Nancy L. Dennison

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by maiming contrary to section 268 of the Criminal Code after punching his cellmate in the face, breaking the victim's orbital bone and requiring surgery.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence and in applying the definition of "maiming." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly determined the punch was not reasonable in the circumstances and that the victim suffered a significant loss of use or function of body parts constituting maiming.

The appellant appealed his convictions on seven counts for various offences against his former domestic partner, including sexual assault with a weapon, and his three-year custodial sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, arguing uneven scrutiny of evidence, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and sentence, finding the trial judge fairly assessed the evidence, that any error regarding Browne v. Dunn did not materially affect the outcome, and that the appellant failed to meet the threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition finding that an NCR accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety and ordering a conditional discharge rather than an absolute discharge.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2002 for serious violent offences including aggravated assault, kidnapping, and assault with a weapon, argued the Board's finding was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the appellant poses a significant threat within the meaning of the Criminal Code, based on his serious index offences, ongoing psychiatric symptoms including paranoid delusions, lack of insight into his mental illness, substance abuse, and stated intention to discontinue medication if absolutely discharged.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement following a trial before a judge sitting without a jury.

The trial judge stayed convictions for sexual assault and assault with a weapon, applying the principles in Kienapple v. The Queen.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: misapprehension of evidence, excessive judicial intervention depriving him of a fair trial, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no deprivation of a fair trial despite judicial interventions, and no uneven standard of scrutiny applied to the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault on three grounds: that the trial judge improperly drew an adverse inference from the failure to call a material witness; that the trial judge failed to adequately consider frailties in eyewitness identification evidence; and that there was no evidentiary basis to reject the appellant's account of an earlier incident.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge did not draw an improper adverse inference, adequately addressed eyewitness frailties, and was amply supported by the record in rejecting the appellant's version of events.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within range and appropriate given the severity of injuries.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault on August 27, 2010, and sexual assault on October 31, 2010.

He was acquitted on one count.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months for the August 27 assault causing bodily harm (concurrent with three months for sexual assault) and six months consecutive for the October 31 sexual assault, for a global sentence of 15 months.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the August 27 conviction but found the trial judge's reasons inadequate regarding the October 31 sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial on that count.

On sentence, the Court adjusted the sentences to account for immigration consequences not considered by the trial judge, reducing the assault causing bodily harm sentence to six months less ten days and converting the sexual assault sentence to consecutive rather than concurrent, maintaining the overall nine-month sentence for the August 27 incident.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference with a minor occurring between ages 9 and 15, involving escalating contact from touching to oral sex, vaginal intercourse, and attempted anal intercourse.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and argued the judge failed to consider the full context of evidence and made speculative findings of fact.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge provided cogent and detailed reasons thoroughly anchored in the evidence, with the allegations powerfully corroborated by social media statements the trial judge found were made by the appellant.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and related charges entered by the trial judge.

The complainant, the respondent's biological daughter, testified to two sexual assaults occurring approximately 10-11 years prior when she was 10-11 years old.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts, treating the timeframe alleged in the indictment as an essential element of the offence that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by requiring proof of the specific timeframe, as this was not an essential element of the offence.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The trial judge found that while the appellant initially acted in self-defence during an altercation with an intruder in his apartment, he went beyond the limits of self-defence by continuing to strike the victim with a metal object after the threat had diminished.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's findings were supported by the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in principle by failing to recognize the significant mitigating factors arising from the appellant's initial justification in self-defence and the victim's role as an aggressor and trespasser.

The sentence was reduced from six years to time served (approximately two and one-half years).

The appellant appealed his sentence on the grounds that the trial judge failed to provide reasons for denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-trial custody and that such denial constituted an error in principle.

The Court of Appeal found that while the absence of explicit reasons was concerning, the trial judge's decision was justified based on the nature of the manslaughter conviction, the appellant's institutional record showing gratuitous violence, his significant criminal history, and his refusal to address addiction issues.

The court concluded this was a rare case where enhanced credit should not be granted.

Leave to appeal was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered correction of the warrant of committal to reflect 1:1 credit for 1083 days of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of perjury for giving evasive and deliberately misleading testimony at another trial.

While the appellant was never directly asked whether he associated the nickname "Carlito" with Pierre Aragon, the trial judge found that the appellant deliberately refrained from identifying Aragon by that nickname despite knowing the questions were directed at soliciting that information.

The appellant's inadvertent reference to Aragon as "Carlito" and subsequent attempt to cover up the mistake further demonstrated deliberate intent to mislead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to her on the evidence and that the Crown had established all requisite elements of perjury.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching by the Superior Court of Justice following a trial without jury.

The complainant, the appellant's 16-year-old daughter, testified that while intoxicated and in her bedroom, she was sexually assaulted by the appellant.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, failed to properly apply the W(D) principles, failed to critically analyze the Facebook message evidence, and failed to consider the absence of medical or forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly analyzed the evidence, applied the correct legal principles, and that the complainant's testimony was sufficient to ground the conviction.

The appellant challenged an order permitting an FBI "clean team" to examine seized computer servers and prepare a report to assist the court in determining what material should be sent to the United States under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The servers were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant in connection with an investigation into alleged copyright infringement.

The court held that while the application judge had jurisdiction under section 15(2) of the Act to make such an order, the application judge erred in failing to consider the effect on the appearance of fairness and judicial impartiality of having an entity closely associated with one of the adversaries examine the material and prepare the report.

The court set aside the order and held that any entity retained to assist the judge should be independent of the interested parties, absent compelling circumstances such as unique expertise.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant challenged the reliability of co-conspirator evidence and argued that extradition would violate his Charter rights under sections 6(1) and 7.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal and dismissed the judicial review application, finding that the reliability of witness evidence is a matter for the receiving jurisdiction, that the possible sentence would not shock the conscience, and that the Minister's decision to defer to US proceedings was reasonable and justified under the Cotroni factors.

The applicant, Marco Viscomi, brought a Charter application to exclude Canadian-gathered evidence from a second extradition application, alleging unlawful residential searches, improper execution of searches, unauthorized forensic searches, unlawful detention of seized items, and a breach of the affiant's duty of candour in obtaining a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the search warrants were lawfully issued, the forensic searches were authorized, the detention of items was not contrary to the Charter, and there was no material breach of the duty of candour.

While acknowledging potential minor Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, the court concluded that these were not serious and had no meaningful impact on the lawfulness of the evidence seizure, thus not warranting exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, sought an order for the committal for extradition of Jhoan Manuel Ciprian-Guzman for the Canadian offence of possession of child pornography.

Guzman opposed the application and brought a cross-application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the anticipated prison conditions in Florida would violate his Charter rights.

The court found that the test for committal was met and dismissed Guzman's cross-application, holding that the extradition judge's jurisdiction to consider Charter issues is limited to the fairness and integrity of the committal hearing itself, not the potential future treatment or punishment in the requesting state, which falls under the Minister of Justice's purview.

Three originating applications challenged the constitutional validity of the gathering-order and sending-order regime under ss. 18 and 20 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act on the basis that the proceedings are presumptively ex parte.

The court held that s. 8 does not generally require inter partes proceedings at the investigative stage, and that the trans-border context does not alter the usual principles favouring confidentiality and expedition in criminal investigations.

Applying the contextual approach from Rodgers, the court found that the statutory scheme contains a broad array of judicial, ministerial, and remedial safeguards.

The absence of presumptive notice before a s. 20 sending order, and the inapplicability of Tse’s after-the-fact notice requirement, did not render the regime unconstitutional.

The applications were dismissed.

The moving party sought disclosure of a full document from which excerpts had been included in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.

The responding party argued disclosure was irrelevant, that no Charter breach had an air of reality, and that disclosure risked harm.

The court held that where a party relies on portions of a document to obtain a warrant, the opposing party is entitled to inspect the entire document under the best evidence rule and ordinary civil procedure principles.

A party cannot selectively disclose favourable excerpts while withholding the remainder.

The court ordered production of the full document.