COURT FILE NO.: CR16-10000114 DATE: 2020-07-21

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN - and - HASSAN JARRAR

Counsel: Ms. K. Simone for the Crown/Applicant Mr. J. Carlisle for the Respondent

HEARD: February 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, October 26, November 22, 2019, January 16, 30, February 13, May 12, 13, 2020

Publication of Any Information Tending to reveal the identity of the Complainant Herein is Prohibited under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada

K. BYRNE J.

Reasons for SENTENCE/DANGEROUS OFFENDER APPLICATION

OVERVIEW AND POSITION OF THE PARTIES

[1] The Respondent, Hassan Jarrar, was found guilty by a jury in March 2016 for the following offences which were committed between December 4, 2013 and February 6, 2014:

1. Sexual Assault;
2. Sexual Interference;
3. Child Luring;
4. Making Child Pornography;
5. Accessing Child Pornography; and
6. Possession of Child Pornography.

[2] In addition to the offences decided by the jury, there were three counts of breaching a s. 810.2 recognizance before the Court on a separate indictment. I found Mr. Jarrar guilty on two of those counts following the jury verdict and a re-election.

[3] The Crown seeks to have Mr. Jarrar declared to be a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of custody in respect of the following "serious personal injury offences": sexual assault s. 271 (Count 6); sexual interference s. 151(Count 7); possessing child pornography s. 163.4(4) (Count 5); accessing child pornography s. 163.1(4.1) (Count 4); make child pornography s. 163.1(2) (Count 8); and child luring s. 172.1(a) (Count 2).

[4] Counsel for Mr. Jarrar does not dispute that the enumerated counts are serious personal injury offences as defined under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, but submits that the Crown has not met its onus of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jarrar meets the criteria to be designated a dangerous offender. Mr. Jarrar has been incarcerated since his arrest 6 years ago. Counsel for Mr. Jarrar takes the position that the appropriate sentence is one of time served. Further, counsel submits that should this court see fit to release Mr. Jarrar, he would not be adverse to entering into a peace bond upon release.

[5] Alternatively, counsel for Mr. Jarrar submits that if Mr. Jarrar is found to meet the criteria to be designated a dangerous offender, an indeterminate sentence should not be imposed. The position of counsel on behalf of Mr. Jarrar is that a sentence of time served, followed by a long-term supervision order (“LTSO”) would adequately protect the public.

[6] The relevant criteria for a designation of dangerous offender are set out in subsections 753(1) (a)(i), 753(1)(a)(ii) and 753(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. [^1]

[7] The onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jarrar meets the definition of a dangerous offender. [^2]

[8] Subsections 753(4) and (4.1) [^3] permit me to impose a determinate sentence or a determinate sentence with a LTSO, rather than an indeterminate sentence, even though the offender is designated a dangerous offender.

[9] The issues on this application are: 1) Whether Mr. Jarrar meets the definition of a dangerous offender pursuant to any of the three subsections relied upon by the Crown; and 2) if so, whether a sentence other than an indeterminate sentence would reasonably be expected to adequately protect the public from Mr. Jarrar.

Evidence Overview

[10] The following exhibits were filed on the Dangerous Offender application:

1. The consent of the Attorney General to the Application;
2. The report of Dr. Philip Klassen, the assessing psychiatrist;
3. The curriculum vitae of Dr. Klassen;
4. The Victim Impact Statement of K.S.;
5. A bound volume of s. 752.1 assessment motion materials filed by the Crown;
6. A disk of materials filed by the Crown;
7. An Agreed Statement of Fact regarding Correctional Services Canada’s Supervision of Long-Term Offenders;
8. A copy of the Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guideline (SORAG) Worksheet;
9. A copy of the Static- 99R Worksheet; and
10. Two bound copies of Mr. Jarrar’s handwritten Affidavit.

[11] In addition to the material filed as part of the record, I heard viva voce evidence from Dr. Philip Klassen, a forensic psychiatrist who was called by the Crown to give expert opinion evidence on Mr. Jarrar’s diagnosis, risk and prognosis.

[12] I also heard viva voce evidence from Mr. Jarrar. This was in addition to his 262-page affidavit. Mr. Jarrar also made fulsome oral submissions to the court following the filing of counsel’s written submissions which I have taken into account.

[13] Finally, I have also considered the evidence from Mr. Jarrar’s trial on the predicate and related offences.

Personal Circumstances and Background of the Offender

[14] Mr. Jarrar is currently 48 years old. He was 42 years old when he committed the predicate offences. Mr. Jarrar and his three siblings were born in Syria to parents of European ancestry. Mr. Jarrar was raised by both natural parents until the family moved to Toronto when he was age two. His parents separated shortly thereafter. The children lived with their mother but had regular contact with their father. His mother remarried when he was age four. Mr. Jarrar reports not getting along with his stepfather, who also had children from a previous marriage. Mr. Jarrar never met his stepsiblings. Mr. Jarrar’s mother was a social worker and his father a tradesperson. There is no family history of violence, criminality or addictions. Mr. Jarrar’s development was unremarkable, and he suffered from no serious childhood illnesses. He was a moderate user of alcohol and did not use street drugs.

[15] In terms of school history, Mr. Jarrar reported that he failed grade one, albeit he was never diagnosed with a learning disability or ADHD. He had no juvenile legal difficulties and associated with pro-social peers. Mr. Jarrar has never been on welfare or EI and claims that he was employed as an exotic dancer in various clubs before being incarcerated.

[16] Mr. Jarrar has never married or had a common-law partner. Mr. Jarrar has no children.

[17] Mr. Jarrar’s family were not contacted and have not provided any information in relation to the s. 752.1 assessment, although I understand he still has some contact with both parents.

[18] Mr. Jarrar declined to participate in the assessment with Dr. Klassen and provided no information. Other than the trial evidence, the only information about Mr. Jarrar’s personal circumstances comes from Mr. Jarrar’s brother, in an assessment report dated October 11, 2000 completed by Dr. Palmer.

The Offender’s Affidavit and Testimony

[19] Mr. Jarrar submitted a lengthy handwritten affidavit for consideration on this application. The affidavit is comprised of two bound booklets. The first booklet is 164 pages in length. In it, Mr. Jarrar has outlined his version of the current and past charges and convictions. The second booklet is 98 pages in length and contains medical records for Mr. Jarrar along with some handwritten notes by him. The affidavit in its entirety is contained in Exhibit 9, which I have thoroughly reviewed.

[20] Mr. Jarrar also gave viva voce evidence on his own behalf.

Criminal Antecedents Prior to the Predicate Offences

[21] Mr. Jarrar has a criminal record.

Assault on His Sister – March 24, 1995

[22] The offender assaulted his sister in 1995. He struck her repeatedly in the face with the heel of his hand and called her a “dumb ho” and a “whore.” He was angry with her because he believed she was a prostitute and was being pimped out by 41 Division. His mother attempted to stop the assault, but he grabbed her by the neck and threw her against a wall. The offender was given a conditional discharge and sentenced to three years of probation. During that time, the offender was ordered to complete counselling and community service. The sentencing judge made it clear that he only imposed such a lenient sentence because the offender’s sister did not want the offender to spend time in jail.

Aggravated Sexual Assault - March 12, 1996

[23] On March 12, 1996, the unconscious body of D.M., a 19-year-old prostitute, was found in the snow in a desolate area near Cherry Beach in Toronto. She had been savagely beaten and sexually assaulted. Her skull showed a visible depressed fracture where it had been crushed. There were lacerations on her skull and face. Her body was bruised and the skin around her knees was torn to the bone. She was found with her pantyhose around her knees, her genitalia exposed. Her shirt was removed, and her bra was up over her breasts. Her body was one degree away from death by hypothermia.

[24] The victim was in a coma for six weeks and in the hospital for ten months. She suffered a “severe closed brain injury” and had to re-learn how to speak, eat, and even lick her lips. There is a scar on her throat and on her stomach from the insertion of tubes needed to help her breath and eat. The judge remarked on how her movements were still robotic and marred by the damage to her brain.

[25] It was the Crown’s theory at trial that the offender had picked up the victim after being enraged by an argument he had that night with his girlfriend, R.M. The offender’s girlfriend was 17 years old and lived in a shelter. He had told her his name was “Hans.” R.M. had become pregnant after being raped by another man. An argument between the two had ensued after the offender gave her an ultimatum: abort the child or he would leave her. After the argument, the offender drove R.M. to the same location where the victim was later found. The judge commented that the offender would have likely assaulted his girlfriend that night had she not been expected back at the shelter.

[26] The offender wove “a web of deceit” in order to conceal his involvement in the crime. He told his girlfriend that his cousin had committed the crime, he gave two false statements to police, he told his friend not to tell police that he had borrowed her car on the night of the attack, and finally he got his friend to pen a letter pretending to be a witness and stating that she had seen the victim being forced into a car by a black pimp after being dropped off safely by a man matching the offender’s description.

[27] The offender was convicted by a jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. In imposing the sentence, the judge considered the viciousness and callousness of the attack, the offender’s persistent and elaborate deceit, his lack of remorse, the fact that he was on probation at the time of the offence, and his obvious animosity towards prostitutes and women in general. In particular, the judge noted the offender’s conviction for assault against his sister, which stemmed from his belief that she was working as a prostitute, as well as the testimony of the offender’s girlfriend, who revealed that the offender hated prostitutes, and the offender’s statement to police, in which he called his sister a “dumb ho” and a “whore.” The Crown described the attack as a “hate crime.” The judge concluded his reasons for sentence by stating, “I feel you are a dangerous person and that some control must be kept on you for the rest of your life.”

[28] The offender appealed his conviction and sentence. His conviction appeal was dismissed, but in 2002, after reviewing a psychological assessment, the Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the sentence appeal and reduced the sentence to 15 years. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had not based his finding of dangerousness on any clear evidence, as no pre-sentence report had been ordered. The “post-sentence” report submitted to the Court of Appeal indicated that the offender represented “only a moderate risk of re-offending.”

Section 810.2 Hearing

[29] After the offender was released at warrant expiry, the Crown pursued a s. 810.2 peace bond. The judge presiding over the offender’s s. 810.2 hearing determined that the offender posed a serious and imminent danger and should be subjected to a peace bond. The judge heard testimony from the offender’s parole officer, who testified to the difficulty she experienced in managing the offender, the police officer responsible for preparing the s. 810.2 application, and the manager of assessment and intervention with Correctional Services Canada, who provided information about the documents provided by Correctional Services.

[30] The judge also heard from Dr. Mandelzys, who had performed a psychological assessment of the offender. However, the offender had refused to participate in the assessment, so the report was based on a file review. Dr. Mandelzys determined that the offender was “a high risk, and a high needs sex offender.” In his testimony, the doctor addressed some of the previous assessments, which suggested that the offender was a low to moderate risk to re-offend. Dr. Mandelzys explained that the offender’s lack of criminal antecedents and substance abuse issues kept the actuarial scores artificially low and that the offender’s failure to participate in programming “outweighed the significance of the actuarial scores.”

Assault on Inmate – 2002

[31] In 2002, the offender was convicted of assault for kicking another inmate in the leg. The kick was preceded by a “very aggressive” verbal confrontation between the offender and the victim. A Correctional Officer observed the confrontation and testified that the offender was the “obvious aggressor.” Two hours after the verbal confrontation, the offender approached the victim with raised fists. The victim testified that the offender punched him in the face and kicked him. The Correctional Officer observed the offender approach the victim with his fists raised, but only observed the kick; the Officer had turned away for a moment to alert the other guards. Initially, the offender denied that the incident ever occurred and said that the Correctional Officer was lying. Later, he claimed it was self-defence. The offender was convicted of assault for the kick and was sentenced to 15 days of incarceration.

PREDICATE AND RELATED OFFENCES

[32] The offences for which I must now sentence Mr. Jarrar all occurred between December 4, 2013 and February 6, 2014. They stem from an online relationship Mr. Jarrar initiated with 14-year-old K.S. The following is a summary of those offences as described by the victim in her testimony at trial.

[33] In December 2013, K.S., a 14-year-old girl, met the offender Hassan Jarrar, then a 41-year-old man on an internet social media platform. He had used a much younger photo of himself for his profile and told her that he was 19 years old.

[34] The two communicated over the phone and on various messaging apps for several months. The relationship became romantic. The victim testified at trial that about “halfway” through their relationship, spanning from December 2013 to February 2014, she told the offender that she was 14 years old and was too young to drive. She told the offender about her high school courses, fights with her mother about cleaning her room, and about the death of her father. The offender lied to the victim and told her that he too had lost his father and lived with his mother. He told her that he loved her, and she returned the sentiment. The offender asked her for phone sex, as well as sexually explicit photos and videos. The victim complied, albeit reluctantly at times. The offender consistently pushed for them to meet in person.

[35] The victim lived in Bowmanville, while the offender lived in Toronto. Hassan Jarrar researched the bus route for the victim to take to come visit him in Toronto. He told her that they would spend the weekend at a motel. The victim testified that she was under the impression that they would watch movies and cuddle. The victim told her parents she was staying at a girlfriend’s house for the weekend and took the bus from Bowmanville to the Yorkdale Mall, where she saw the offender for the first time. The victim was far from home and was scared. To explain his appearance, the offender said that he had gained some weight over the holidays. Unsure of what to do, the victim followed him to the Queensway Motel.

[36] At the motel, the offender took 30 minutes of video and several photos of the victim in a state of undress and in various sexual positions. In the videos, the victim appears confused, embarrassed, and unwilling to participate at times. The video also captures the offender touching the victim’s breasts, buttocks, and vagina.

[37] The offender provided the victim with one or two glasses of vodka mixed with apple juice. The victim believes the drink was drugged, because after she drank it, she became weak and lapsed in and out of sleep until the next day. She does recall that the offender took off her clothes and digitally penetrated her vagina. She objected and managed to kick him away. She also recalls that the offender took her to the bathroom to wash “something sticky” off her stomach. The offender informed her that he had had sex with her. She could not remember the intercourse. The offender’s DNA was found inside the victim’s vagina, on her external genitals, and on her stomach. It was an admitted fact that one of the sources of this DNA could have been from semen. As a result, I am prepared to find that Mr. Jarrar did vaginally penetrate the victim. As well, the offender’s phone contained over 60 images of the victim and 17 videos of her masturbating and/or stripping.

[38] In March 2016, the jury found the offender guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, child luring, making child pornography, accessing child pornography, and possession of child pornography.

Breach Convictions: s. 810.2 Peace Bond x2

[39] Throughout his relationship with the 14-year-old victim, the offender was bound by a s. 810.2 peace bond. The peace bond required the offender to abide by the following conditions: (i) Abide by a curfew and be inside your residence between the hours of 12:00 am and 6:00 am each and every day, except for lawful employment or medical purposes; and (ii) Do not have contact, directly or indirectly, with any female under the age of 16.

[40] This Court fully accepted the evidence of K.S. and found that Mr. Jarrar was in direct contact with a 14-year old girl for months and spent the weekend with her at a motel that was not his residence. Accordingly, Mr. Jarrar was found guilty of both breach charges (see: Reasons for Judgment, s. 810.2 Breaches, R. v. Jarrar, 2016 ONSC 5898).

VICTIM IMPACT

[41] I have considered the Victim Impact Statement written by C.S. on behalf of her daughter, K.S. It is abundantly clear that K.S. and her entire family have and continue to suffer as a result of these offences. Every aspect of their lives has been shattered. C.S. describes how her once vibrant and socially active young teenage daughter has become withdrawn and fearful. She is concerned about what the future holds for her daughter in terms of both her physical and emotional well-being. The only thing that is certain is that the impact on K.S. is ongoing, serious and something that she will have to live with for the rest of her life.

INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

[42] The offender was described by his parole officer at the s. 810.2 hearing as “one of the most difficult inmates to manage or motivate . . . in her long tenure with Corrections Canada.” Throughout the institutional records, he has been consistently described as uncooperative and manipulative. He refused to take part in any programming, would not participate in interviews, and refused to integrate into the normal prison population. The offender spent approximately 11 years and 7 months in segregation while serving his 15-year sentence; the vast majority of that time was voluntary segregation. He refused alternatives to segregation and, if the staff attempted to put him with the normal prison population, he would threaten them or other inmates, go on hunger strikes, or, in one instance, throw liquids and break sprinkler heads.

[43] Despite being in segregation for the vast majority of the time he was incarcerated, the offender managed to incur a criminal conviction for assault and cause significant fear and distress amongst the prison population. On October 16, 2000, several inmates at Warkworth typed a letter to the institution about the offender. The inmates were under the impression that the offender had been released on October 12, 2000. In response, they wrote “[h]e isn’t going to be out long this we know, and we should, out of self-protection prepare for his inevitable return. We want to bring to your attention that this person is incompatible, is a dangerous threat to many of us in Warkworth [emphasis in the original].” The inmates referenced “two big incidents” with the offender, one involving death threats. They claimed that the offender was also able to use fear and “manipulative intimidation” to get others to act for him. The inmates were requesting that the offender be prohibited from coming back to Warkworth because they felt “he is a danger to us, that he’ll resort to death threats again or worse and could next time be successful.”

[44] The offender claimed to be “incompatible” with many staff members at various institutions. However, he would not give their names. He believed that the Parole Board and Correctional Services Canada were in a conspiracy to keep him in jail and he made unfounded allegations of “horrific” staff abuse. In one instance, he blackened his own eye with ink and claimed to have been hit by a staff member. The offender also often complained of various health problems, including cancer. The offender was examined, but none of his complaints were confirmed.

[45] The dominant feature of the offender’s tenure in prison was his persistent animosity towards women:

• The offender consistently voiced his contempt for female correctional officer Jennifer Newport. He made false allegations against her, accusing her of sexual assaults and of conspiring against him. He said he wanted to see her get pulled into a cell and “assaulted.” The behaviour persisted for two years and was so egregious that Ms. Newport said she feared for her personal safety and formally requested to be identified as an incompatible. The institution requested that a psychologist perform a specialized threat assessment for the offender, but he refused to participate.
• In 2002, the offender was the subject of two letters from two different sets of inmates at Warkworth. Both letters indicated that the offender’s violent sexual comments, attitudes towards women, and false allegations against staff were disturbing and were causing them to be “increasingly concerned for their wellbeing.” The Parole Board investigated the reliability of these claims and was satisfied by the Warkworth Institution’s Security and Intelligence Officer that the information was reliable.
• The offender asked that all his female case management workers be replaced by men.
• In 2008, the Toronto Police Service indicated that the offender was the subject of a criminal harassment complaint from a female lawyer. The offender had been sending the lawyer unwanted letters and calling her office. The offender had met the lawyer briefly approximately twelve years prior, when she was an articling student. He believed that they had a romantic relationship at that time, held hands, and kissed. He believed that she had sent him unsigned letters over the years and put money in his canteen. This was all false. He initially wrote to the lawyer under the pretext of retaining her as legal counsel. However, in later letters he told her he wanted to rekindle their relationship. The lawyer asked the offender to stop contacting her, but the letters and phone calls continued. The letters were obscene, and he said he was angry with her for not remembering him. She reported the communications to the institution and to police, indicating that she feared for her safety and the safety of her family. In response to being asked to stop communication, the offender was “rude and belligerent.” He submitted a complaint against the lawyer to the Law Society of Upper Canada calling her vindictive. No criminal harassment charges were laid but the lawyer was included on the no contact order.
• Several notebooks were confiscated from the offender’s cell. One of the notebooks contained the names and physical descriptions of several females, including staff, and planned sexual activities for each of them.
• When the offender’s Parole Officer wrote that the offender had “a problem dealing with women” in a report, the offender solicited signatures from female staff in an effort to discredit this assessment. The offender deceived these female staff members into thinking their signatures were in support of an employment position.

PAST RISK ASSESSMENTS

[46] The offender has been subject to seven psychological assessments, but he has only participated in two. He refuses phallometric testing on the grounds that he has previously taken part in rape scenarios with consenting partners and he fears that this will skew his results.

Psychological Assessment Report – September 15, 1997 – Dr. Malcolm

[47] The offender participated in the “Specialized Sex Offender Assessment” at the Millhaven assessment unit when he was first incarcerated in 1997, although he refused to undergo phallometric testing. The doctor described him as “manipulative and controlling.” The offender was very defensive about his sexual history and refused to answer related questions. The doctor felt that the offender’s “sexual behaviour is problematic and needs to be more fully explored.”

[48] The doctor also noted that the offender showed no remorse for his victims. The offender told the doctor that the victim had apologized to him in court because she knew he had not committed the offence, and that she knew who the “real” assailant was.

[49] The doctor assessed the offender’s risk of re-offence with several actuarial tools. The offender’s score on the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (“PCLR”) and the Level of Service Inventory – Revised (“LSI-R”) both indicated a low risk for general recidivism. The score on the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide – Sex Offender Version suggested a 36% probability of sexual recidivism after seven years and finally the score on the General Statistical Index of Recidivism (“GSIR”) put the offender in a group where four out of five offenders will not re-offend.

[50] Despite these findings using the actuarial tools, the doctor concluded that the offender presented an overall “HIGH risk for re-offence.”

Pre-Parole Assessment – August 21, 2000 – Dr. Dickey

[51] Dr. Dickey attempted to conduct a pre-parole psychiatric assessment, but the offender ended the interview after 15 minutes. The offender refused to answer questions about his sexual history and refused phallometric testing. The offender presented as “aggressive, covertly threatening, and manipulative”, but did not exhibit any signs of major mental illness or affective disturbance. The doctor did opine that there was likely the “presence of personality pathology.”

[52] The doctor felt he could not score the offender using any of the actuarial tools but felt that “in the general sphere of violent and sexual [offences] re-offence would not be inconsiderable.” The doctor also suspected that any treatment would be “confounded by personality characteristics.”

Psychological Assessment Report – October 11, 2000 – Dr. Palmer

[53] The offender participated in Dr. Palmer’s assessment in 2000. This was the assessment viewed by the Court of Appeal for the offender’s sentencing appeal. The offender’s score on the GSIR accorded him a 16% chance of general reoffending in seven years and a 10% chance of violent recidivism in 10 years. The doctor did not include the offender’s conviction for the 1995 assault in calculating this score because it resulted in a conditional discharge. The offender’s score on the Static-99 showed him to be in the second lowest of four categories for sexual recidivism. The PCL-R score was 23, indicating a moderate risk of re-offending. The doctor concluded that there was a moderate risk of re-offence based on the score. However, he added that the risk could be higher on a clinical basis.

Psychological Assessment Report – November 27, 2006 – Dr. Mandelzys

[54] The offender refused to participate in the assessment with Dr. Mandelzys. The assessment was therefore based on a file review. The doctor noted the offender still refused to accept responsibility, showed no remorse, and would not take any treatment. He concluded that there had been no reduction in his risk to public safety.

Psychological Assessment Report – February 5, 2009 – Dr. Mandelzys

[55] The offender again refused to participate in the assessment with Dr. Mandelzys. The doctor concluded that the offender remained a “high risk for sexual recidivism.”

Psychological Assessment Report – July 7, 2011 – Dr. Bossin

[56] The offender refused to participate in the assessment with Dr. Bossin. The doctor simply stated that there had been no change and the offender “continued to pose an unmanageable risk to cause serious harm.”

[57] The offender has not participated in any programming to target his risk factors. At the outset of his sentence, he claimed that participation in programming would be an admission of guilt and would work against him in his appeal against conviction and sentence. Once his appeal avenues were spent, he maintained that he was not guilty and did not require any programming. The offender has engaged in some educational programming and vocational work.

ASSESSMENT REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILIP KLASSEN – NOVEMBER 30, 2017

Overview

[58] An assessment of Mr. Jarrar pursuant to s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code was conducted by Dr. Philip Klassen, a forensic psychiatrist. Dr. Klassen’s report, dated November 30, 2017, was filed with the Court. Dr. Klassen gave expert opinion evidence at the hearing.

[59] Dr. Klassen reviewed synopses related to some of Mr. Jarrar’s charges and convictions, transcripts of court proceedings in relation to some of Mr. Jarrar’s prior charges, information from the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, transcripts of Mr. Jarrar’s testimony in the trial before me and the Reasons for Judgment on the charges before me. The defence took no issue with the accuracy of the historical information relied upon by Dr. Klassen. Further, the defence conceded in cross-examination that Dr. Klassen had carefully evaluated the evidence and that evaluation resulted in reasonable determinations.

[60] Mr. Jarrar declined to participate in the assessment. When Dr. Klassen met with Mr. Jarrar in the institution, Mr. Jarrar only spoke to deny his guilt in the predicate offences and offered nothing further.

Diagnosis

[61] Dr. Klassen could not definitively diagnose the offender due to the lack of information. However, the doctor believed that the offender’s previous assaults and sexual assaults “strongly suggest” a paraphilic disorder, specifically an interest in coercive or aggressive sexuality. The doctor opined that the choice of a 14-year-old girl had more to do with the offender’s interest in successfully manipulating his victim rather than an interest in minors. The doctor stated persons with a paraphilic coercive disorder often show an interest in teenage girls and the victimization of prostitutes.

[62] The doctor also could not define the offender’s personality style. In his opinion, the offender was suffering from a sexual behavior disorder that needed to be managed. He also noted that the offender had persistent paranoid themes and suggested that the offender may have “significant personality disturbance with narcissistic and paranoid personality features” or “either in addition to significant personality disturbance, or instead of it, this gentleman may suffer from a delusional disorder with possible persecutory, erotomaniac, or somatic themes.” Dr. Klassen candidly admitted that he was less confident and not prepared to make a formal diagnosis that Mr. Jarrar has a personality disorder or a delusion disorder. Dr. Klassen did offer that he felt that the personality disturbances alone would not account for the offender’s actions and believed that the offender most likely suffered from a paraphilic disorder, “facilitated in its expression by personality deficits.”

Risk Assessment

[63] Because Mr. Jarrar refused to participate in the assessment process, Dr. Klassen attempted to assess the offender’s risk of reoffending using various actuarial risk assessment tools. Actuarial or structured methods of risk assessment are considered to be the most accurate methods of predicting the risk of recidivism. In this case, Dr. Klassen relied upon the Static – 99R, the PCL-R and the SORAG. He was not able to score several of the actuarial tools.

[64] It is important to note the doctor was forced to formulate scores for the offender based on the limited available information. He noted that he did not have much confidence in the scores on the PCL-R or the SORAG. He estimated that the offender’s risk assessment scores hovered around 50% and submitted that his “risk might, clinically, be considered substantial.”

[65] During Dr. Klassen’s testimony, he made it clear that there are significant limitations with the risk assessments conducted on Mr. Jarrar because of the lack of information regarding the offender, his lack of participation and because of the significant length of time he has spent in custody.

[66] Even with these limitation in the risk assessments, Dr. Klassen was prepared to opine with some confidence that Hassan Jarrar fell in the range of a 50 percent risk of re-offence.

Static-99R

[67] The Static-99R is the most widely used assessment instrument to predict sexual and violent recidivism in sexual offenders. The Static-99R provides an estimate based on the recidivism rates of individuals with similar characteristics. This creates a group-based estimate and, as such, the offender’s risk may be higher or lower than the estimate depending on factors that are not measured by the instrument. The offender scored a three. This denotes a “moderately high risk” of reoffending and the doctor explained that the score indicates that the offender is 2.7 times more likely to offend than the “average” sex offender. Other offenders who scored a three had a violent or sexual recidivism rate of 46% over 10 years.

[68] Dr. Klassen testified that he has the most confidence in the scoring on this test because it does not rely on nearly as much information from the offender as the PCL-R or the SORAG.

PCL-R: Psychopathy Checklist Revised

[69] The PCL-R measures the subject’s level of psychopathy looking at interpersonal, affective, and antisocial lifestyle factors. Psychopathy has been associated with recidivism and is a “strong predictor of risk.” High scores on the PCL-R also indicate that the subject will be resistant to treatment. The doctor gave the offender a score of 24 on the PCL-R out of a possible 40. This puts the offender in the 57^th percentile of North American male inmates and indicates a moderate risk of reoffending. However, Dr. Klassen testified that he was least confident about Mr. Jarrar’s PCL-R score. The doctor explained that accuracy is dependent on the assessor having more nuanced information about the offender’s lifestyle, beliefs, behaviors, childhood and other background information. Given the limited information base available about Mr. Jarrar, Dr. Klassen testified that his level of confidence in this score was low.

SORAG: Sexual Offence Risk Appraisal Guide

[70] The SORAG measures the risk of sexual offenders using their static and historical factors. The offender scored 19, which places him in the 79^th percentile in relation to the reference sample. Offenders with similar scores reoffend at a rate of 50 percent. Dr. Klassen was cautious about placing any weight on this score because it includes the PCL-R. Dr. Klassen acknowledged there are limitations and complications with relying on this test because he assumed that the offender had a personality disorder when calculating this score.

[71] Dr. Klassen also testified about using the severity of offences as risk predictors. None of the actuarial assessment tools used by Dr. Klassen in this case identified or used the severity of the offences as a predictor of risk. Dr. Klassen explained that he did consider whether the test results in relation to risk were fair because Mr. Jarrar has been incarcerated for approximately 20 years giving him less opportunity to either display good behavior or to re-offend.

Treatability and Risk Management

[72] The doctor could not identify the criminogenic variables that would increase the offender’s risk of recidivism due to the lack of information available to him. He was of the opinion that Mr. Jarrar has a sexual behavior disorder that needs to be managed. Dr. Klassen was also of the opinion that Mr. Jarrar may have a personality or delusion disorder that would also need to be managed if formally diagnosed.

[73] Given the limited information available, it was difficult for Dr. Klassen to suggest a risk management plan. The doctor testified that management is dependent on being able to identify underlying problems and helping an individual contain those things that lead to the offence cycle. He testified that Mr. Jarrar’s long-standing reluctance to have any conversations with mental health professionals is a significant impediment to management and risk reduction. Dr. Klassen testified that Mr. Jarrar was of above average intelligence. Dr. Klassen also identified that Mr. Jarrar had a trend towards compromised and/or vulnerable individuals. He suggested that the offender receive sex offender treatment, anger treatment, associate with prosocial individuals, and pursue training or employment.

[74] The doctor noted that the offender was unlikely to participate in programming given his history and unwillingness to engage in assessment and treatment. The doctor saw no evidence that would allow him to say that there was a reasonable expectation of control in the community.

[75] Dr. Klassen considered the breach convictions to be a risk-enhancing variable. Dr. Klassen agreed in his testimony that not enough is known about Mr. Jarrar to properly assess his specific risk at any point. He did conclude that the probability of Mr. Jarrar committing future violent or sexual re-offences was approximately 50 percent.

[76] Finally, Dr. Klassen testified that on average, people like Mr. Jarrar will essentially be at zero risk of violent sexual offending by the age of 60.

Analysis

1. Has the Crown proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jarrar meets the criteria in ss. 753(1)(a)(i), 753(1)(a)(ii) or 753(1)(b) to be designated a Dangerous Offender?

General Principles

[77] The onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jarrar meets one or more of the definitions of a dangerous offender. [^4]

Subsection 753(1)(a)(i)

[78] To prove that Mr. Jarrar is a dangerous offender pursuant to subsection 753(1)(a)(i), the Crown must prove that he constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of evidence that establishes a pattern of repetitive behavior, of which the offences for which he has been convicted form a part, showing a failure to restrain his behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons through failure to restrain his behaviour in the future.

“Pattern of Behaviour”

[79] To establish a pattern of repetitive behaviour under subsection 753(1)(a)(i), the Crown must prove that there are significant similarities among the acts of violence committed by the offender. The inquiry must examine the nature and context of the acts committed. [^5]

[80] Whether or not an offender’s conduct constitutes a pattern of repetitive behaviour is determined both by the number and the nature of the offences alleged to make out the pattern. The offences need not be identical. [^6] It is well established that two offences can constitute a pattern, if the degree of similarity is sufficient. [^7] On the other hand, the requirement for similarity will be less exacting where the offender has a lengthy history of criminal conduct. The offences making out the pattern of behaviour need not be the same or like each other in terms of form, order and arrangement. [^8] What matters is that the pattern of repetitive behaviour contains “enough of the same elements of unrestrained dangerous conduct to be able to predict that the offender will likely offend in the same way in the future.” ^9

[81] The pattern of repetitive behavior for Mr. Jarrar is based on two offences, the predicate offence and his prior conviction for aggravated sexual assault. It is obvious that the offences are factually quite different. However, it is possible to find a pattern between factually different offences if they share enough common elements to constitute a pattern and that pattern then demonstrates that the offender is likely to repeat this dangerous behavior and cause death or serious injury in the future. [^10]

[82] In this case, both sets of offences are sexual in nature and both targeted young vulnerable female victims. Sexual offences are violent by their very nature. They need not include additional acts of violence to be considered violent. Mr. Jarrar showed extreme violence against the victim of his aggravated sexual assault conviction. The fact that he used no overt physical violence in the predicate offence where 14-year-old K.S. was the victim does not detract from my finding that it was a violent act. The level of manipulation, deception, coerciveness and ultimately providing 14-year-old K.S. with alcohol immediately prior to the sexual assault was intended to hurt and damage her and amounts to violence being inflicted on the victim.

[83] I find that both sets of offences were sexual, violent and targeted young vulnerable females. They thereby amount to a pattern of behavior as required and defined in s. 753(1) (a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

“Failure to restrain his behaviour”

[84] The pattern of repetitive behavior is based on three offences, the predicate offence, the guilty finding without conviction of the assault of his sister in 1995 and the 1996 aggravated sexual assault conviction for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment, reduced on appeal to 15 years.

[85] It is obvious that the offences are factually quite different. However, I find that the common elements of sexualized hatred for women and the use of violence to control and demean constitute pattern. This pattern has been interrupted, not by insight and treatment or Court Orders, but incarceration. I find that this dangerous pattern of conduct will likely continue and cause death or serious injury in the future.

[86] Mr. Jarrar assaulted his sister, undeterred by the physical intervention of his mother, because he believed her to be a “whore” and “dumb ho”, a prostitute pimped out by 41 Division. He struck her repeatedly in the face with the heel of his hand and threw his mother against a wall when she attempted rescue.

[87] Mr. Jarrar again resorted to predatory violence to control a 19-year-old prostitute after unsuccessfully trying to get his 17-year-old girlfriend from aborting a pregnancy conceived by rape. His use of violence was graphic, leaving the 19-year-old victim near death in the snow with severe head trauma and other injuries from which she will likely never recover. This was another act of sexualized hatred of young women. Part and parcel of his crime was an extensive attempt at manipulations and obstruction.

[88] Released from prison but bound by a s. 810.2 Order with conditions that prohibited him from having contact with any female under the age of 16, Mr. Jarrar engaged in manipulations and obstructions of the truth in order to secure his next victim 14-year-old K.S. Mr. Jarrar pursued K.S. for months leading up to the sexual assault under the guise that he was 19 years of age and had also recently lost a parent. Mr. Jarrar could have, at any point, chosen to cease and desist. He did not. Quite the opposite. He chose to aggressively persist and pursue her each day. Applying what the complainant believed to be drugged cocktails, Mr. Jarrar was able to obtain complete control over his next female victim.

[89] After months of deceptive pursuit, Mr. Jarrar convinced K.S. to lie to her mother and meet him in Toronto. Mr. Jarrar directed and controlled every aspect of this meeting. He picked the place and the time and purchased a bus ticket for K.S. After arriving in the motel room K.S. believed that Mr. Jarrar gave her some kind of drug and alcohol cocktail that impacted her consciousness. She described herself as being in and out of sleep until the next day. During her stupor Mr. Jarrar took 30 minutes of video and several still photographs of K.S. in a state of undress in various sexual positions. The video footage also clearly captures Mr. Jarrar touching the victim’s breasts, buttocks and vagina. K.S. was able to recall Mr. Jarrar removing her clothes and digitally penetrating her vagina. Although K.S. does not recall I find that Mr. Jarrar did have non-consensual sexual intercourse with her during this time in motel room. Further, post arrest, Mr. Jarrar’s cell phone was found to contain over 60 still images of K.S. and seventeen videos of her masturbating and/or stripping. Such sexualized violence, domination, and demeaning conduct by Mr. Jarrar bespeaks his sexualized hatred of young women.

[90] The pattern of repetitive behaviour under s. 753(1)(a)(i) must show a failure on the part of Mr. Jarrar to restrain his behaviour. As noted above, Mr. Jarrar’s pattern of sexualized hatred and violence towards women has only abated when incarcerated. He has otherwise failed to restrain his behavior. Moreover, he has actively rejected any therapeutic attempt to restrain or mitigate his behavior.

[91] I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence establishes a pattern of repetitive behaviour on the part of Mr. Jarrar in the offences against K.S. and the prior offence of aggravated sexual assault that shows a clear failure to restrain his behaviour.

“Likelihood of death or injury to other persons or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons through a failure to restrain his behaviour”

[92] The Crown is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is likely that Mr. Jarrar would cause death, injury or severe psychological damage to a person through a failure in the future to restrain his behaviour. The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is likely that Mr. Jarrar will reoffend in this way.

[93] Dr. Klassen was not able to complete most of the actuarial tests that would have been helpful in determining the likelihood of Mr. Jarrar re-offending violently. Mr. Jarrar did not participate in the assessment. There were no school records available. No family members provided background information.

[94] Counsel for Mr. Jarrar has argued that in the absence of actuarial evidence, I should not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that violent re-offence is likely in this case.

[95] While actuarial tests are useful, they are not required in order to determine this issue. One relevant test was completed, the Static-99R. The risk predicted by this test was significant.

[96] I find that in this case, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt a very substantial probability that Mr. Jarrar will reoffend violently in the future. Mr. Jarrar inflicted severe psychological damage on K.S. and inflicted severe physical and psychological damage on the victim of the aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Jarrar’s criminal history and general behavior clearly demonstrate that he constitutes an ongoing threat to life, safety, physical and mental well-being of other persons.

[97] While I accept the general proposition that risk of violent recidivism declines with age for most offenders, a general pattern does not necessarily predict the behaviour of an individual offender. Dr. Klassen’s evidence regarding Mr. Jarrar’s risk of recidivism declining with age is based on a statistical average. In my view, currently there is absolutely no evidence before me to make a finding that Mr. Jarrar falls within that category of average individual. Accordingly, the evidence is of no value to me on this assessment.

[98] I find, based on his pattern of behaviour, that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jarrar is likely to cause death or serious injury in the future from a failure to restrain his behaviour. Accordingly, Hassan Jarrar will be designated as a dangerous offender pursuant to ss. 753(1) (a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

[99] Having concluded that Mr. Jarrar meets the definition in ss. 753(1) (a)(i), it is not necessary to address the definitions in ss. 753(1)(a)(ii) and 753(1)(b).

Is there a reasonable expectation that a sentence other than an indeterminate sentence will adequately protect the public against the commission, by Mr. Jarrar, of murder or a serious personal injury offence?

[100] Subsections 753(4) and (4.1) of the Criminal Code create a “highly structured discretion” to impose a determinate sentence or a determinate sentence with a LTSO, rather than an indeterminate sentence, even though the offender is designated a dangerous offender. A determinate sentence or a determinate sentence followed by a LTSO may only be imposed if there is, on the evidence, a “reasonable expectation” that such a sentence will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence. [^11]

[101] In R. v. Tremblay, 2010 ONSC 486, Karakatsanis J. stated that “the determination of whether an offender’s risk can be reduced to an ‘acceptable’ level requires consideration of all factors, including whether the offender can be treated, that can bring about sufficient risk reduction to ensure protection of the public. This does not require a showing that the offender will be ‘cured’ through treatment or that his or her rehabilitation may be assured.” [^12]

[102] Evidence that the offender is amenable to treatment must be more than mere speculative hope and must indicate that the offender can be treated within a definite time frame. [^13]

[103] The phrase “reasonable expectation” requires an evidence-based evaluation, based upon objectively valid criteria. It cannot be based on hope or possibility. [^14] In R. v. D.B., 2015 ONSC 5900, Hill J. set out the following non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining whether there exists a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure than an indeterminate sentence will adequately protect the public:

1. The degree to which the offender has been cooperative with the Part XXIV process;
2. Whether the offender has previously refused treatment or failed to take advantage of treatment opportunities;
3. Whether the offender has been expelled from prior treatment programs;
4. Whether the offender has previously refused to take prescribed medication or has unilaterally discontinued pharmacological treatment;
5. Whether the offender has taken treatment in the past and if so, whether it ultimately failed to reduce or control the offender's risk to the public;
6. Is the offender motivated and committed to treatment?
7. Are there realistic prospects for treating the offender's mental disorder(s) having regard to relevant factors such as propensity and intractability?
8. Respecting the predicate offences, is there a lack of insight, failure to accept responsibility, denial and minimization, a lack of empathy for the victim(s), absence of remorse?
9. The circumstances of the offender's institutional behaviour, including in advance of the dangerous offender hearing;
10. What improvements or gains in risk reduction can be expected during a period of custody preceding community release?;
11. Has past engagement with community supervision been compliant?; and
12. Apart from treatment considerations, are there sufficiently available and resourced external controls in the community to adequately protect the public?; and
13. As a factor independent of treatment, is there compelling, not speculative, expert evidence that the offender's proclivities will significantly decline in the future while falling within the period of a determinate sentence and the term of a LTSO? [^15]

I will address only those factors that are relevant to this case below.

The degree to which the offender has been cooperative with the Part XXIV process

[104] Mr. Jarrar did not cooperate with the Part XXIV process. He was, of course, under no obligation to participate in the process, nor can an adverse finding be made as result of non-participation.

Whether the offender has previously refused treatment or failed to take advantage of treatment opportunities

[105] Mr. Jarrar, in the past, has generally refused to participate in any assessment or treatment opportunities.

Whether the offender has been expelled from prior treatment programs

[106] Mr. Jarrar has not participated and therefore has not been expelled from any of the programs.

Whether the offender has taken treatment in the past and if so, whether it ultimately failed to reduce or control the offender's risk to the public

[107] Mr. Jarrar has taken no treatment programs.

Is the offender motivated and committed to treatment?

[108] Notwithstanding Mr. Jarrar’s testimony that he is now prepared to participate, there is absolutely no other evidence of his motivation or commitment to treatment. Quite the opposite. Mr. Jarrar has, in the 20 plus years he has been incarcerated, had countless opportunities for treatment. He has availed himself of none.

Are there realistic prospects for treating the offender's mental disorder(s) having regard to relevant factors such as propensity and intractability?

[109] There is no evidence before me with respect to Mr. Jarrar’s prospects for successful treatment. His past conduct demonstrates a propensity for violence against young, vulnerable females and a high level of intractability.

Respecting the predicate offences, is there a lack of insight, failure to accept responsibility, denial and minimization, a lack of empathy for the victim, absence of remorse?

[110] Mr. Jarrar maintains his innocence with respect to the predicate offence and his criminal antecedents. He has in his testimony and handwritten affidavit showed a complete lack of insight and failure to accept any responsibility of any of his criminal behavior including the predicate offence. He takes every opportunity to minimize and rationalize his conduct and blame his victims for his behavior.

The circumstances of the offender's institutional behaviour, including in advance of the dangerous offender hearing

[111] As previously indicated and reflected in the materials, Mr. Jarrar has presented significant management problems in the correctional system. Despite Mr. Jarrar’s extended period of time spent in voluntary segregation, these problems continue.

What improvements or gains in risk reduction can be expected during a period of custody preceding community release?

[112] Absent a fulsome risk assessment Dr. Klassen was unable to indicate exactly what treatment programs Mr. Jarrar would require to reduce risk upon release. Even with limited information, Dr. Klassen was of the opinion that Mr. Jarrar needs sexual offender treatment and other types of treatment programming. All of that programming would be available to Mr. Jarrar in the federal penitentiary system. However, I have no evidence before me to suggest that Mr. Jarrar would meaningfully engage in these programs. Accordingly, I have no ability to quantify any potential risk reduction.

Has past engagement with community supervision been compliant?

[113] Mr. Jarrar was not compliant with recognizances in the past. He breached non-contact conditions.

Apart from treatment considerations, are there sufficiently available and resourced external controls in the community to adequately protect the public?

[114] If Mr. Jarrar were to be released on a LTSO, it is likely that he would be released to a Correctional Community Centre (“CCC”). There would be close monitoring and supervision by staff at the CCC. Breaches of conditions of the LTSO could result in suspension of the LTSO and return to custody for a period of up to 90 days. A breach could also result in a further criminal charge. Pursuant to subsection 753.01 of the Criminal Code, a conviction for a breach of the LTSO by a person who has been designated a dangerous offender results in a mandatory assessment order upon the application of the prosecutor. The prosecutor may then apply for an indeterminate sentence.

[115] However, release to a CCC necessarily entails community access. When released to a CCC, Mr. Jarrar would be given unsupervised access to the community and the public at large for some portion of the day. In my view, absent meaningful treatment, this would put the public at risk. Given Mr. Jarrar’s profound unwillingness to engage in any assessment or treatment plan, I find that there is no possibility, certainly at this juncture, that Mr. Jarrar can be managed in the community.

As a factor independent of treatment, is there compelling, not speculative, expert evidence that the offender's proclivities will significantly decline in the future while falling within the period of a determinate sentence and the term of a LTSO?

[116] The evidence before me from Dr. Klassen is that generally the risk of violent recidivism declines with age. As a general observation this makes sense. Dr. Klassen acknowledges that on average risk of re-offence is significantly reduced or can be completely eliminated by the age of 60. It does not assist, however, in predicting the likely decline in this offender. Mr. Jarrar is far from the average offender. His profound lack of engagement combined with his choice to remain in segregation for more than a decade while serving his sentence has a unique and disturbing quality to it. Without evidence of Mr. Jarrar’s attitude, insight and motivation, I cannot say and have no confidence that age will significantly reduce risk in this offender.

Conclusions on Reasonable Expectation

[117] After careful consideration of all of the evidence, caselaw, submissions of counsel and the unique factors that attach to this case, I am satisfied that there is no possibility that the serious and real risk Mr. Jarrar poses can be managed in the community in a definite period of time.

[118] I am further satisfied that Mr. Jarrar is in need of extensive psychological and behavioral treatment that would need to continue indefinitely if he were released. Given Mr. Jarrar’s well demonstrated resistance and lack of motivation to participate in any treatment, even the prospect of a treatment plan is non-existent. In the absence of a meaningful and comprehensive plan, Mr. Jarrar will continue to pose a significant risk to society and the only appropriate sentence is an indeterminate sentence.

[119] In reaching this decision, I am ever mindful of the purpose of the dangerous offender provisions and that they are designed to apply to “a very small group of offenders whose personal characteristics and particular circumstances militate strenuously in favour of preventative incarceration.” [^16]

[120] If Mr. Jarrar chooses to participate in an assessment at the penitentiary and engages in treatment, it remains open to the Parole Board to ultimately fashion a supervised release.

CONCLUSION

[121] For reasons stated, I conclude that Mr. Jarrar must be found to be a dangerous offender and sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms on each of the serious personal injury offences, namely: sexual assault s. 271 (Count 6); sexual interference s. 151 (Count 7); possessing child pornography s. 163.4(4) (Count 5); accessing child pornography s.163.1(4.1) (Count 4); making child pornography s. 163.1(2) (Count 8); and child luring s. 172.1(a) (Count 2).

[122] On the remaining two breach counts, that are not serious personal injury offences, Mr. Jarrar will be sentenced to 24 months on each count consecutively, for a total sentence of 48 months. The sentence will be concurrent to the indeterminate terms of detention. Given that Mr. Jarrar’s pretrial custody exceeds this 48-month sentence, the sentence will on these two counts will be time served plus one day.

[123] Further, I order the taking of samples of bodily substances for the purpose of DNA analysis pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code.

[124] I order, pursuant to s. 110 of the Criminal Code, that Mr. Jarrar is prohibited from possessing any weapon for life.

[125] I order, pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, that Mr. Jarrar is prohibited from contacting K.S. while in custody.

[126] I order, pursuant to s. 490.012 of the Criminal Code, that Mr. Jarrar is required to comply with the provisions of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 for life.

[127] I order, pursuant to s. 161 (b) of the Criminal Code, that Mr. Jarrar is prohibited from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment whether or not that employment is remunerated, or becoming a volunteer in a volunteer in a capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person(s) under the age of 16 for life.

[128] I order, pursuant to s. 161 (c) of the Criminal Code, that Mr. Jarrar is prohibited from having any contact - including communication by any means - with a person under the age of 16 years, unless under the supervision of a judicially approved individual for life.

[129] In accordance with s. 760 of the Criminal Code, I order that transcripts of the evidence on these proceedings, all material filed on this application, these Reasons and a transcript of the trial evidence be forwarded to Correctional Services Canada.

Byrne J. Released: July 21, 2020

[^1]: 753(1) On application made under this Part after an assessment report is filed under subsection 752.1(2), the court shall find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied (a) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (a) of the definition of that expression in section 752 and the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons on the basis of evidence establishing (i) a pattern of repetitive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a failure to restrain his or her behaviour and a likelihood of causing death or injury to other persons, or inflicting severe psychological damage on other persons, through failure in the future to restrain his or her behaviour, (ii) a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour by the offender, of which the offence for which he or she has been convicted forms a part, showing a substantial degree of indifference on the part of the offender respecting the reasonably foreseeable consequences to other persons of his or her behaviour… or (b) that the offence for which the offender has been convicted is a serious personal injury offence described in paragraph (b) of the definition of that expression in section 752 and the offender, by his or her conduct in any sexual matter including that involved in the commission of the offence for which he or she has been convicted, has shown a failure to control his or her sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing injury, pain or other evil to other persons through failure in the future to control his or her sexual impulses.

[^2]: R. v. Currie, 1997 SCC 347, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 260, at para. 42.

[^3]: 753(4) If the court finds an offender to be a dangerous offender, it shall (a) impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period; (b) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted — which must be a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of two years — and order that the offender be subject to long-term supervision for a period that does not exceed 10 years; or (c) impose a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted. (4.1) The court shall impose a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period unless it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of the application that there is a reasonable expectation that a lesser measure under paragraph (4)(b) or (c) will adequately protect the public against the commission by the offender of murder or a serious personal injury offence.

[^4]: R. v. Currie, 1997 SCC 347, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 260 at para. 42.

[^5]: R. v. Neve, 1999 ABCA 206, at para. 118; R. v. Naess, at para. 63 (S.C.J.).

[^6]: R. v. George, 2012 ONSC 2400, at para. 94 (S.C.J.).

[^7]: R. v. Langevin (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 705 (C.A.), at paras. 28-29.

[^8]: R. v. Hogg, 2011 ONCA 840, at para. 40.

[^10]: R. v. Camara, 2017 ONCA 817, at paras. 20-28.

[^11]: R. v. Szostak, 2014 ONCA 15, at paras. 52-53.

[^12]: R. v. Tremblay, 2010 ONSC 486, at para. 154.

[^13]: R. v. Tremblay, 2010 ONSC 486 at para. 155; R. v. McCallum (2005), 201 C.C.C. (3d) 541 (ON CA), at paras. 34-42, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 145.

[^14]: R. v. D.B., 2015 ONSC 5900, at para. 194.

[^15]: R. v. D.B., 2015 ONSC 5900 at para. 199.

[^16]: R. v. Lyons, 1987 SCC 25, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, at para. 44.