of the respondents' objection.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was no mutual intention to be bound because several terms proposed by the respondents in a counteroffer, including the closing date, right of assignment, and registration of the agreement, were never accepted by the applicant.

The plaintiff sought costs of $20,000 on a substantial indemnity basis against the defendant Lynch following a successful motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation.

The defendant argued costs should be in the cause or fixed at $5,000.

The court found the plaintiff was successful and the motion should have been resolved on consent, but reduced the requested amount for proportionality, fixing costs at $14,000 payable by the defendant Lynch.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion seeking $150,000 in security for costs from the applicant, citing his conduct, delay tactics, outstanding costs awards, and impecuniosity.

The court noted the applicant's reliance on ODSP and lack of assets other than his share of the matrimonial home sale proceeds.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court declined to order the requested security, finding it would unjustly prevent the applicant from presenting his case on the merits.

However, the court ordered outstanding costs to be paid from a joint account and required the applicant to post $5,000 in security for any future motions.

The applicant, charged with obtaining sexual services for consideration, brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude text messages and identification evidence.

The police had photographed text messages between the applicant and the complainant on the complainant's phone with her consent, and showed her a single photograph of the applicant to confirm his identity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages voluntarily shared by the recipient, and that the identification evidence was reliable recognition evidence rather than a tainted identification.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80', arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application.

The appellant contended that an 8-minute delay at the roadside before being informed of his right to counsel, and the police officer's decision to delay access to counsel until arriving at the station, violated his rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the brief delay to secure the scene and the decision to wait for a private environment at the station were reasonable.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of fatally injuring his roommate's dog and sentenced to nine months' custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by shifting the burden of proof regarding his level of intoxication, effectively requiring him to prove he was too intoxicated to form the requisite specific intent.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the intoxication evidence and did not reverse the burden of proof.

Furthermore, the court held that injuring an animal under section 445(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is a general intent offence, meaning intoxication short of automatism is not a valid defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL and driving while prohibited.

At trial, the sole issue was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness reliability, misapprehended evidence regarding a gap in police observation, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness identification was contemporaneous and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge made no errors in apprehending the evidence or applying the burden of proof.

The plaintiffs brought an action seeking a "corporate divorce" and remedies for oppression under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act against the defendant, a 50% shareholder and director of the corporate plaintiff.

The defendant had abandoned his role in the business but continued to make unauthorized withdrawals from the corporate accounts for personal expenses, while also failing to pay personal taxes which resulted in CRA demands against the corporation.

The court found the defendant's conduct to be oppressive and ordered the corporation to purchase his shares for cancellation.

The court valued the defendant's 50% interest at $217,500 based on a current valuation without a minority discount, and deducted $50,000 for specific unauthorized withdrawals and tax payments made on his behalf, resulting in a final buyout price of $167,500.

The court also dismissed the defendant's late request to amend his pleadings to raise a limitations defence due to prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs brought an action against the municipality seeking damages and the removal of a municipal road built on their property in 1986.

The municipality brought a motion to dismiss the action, arguing it was statute-barred, res judicata, and that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that under section 65(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, the mistaken construction of the road constituted a deemed expropriation.

Consequently, the plaintiffs are prohibited from bringing an action for possession or damages in the Superior Court, and their sole remedy is to seek compensation before the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant mortgagors sought to set aside a Notice of Sale issued by the respondent mortgagee, arguing that the notice and a subsequent mortgage statement claimed unlawful interest rates and fees.

The court found that while the 18% interest rate charged on arrears likely violated section 8 of the Interest Act, the original Notice of Sale was valid as the disputed amounts were not sufficient to invalidate it.

Furthermore, the applicants were unable to obtain sufficient financing to redeem the mortgage even if the disputed charges were removed.

The application to stay the sale was dismissed, with disputed funds from the sale ordered to be paid into court.

The plaintiff sought default judgment against the defendants for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on ice at the premises where he rented a room.

The defendants were noted in default after failing to defend the action.

The court found the defendants owed a duty of care under the Occupiers' Liability Act and their negligence caused the plaintiff's broken hip.

The court awarded the plaintiff $80,000 in general damages, $10,000 for future care costs, the OHIP subrogated claim, and costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for $538,000 representing the principal of various loans.

Prior to the hearing, the defendant consented to partial summary judgment for $300,000.

The court considered whether summary judgment should be granted for the remaining $238,000.

Finding that the outcome would turn heavily on assessments of credibility due to contradictions in the defendant's evidence and the nature of the documentary evidence, the court concluded it could not make the necessary findings of fact.

The motion for summary judgment for the remaining $238,000 was dismissed and ordered to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for breaching an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The defendant failed to close the transaction after the real estate market declined and she was unable to secure sufficient financing.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiff's agent misrepresented the property's value.

Summary judgment was granted, the $60,000 deposit was forfeited, and the plaintiff was awarded $98,936.56 in damages for loss of bargain and carrying costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to maintain a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) on a property owned by the defendants.

The plaintiffs had paid deposits for pre-construction townhomes, but the defendants made no progress on the development and attempted to sell the property to a third party.

The defendants argued the CPL should be discharged based on a 'no registration clause' in the agreements of purchase and sale.

The court found a triable issue regarding an interest in land and held that the equitable factors favoured maintaining the CPL to protect the plaintiffs' investments, despite the contractual prohibition.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff claimed entitlement to the proceeds of her deceased husband's investment accounts, alleging an oral agreement that they would remain beneficiaries on each other's accounts, and asserting a constructive trust.

She also sued the investment firm for failing to notify her when the deceased changed his beneficiaries to his children.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the investment firm had no duty to disclose the deceased's personal financial decisions, and the plaintiff failed to establish a constructive trust or agreement, noting she had already received a substantial portion of the estate.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 rights following his arrest and the search of his home, seeking exclusion of a firearm under s. 24(2).

Police had intercepted communications indicating a firearm transaction and followed the seller to the applicant's residence.

When police attempted to arrest the men in the driveway, they fled into the house.

The court found the arrest and search incident to arrest were lawful, and the warrantless entry into the home was justified by hot pursuit and exigent circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff municipality obtained a judgment against the defendant in a related tort action.

Shortly before the trial of that action, the defendant transferred his property to his mother for significantly less than market value.

The plaintiff brought an action to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.

The defendants failed to file statements of defence and were noted in default.

The court applied the 'badges of fraud' doctrine and found the transfer was made with the intent to defeat creditors.

The court granted default judgment and set aside the property transfer.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand at a RIDE check.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons by failing to address the investigating officer's failure to record the interaction, and that the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework when assessing credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient when read in the context of the trial record, and that there was no error in the application of the burden of proof or the assessment of the evidence.

The applicant, charged with domestic violence offences across two informations, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total anticipated delay was nearly 35 months.

The court deducted delay caused by the complainant's failure to attend the first trial and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court also found the Crown's decision to join the two informations was reasonable and did not reflect indifference to the applicant's Charter rights.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership by adverse possession over a portion of the respondent's land, as well as an order to remove a fence and trees.

The respondent argued the application was an abuse of process because the applicant had previously brought a similar claim in 2017, which was dismissed.

The court agreed with the respondent, finding that the issue of adverse possession over the subject lands had already been determined in the prior action, where it was established that the previous owners had no intention to exclude the true owners.

The application was dismissed on the basis of res judicata.