J. Dawe

The moving party brought a motion to quash the insurers' appeal of an order denying them leave to amend their pleadings to add the defence of civil fraud.

The moving party argued the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal held that an order refusing leave to amend a pleading to advance a new substantive defence is a final order.

Because the order foreclosed the insurers' ability to assert the distinct defence of civil fraud, the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal.

The motion to quash was denied.

The appellant appealed an order denying her motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the respondent after the appellant defaulted on her mortgage.

The motion judge found that while the appellant moved with reasonable dispatch, she failed to provide a draft statement of defence and her proposed defences lacked an air of reality.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's articulation or application of the test for setting aside a default judgment and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a scheduling order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that a scheduling order is an interlocutory order because it does not determine the merits of the dispute.

Therefore, the appeal should have been brought to the Divisional Court, and the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine into Australia and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on cell phone data, including text messages, WhatsApp group chats, and audio recordings involving the appellant and his co-conspirators.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admissibility of the audio recordings, the trial judge's treatment of a co-conspirator's testimony, the application of the wilful blindness standard, and the characterization of the conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or legal analysis.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the nine-year sentence was fit and did not violate the principle of parity when compared to the co-accused's sentence, given the co-accused's early guilty plea.

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences after police discovered a loaded handgun during a warrantless search of a rental car under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, 2017.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when officers failed to advise him of his rights before conducting the CCA search, consistent with the court's intervening decision in R. v. McGowan-Morris, 2025 ONCA 349.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the vehicle search did not breach s. 8 but allowed the appeal on the s. 10(b) ground, setting aside convictions and ordering a new trial where the admissibility of the appellant's flight evidence and his racial profiling claim could be properly assessed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud after failing to declare over $50,000 in earnings and COVID-19 benefits while receiving Ontario Works assistance, collecting approximately $16,000 to which she was not entitled.

She received a six-month conditional sentence and a restitution order.

On appeal, the appellant sought to set aside her guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to mental health conditions and uninformed because she was unaware those conditions might have provided a defence.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was voluntary, as the record showed active participation in the year-long process leading to the plea, and informed, as the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by jury of two counts of trafficking cocaine and one count of assaulting a peace officer with a weapon after police executed a search warrant on his apartment.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defence of mistake of fact regarding the assault charge, and in failing to relate the evidence summary to material issues and the defence position.

The court found no merit in either ground, holding that the trial judge's instructions adequately required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the officer was a peace officer engaged in executing his duty, which effectively encompassed the mistake of fact defence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellants appealed an order validating unsigned 2024 draft wills under s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased had executed a will in 2018 and improperly executed wills in 2022, before having new drafts prepared in 2024 that remained unsigned at his death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the 2018 will as fresh evidence, set aside the validation of the 2024 drafts because they did not reflect final testamentary intentions, and remitted the issue of the 2022 wills' validity to the Superior Court for fact-finding.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The self-represented appellant mother sought leave to appeal a costs order made following a lengthy family law trial in which the respondent father was largely successful.

The trial judge had awarded the father net costs of $20,000 after setting off support arrears, noting the father's reasonable offers to settle and the mother's bad faith conduct.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the costs award was not plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

The appellant condominium owner appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay $495,888.39 in common expense arrears and granting vacant possession to the respondent condominium corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's use of enhanced fact-finding powers to resolve credibility issues and reject the appellant's claim of having paid in cash.

The Court also declined to entertain a new limitations defence raised for the first time on appeal.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred by using the oppression remedy to expand the respondent's registered condominium lien to cover unsecured arrears, as doing so could prejudice third-party creditors.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal filed in the Court of Appeal, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction.

The responding party acknowledged the error and requested a transfer to the Divisional Court under section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash and declined to order a transfer, finding the proposed appeal lacked obvious merit and that further delay would prejudice the moving party given significant unpaid support and costs arrears.

Following an appeal that was allowed in part with divided success, the parties made written submissions regarding costs in the court below.

The appellants sought to set aside a $20,000 costs award against them, while the respondent argued the costs order should remain.

The Court of Appeal held that the divided success on appeal informed the appropriate disposition of costs below.

The court set aside the $20,000 costs award and ordered no costs of the motion in the court below.

Following a successful appeal against the respondent Samir Chhina, the self-represented appellants sought costs of $35,000 for the appeal and the motion below.

The respondent argued the appellants failed to establish they had forgone remunerative activity to justify a fee allowance.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants did not meet their evidentiary onus but awarded a lump sum of $10,000 all-inclusive for costs of the motion and the appeal.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, appealed an order dismissing his motion to appoint counsel and striking his statement of claim against the respondent regarding a disciplinary proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that there is generally no authority to appoint counsel in civil proceedings, that the Human Rights Code does not apply to federal institutions, and that the claim lacked material facts and constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment finding she breached an agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was never in a position to close the transaction.

A one-day error by the respondent in setting the closing date was deemed minor and immaterial to the appellant's ability to complete the purchase.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed his action based on the defence of qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of law, legal principle, or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's decision to proceed by summary judgment or in her analysis of qualified privilege.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the hearing was unfair.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the mandatory notice requirements for constitutional issues under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act had not been complied with, depriving the Attorneys General of the opportunity to participate.

Consequently, the court set aside the order below and directed that any further pursuit of the matter must be reheard before the Superior Court on proper notice.

The appellant appealed an order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim against the individual respondents without leave to amend.

The claim alleged constructive dismissal, defamation, conspiracy, discrimination, and breach of Law Society rules following his resignation from the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleadings lacked material facts, failed to disclose viable causes of action, and could not be saved by further amendment.