R. Juginovic

The defendant, Liban Omar, charged with first degree murder, sought to admit expert psychological evidence from Dr. Marc Patry regarding false confessions and "Mr. Big" operations during a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Omar's statements to undercover officers.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for expert evidence admissibility, finding that while Dr. Patry was qualified and the evidence logically relevant, it was not necessary to assist the jury.

The court concluded that the dangers of "Mr. Big" confessions could be adequately addressed through jury instructions, as established by Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in R. v. Hart and R. v. Mack, and was bound by R. v. Osmar.

The expert evidence was deemed unnecessary and therefore inadmissible.

The accused, Liban Omar, was charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by Omar to undercover police during a "Mr. Big" operation.

Applying the principles from R. v. Hart and R. v. Mack, the court found the statements to be reliable and highly probative, with their probative value outweighing any prejudicial effect.

The court also found no abuse of process by the police.

Consequently, Omar's statements to the undercover officers were deemed admissible at trial, subject to editing.

The court also briefly addressed the admissibility of expert evidence on the shooter's height, finding it admissible but ultimately giving it no weight.

Liban Omar, charged with first-degree murder, was the subject of a Crown application to admit a video-taped statement made by Gavin Daley to police.

Daley, who was murdered before trial, had implicated Omar in the murder and was found in possession of the deceased's ring.

The Crown sought to admit Daley's statement as hearsay evidence under the principled approach, arguing necessity due to Daley's death.

The court found the necessity criterion met but determined that the statement lacked sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability.

Factors undermining reliability included Daley's criminal record (including for fabricating evidence), his motive to lie to avoid more serious charges (accessory to murder, cocaine possession), and the interviewing officer's actions in feeding him key information about the suspect and the murder weapon.

The court concluded that the statement was not inherently trustworthy and that its admission would be unfair to the defence.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, a Black man charged with first-degree murder, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause regarding racial bias.

The accused requested that the challenge be decided by rotating triers and that the unsworn jury panel be excluded from the courtroom during the process.

The accused explicitly declined to apply under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code, relying instead on the court's inherent common law jurisdiction.

The court reviewed the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code and conflicting jurisprudence on whether trial judges retain inherent jurisdiction to exclude unsworn jurors when rotating triers are used.

The court concluded that applications to exclude jurors to preserve impartiality fall under s. 640(2.1), which mandates static triers if granted.

However, the court declined to make an order under s. 640(2.1) and further declined to exercise any residual common law discretion to exclude the panel, finding the grounds advanced did not warrant exclusion.

The challenge for cause was ordered to proceed with rotating triers and without excluding unsworn jurors.

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to first responders and police following the death of her severely disabled daughter.

The defence conceded there were no threats or inducements but argued the accused lacked an operating mind and that the police failed to keep an accurate record of the utterances.

The court found that the accused's responses were appropriate and demonstrated she had the minimum cognitive ability to understand what she was saying and to whom.

The court also held that the lack of complete recordings went to the weight of the statements, not their admissibility, and ruled all statements admissible.

The accused is charged with the first-degree murder of her severely disabled daughter.

The Crown brought an application to use a couch and a mannequin as demonstrative evidence during the testimony of a firefighter who first discovered the victim.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the firefighter could clearly describe the victim's position without the props, meaning the demonstrative evidence had minimal probative value.

Furthermore, the court held that using the props carried a real risk of prejudicial effect by potentially overemphasizing the victim's initial position or artificially inflating the witness's credibility.

The accused was charged with the first degree murder of her severely disabled daughter.

The defence brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first degree murder, conceding there was evidence for second degree murder but arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The court reviewed the evidence, including the accused's fabricated story of a home invasion, the staging of the crime scene, and the mode of killing by asphyxiation.

The court held that the complexity of the fabricated story and the staging of the scene provided sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a loaded handgun and ammunition discovered during a warrantless arrest on a TTC bus, arguing breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 9 due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

Police had acted on information from a confidential informant and later obtained a search warrant for the accused’s residence.

The court applied the Garofoli “step six” procedure, relying on a judicial summary and reviewing the unredacted information to obtain to assess whether sufficient disclosure had been provided while preserving informant privilege.

Applying the Debot framework, the court found the informant’s information compelling and credible, though only minimally corroborated, and held that reasonable and probable grounds for arrest existed.

The search incidental to arrest was therefore lawful and the application to exclude the firearm evidence was dismissed.

The accused, a 54-year-old teaching assistant with 25 years of experience working with special needs children, was charged with one count of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon against two autistic students in her classroom in September 2012.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the classroom teacher, while the accused testified in her own defence denying all allegations.

The court found the accused not guilty of the assault charge and the first assault with a weapon charge (pen incident), but guilty of the second assault with a weapon charge (pointer incident).

The court found the accused's credibility undermined during cross-examination, particularly regarding her explanation for using the pointer against the student.

The accused was charged with domestic assault.

He brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings, arguing that police conduct during his arrest violated sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Charter.

The accused alleged that police used excessive force when they tackled him to the ground, resulting in a broken cheekbone and broken ribs.

He also challenged the lawfulness of police entry into his apartment and raised concerns about being denied access to a washroom while in custody.

The court found that while the police use of force was excessive and violated section 7 of the Charter, a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy.

The court determined that the officer acted in good faith in a volatile situation, and that sentencing principles would be flexible enough to address the circumstances of the arrest.