D. Fletcher Dawson

The appellant, convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by lorazepam, appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by "entering the arena" through her own questioning, misapprehending evidence, and rejecting unchallenged testimony regarding her claim of accidental ingestion due to illness, fatigue, and rushing.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's questions permissible for clarification, her assessment of the appellant's credibility reasonable, and her reasons for rejecting the defence sufficient.

The court affirmed that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and was entitled to reject the appellant's testimony for articulated reasons, even if certain aspects were largely unchallenged in cross-examination.

The accused, Y.Y., was convicted by a jury of assault and sexual exploitation against his daughter.

A sexual assault conviction was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The assault, occurring when the complainant was 14, involved a prolonged physical attack including choking.

The sexual exploitation, when the complainant was 16, involved non-penetrative sexual touching.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, the victim's age, and the profound psychological impact, including suicidal ideation and family ostracization.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, stable employment, and low risk of reoffending.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as per R. v. Friesen, the court imposed a total sentence of two years and six months imprisonment: two years for sexual exploitation and six months consecutive for assault.

Ancillary orders included DNA, weapons prohibition, non-communication, and SOIRA registration.

A s. 161 order was not available as the complainant was 16 at the time of the sexual offence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an impaired driving charge, which resulted from the trial judge's exclusion of breath test evidence.

The trial judge found two Charter breaches: arbitrary detention (s. 9) when the respondent was placed in a police vehicle for an ASD test without reasonable necessity, and unreasonable search/seizure (s. 7 and s. 8) due to video monitoring and recording of the respondent using the toilet in her cell, where the provided privacy gown was ineffective.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings of Charter violations, affirming that the increased restriction on liberty required reasonable necessity and that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists even in police cell toilets.

The court also upheld the exclusion of the breath test evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a sufficient connection between the breaches and the evidence, and that the seriousness of the s. 8 breach warranted exclusion.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Timothy Cormier, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault in relation to the stabbing of his sister.

He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, and the trial proceeded on the attempted murder count.

The central issue was whether the accused possessed the specific intent to kill.

The court considered evidence of the accused's cognitive deficits, history of epilepsy, brain surgery, and a fixed delusional belief regarding the victim.

Despite these factors, the court found that the accused's actions, including bringing a concealed knife, the nature of the attack (multiple stabs to vital areas), his stated motive (considering abortion to be murder), and his post-offence conduct (disposing of evidence and lying to police/doctors), demonstrated a specific intent to kill.

The court rejected the accused's exculpatory statements as untruthful.

The accused was found guilty of attempted murder.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing Janis and Adem Corhamzic, who were found guilty of aggravated assault and assault.

The incident involved a brutal, hate-motivated attack on two victims, Mohammad Abu Marzouk and Fuat Yucel, in front of their families.

Mr. Abu Marzouk suffered severe traumatic brain injuries.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the anti-Arab hate motivation, the severe and lasting impact on the victims and their families, and the sustained violence, particularly the kicking of an unconscious victim.

Mitigating factors included the offenders' lack of prior criminal records, expressions of remorse, stable employment, and family support.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation for hate-motivated crimes while also applying the principle of restraint for first-time offenders.

The accused, Bernard LaCombe, was found guilty of one count of sexual assault involving four non-consensual sexual acts with an intimate partner.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the intimate partner relationship and breach of trust, and mitigating factors such as the accused's health issues and the out-of-character nature of the offences.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three and a half to four and a half years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court sentenced the accused to three years in a penitentiary, along with a five-year firearms prohibition and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The applicant sought extensive disclosure from the Crown and Peel Regional Police (PRP) under Stinchcombe and O'Connor, and a sealing order for application materials.

The disclosure requests stemmed from suspicions of targeting and police misconduct related to a vehicle stop and subsequent arrest for firearms and drug offences.

The court denied most disclosure requests where the information did not exist (e.g., historical CPIC snapshots, specific informant recruitment policies) or where likely relevance was not met.

However, the court ordered the production of officer notes and "will say" statements regarding an off-camera interview where the applicant was asked to become a confidential informant, and specific notes of an officer related to a BOLO broadcast.

The sealing order request was denied as the applicant failed to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test for restricting the open court principle.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to provide a breath sample for a roadside screening device (ASD).

The trial judge found that despite an initial refusal, the respondent's subsequent offer to provide a sample, made within approximately ten minutes and while the device was still available and the test could be meaningfully performed, was part of the "same transaction." The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming the "same transaction" principle established in R. v. Domik, which holds that a refusal followed almost immediately by an assent may not constitute a criminal offence.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that later Supreme Court and Court of Appeal decisions (Woods and Degiorgio) had displaced the Domik principle, noting those cases dealt with different factual contexts and did not address the "same transaction" issue.

The appeal was dismissed.

Rajvinder Singh appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol.

At trial, he was acquitted of the over 80 mg charge due to a Charter violation (s. 10(b) right to counsel in Punjabi).

On appeal, Singh argued the trial judge erred in finding him impaired, primarily by challenging credibility assessments of witnesses and alleging misapprehension of evidence, including video recordings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were reasonable and well-supported by the evidence, and that no palpable or overriding errors in credibility findings or factual assessments were demonstrated.

The court reiterated the high standard for appellate intervention on factual findings and credibility.

This ruling addresses whether the defence of necessity had an "air of reality" to be presented to the jury in a criminal trial.

The accused, facing charges including robbery, kidnapping, and dangerous driving, claimed he acted out of fear for his life from police.

The court found no air of reality to the defence, concluding that the accused was not in imminent peril at the time of the later offences and had reasonable legal alternatives to committing the crimes.

The judge emphasized that lawful police actions do not constitute imminent peril for necessity, and any potential excessive force by police had dissipated.

The appellant, a teacher assistant, was convicted of assault for grabbing a seven-year-old boy by the throat.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding video timestamps and erred in rejecting the defence of corrective force under s. 43 of the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the timestamp evidence was not properly authenticated as real evidence, and even if it were, it did not render the verdict unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's rejection of the s. 43 defence, concluding that the force was applied out of anger and frustration, not for educative or corrective purposes, and therefore did not meet the requirements for justification under the section.

The appellant appealed a forfeiture and prohibition order under s. 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in preferring hearsay evidence, reversing the onus of proof, impermissibly speculating, and misapprehending evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly given the deference owed to credibility findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of hearsay or the burden of proof, and that the inferences drawn regarding the appellant's anti-government views and potential for inciting others were reasonable given the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle and "over 80", and the imposed sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand, alleged violations of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and the sufficiency of evidence for impairment.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the conviction and the 18-month driving prohibition, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal reasoning.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by limiting his analysis to the complainant's capacity to consent, rather than her direct assertion of non-consent.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge misapplied the two-step consent analysis from R. v. Hutchinson, failing to address the subjective element of consent.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the factual findings necessary for a substituted conviction were not made.

The applicants, Dyllan Ali and Diquan Taylor, facing firearms and drug trafficking charges, brought a motion for disclosure of the full contents of disciplinary and criminal investigation files relating to Constable Sean Osborne, a key police witness.

The court dismissed the request for disclosure of files related to past disciplinary findings, citing principles of finality and lack of demonstrated likely relevance.

However, the court granted the request for disclosure of investigative files related to Constable Osborne's outstanding criminal charges for assault and obstruction of justice, finding them "obviously relevant" to the applicants' Charter application and trial, particularly concerning the officer's credibility and potential propensity for misconduct.

The applicant, Samer Dagher, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained due to an inability to provide a surety following an assault charge.

The reviewing judge found a material change in circumstances, including the applicant's 22 days in custody (equivalent to a non-custodial sentence if convicted), new disclosure clarifying the domestic history and mental health claims, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trial timeliness.

The court determined that the original decision was inappropriate and erred in law by not considering the potential for pre-trial custody to exceed a likely sentence.

The applicant was released on his own recognizance with conditions, including supervision by the John Howard Society Bail Program, as the Crown failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of further offense or interference with justice on secondary grounds.

The appellant, Bilal Moucho, appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and speeding.

The appeal focused on the admissibility of fresh evidence, specifically cell phone records, to challenge the identity of the driver.

The court applied the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence, finding a lack of due diligence by the appellant but concluding that the evidence was relevant, reasonably credible, and could have affected the verdict, particularly given the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification.

The convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by excluding Intoxilyzer test results.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter violation due to police failure to ensure the respondent received legal advice despite diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in assessing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on Charter interests, or society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court affirmed that the police's prior compliant conduct did not mitigate the breach and that the right to counsel has intrinsic value beyond discoverability.

The appellant, Sean McGovern, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The central issue was whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant and demand breath samples.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in factual findings and credibility assessment, specifically by relying on a single stumble and slightly slurred speech to establish reasonable grounds, and by giving undue weight to the police officer's testimony.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual determinations or credibility assessment.

The court affirmed that the cumulative observations made by the officer, including traffic offences, odour of alcohol, watery eyes, slow document production, and a slight stumble, constituted objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

The court also clarified that the trial judge's preference for the officer's evidence was based on factual considerations of reliability, not a per se elevation of police testimony.

The defendant Unifund Assurance Company brought two motions: one for summary judgment under Rule 20 based on a deemed admission, and another under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiff's personal injury claim on grounds of issue estoppel.

The Rule 20 motion argued that the plaintiff's failure to respond to a request to admit, concerning his presence in the vehicle at the time of the accident, constituted a deemed admission.

The Rule 21 motion asserted that the issue of the plaintiff's occupancy had been finally determined against him in a prior FSCO arbitration, thus precluding relitigation.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the deemed admission was of limited value due to drafting inaccuracies and that, despite the preconditions for issue estoppel being met, applying the doctrine would be unfair given the significant differences in purpose, process, and stakes between the FSCO arbitration and the tort claim.