Jeffery Couse

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that his confession, obtained during a 13-hour police interrogation using the Reid Technique, should have been excluded.

The appellant and an intervener argued for a new common law rule creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness for confessions elicited via the Reid Technique.

The Court of Appeal declined to amend the confessions rule, finding the existing framework sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to assess the cumulative effect of the prolonged, aggressive questioning and by making a palpable and overriding error of fact in concluding the appellant had not fallen asleep during the interrogation.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving.

At trial, the appellant brought applications alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 11(b) Charter rights, which the trial judge dismissed by largely adopting the Crown's submissions without providing independent analysis or factual findings.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons on both Charter applications were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

At trial, the judge applied section 276 of the Criminal Code to restrict the appellants from cross-examining the complainant about her prior work in the sex trade.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 276 does not apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences, and that the trial judge erred in applying it to restrict relevant cross-examination.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals in respect of the sexual services offences, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal against a conviction for trafficking MDMA was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

At trial, a key Crown witness recanted her videorecorded police statement in which she described witnessing the respondent sell cocaine.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine the witness under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act but dismissed the Crown's application to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made multiple errors in his hearsay analysis, including improperly assessing necessity based on the overall strength of the Crown's case, failing to recognize the witness's availability for cross-examination as a procedural safeguard, and improperly exercising his residual discretion.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.