Vanita Saxena Goela

The accused, an unlicensed immigration consultant, was charged with providing unauthorized immigration advice and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

During her jury trial, she brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not meet the statutory definitions of 'advice', 'represent', or 'counsel'.

The court interpreted the relevant provisions, finding that 'advice' involves personalized recommendations rather than general information, and that 'counselling' requires active encouragement.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence on all counts for a properly instructed jury to potentially return guilty verdicts and dismissed the motion.

The self-represented applicant, charged with unauthorized provision of immigration advice under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), brought pre-trial motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to prosecute her and the constitutional validity of several IRPA provisions.

The court found that the CBSA had statutory authority to investigate and prosecute the offences pursuant to s. 138(1) of the IRPA and a valid delegation of power.

The court also dismissed the division of powers argument, holding that s. 91(1) of the IRPA is a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction over immigration and criminal law, and does not improperly intrude on provincial regulation of legal professionals.

The applicant's section 7 Charter challenges based on vagueness were dismissed, with specific interpretive issues deferred to trial.

The self-represented accused, charged with unauthorized immigration consulting under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought pre-trial applications to quash a preferred indictment and challenge the constitutionality of s. 577 of the Criminal Code.

She argued the indictment was a nullity because the consent was signed by the Acting Director of Public Prosecutions rather than the Deputy Attorney General personally.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the issue was res judicata as it had been previously rejected by the Court of Appeal.

In the alternative, the court held that the Director of Public Prosecutions Act deems the DPP to be the Deputy Attorney General for this purpose, and that s. 577 is constitutional.

An application to quash the indictment for lack of particularity and duplicity was also dismissed.

The self-represented accused brought pre-trial applications challenging the constitutionality of several provisions of the Criminal Code, including Part 18, s. 523, s. 524, and s. 145(3).

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the challenges to Part 18 and the bail provisions had already been decided by another judge and were therefore res judicata, as well as moot since the preliminary inquiry had ended and the accused had been released on bail.

The challenge to s. 145(3) was also dismissed as moot because the breach of bail charges had been stayed.

The Crown brought pre-trial applications to admit audio recordings made by clients of the accused and to admit the preliminary hearing transcript of a witness who refused to return to Canada for trial.

The court admitted the audio recordings, finding them highly probative and authentic, with minor edits to remove prejudicial material.

However, the court dismissed the application to admit the preliminary hearing transcript under s. 715 of the Criminal Code or the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that the accused's cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing was unfairly restricted by Crown objections and judicial rulings, depriving her of a full opportunity to cross-examine.

The self-represented applicant, charged with unauthorized immigration consulting and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, brought pre-trial Charter applications challenging her arrests, the search of her office, and the Crown's disclosure.

The court found that the CBSA officers had reasonable and probable grounds for both the initial arrest warrant and a subsequent warrantless arrest for breaching bail conditions.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and found no breach of the Crown's disclosure obligations, noting that communications between Crown counsel and investigators are privileged.

All Charter applications were dismissed.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The appellant was convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police entered his home without a warrant, ostensibly to check on the welfare of his autistic son who had wandered to a nearby intersection.

The police discovered a marijuana grow operation in the basement.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the court held that the police's initial warrantless entry into the home breached section 8 of the Charter and that the trial judge erred in applying R. v. Godoy beyond its limited scope.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence under section 24(2), as the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

The appellants pleaded guilty to marijuana production under section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and received the mandatory minimum sentence of nine months imprisonment.

The appellants appealed on the grounds that their guilty pleas were not informed due to ineffective assistance of counsel and language barriers.

The police brief summarizing the facts was in English only, not shared with the appellants, and contained admissions that would establish aggravating factors triggering the mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellants were not adequately informed of these consequences.

The court found that the appellants' guilty pleas were uninformed and that they suffered prejudice, as they would not have pleaded guilty had they been aware of the relevant facts and sentencing consequences.

The offender pled guilty to seven counts of counselling misrepresentation contrary to section 126 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Over a five-year period, the offender, an unlicensed immigration consultant, exploited vulnerable would-be immigrants seeking entry through the Live-In Caregiver Program by providing false employment contracts and Labour Market Opinions, charging substantial fees while delivering no legitimate services.

The offender threatened victims who complained.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment (11 months after pre-trial custody credit), three years probation with conditions including a prohibition on providing immigration advice, no contact orders with victims, and restitution orders totalling $23,500.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and misrepresentation to immigration authorities under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking disclosure of Children's Aid Society records and police records relating to the complainant.

The court determined that the O'Connor regime applied to the CAS records and the Mills regime (section 278) applied to the police records.

The court denied production of the police records as the accused failed to establish they were likely relevant, relying solely on credibility arguments which are insufficient under section 278.3(4).

The court found the CAS records were likely relevant as they were compiled during a joint investigation that led to the charges, and ordered the second stage of the O'Connor test to proceed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled drug for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence.

The Crown conceded that the conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking could not be sustained on the record and requested a substitution for simple possession.

The Court of Appeal rejected the substitution because the drugs were prescription medications for which the appellant had prescriptions, making his possession lawful absent a purpose to traffic.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his restaurant.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in her treatment of missing original police notes, and engaged in forbidden oath-helping when assessing police credibility regarding alleged fabricated evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in placing little weight on the missing rough notes given the officers' independent recollections, and no improper oath-helping in the trial judge's consideration of the professional risks officers would face if they fabricated evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less one day to avoid immigration consequences, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his post-traumatic stress disorder and misapprehended the sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully considered all relevant factors and imposed a fit sentence within the applicable range.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing he was entitled to enhanced credit (1.5 to 1) for pre-sentence custody after his bail was revoked.

He had consented to his detention without a show cause hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that an accused whose prior form of release is cancelled under s. 524(8) of the Criminal Code is 'detained in custody' under that section, regardless of whether a separate detention order is made following a show cause hearing.

Consequently, the appellant fell within the exclusion in s. 719(3.1) and was not entitled to enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a francophone, was charged alongside anglophone co-accused.

A bilingual preliminary inquiry was held.

The Crown assigned unilingual anglophone prosecutors, provided English-only disclosure and notices, and the court refused to provide a bilingual court reporter or issue interlocutory judgments in French.

The certiorari judge found language rights violations but denied a remedy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding systemic failure by the Crown and the preliminary inquiry judge to respect the equality of official languages.

The committal for trial was quashed and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed sentence solely on the basis of the credit granted for one year of pretrial detention.

The court held that the trial judge erred by requiring something 'exceptional' before granting enhanced credit, contrary to the framework in Summers.

Given the appellant's likely eligibility for early release, compliance on bail, good behaviour in custody, and lack of delay, enhanced credit of 1.5 to 1 was warranted.

The sentence was reduced from 30 months to a net custodial sentence of 12 months, with the two-year probation term remaining.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration for possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the sentence was manifestly unfit and that the sentencing judge failed to adequately explore the principle of restraint for youthful first offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant was 29 years old and the trial judge properly considered and rejected a conditional sentence due to the harm caused by the drug.

The court found the sentencing judge balanced general deterrence and rehabilitation, and provided adequate reasons.

The accused was charged with identity theft and immigration fraud under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

He brought a pre-trial application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the 32-month delay from his arrest to the scheduled trial date was unreasonable.

The court found that the delay significantly exceeded the Morin guidelines and that the Crown failed to provide a reasonable justification, particularly regarding the lengthy preliminary inquiry and late disclosure.

Finding both presumed and actual prejudice due to restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marihuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient grounds for the search warrant of his residence and that his section 8 Charter rights were violated because a Quebec search warrant was endorsed in Ontario without the proper record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the endorsing justice had sufficient information to carry out her statutory duty and that there was ample evidence in the Information to Obtain to link the appellant's drug activities to his residence.