Vanita Saxena Goela

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, which occurred while he was an inmate at a jail.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant by rejecting his testimony and the exculpatory evidence of a correctional officer, while accepting the evidence of another officer.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made several errors in assessing credibility, including misapprehending the record regarding the officer's use of notes, improperly using the appellant's failure to plead guilty to a separate charge, and misapplying expert testimony regarding the value of drugs in jail.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, charged with marijuana possession, production, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed two Superior Court decisions dismissing his applications to prohibit prosecution.

He argued that the relevant provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act had been invalidated by various courts and were offences unknown to law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, noting that it had previously confirmed the provisions remain in full force and effect.

The appellant appealed an endorsement of a Superior Court judge that set aside a previous order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore not properly before the court.

The Court also noted that the motion judge reached the correct result, as the initial order had been made without proper service.

The appellant was charged with possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought a motion to stay the charge, arguing that the declaration of invalidity in R. v. Parker deleted marihuana from Schedule II of the CDSA for all purposes, meaning the charge no longer existed.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a declaration of invalidity does not delete a provision from a statute, but renders it of no force or effect to the extent of its inconsistency.

The Parker declaration only applied to the simple possession charge under s. 4, not the trafficking charge under s. 5(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application dated February 10, 2003.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly dismissed the application because it sought the exact same relief as prior applications disposed of by another judge, and all issues were or could have been raised in those prior proceedings.

The appeals concerned whether the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations created a constitutionally adequate medical exemption to the criminal prohibition on marihuana possession for persons with serious medical needs.

The court held that the scheme violated s. 7 because it forced authorized users to rely on the black market for supply and because the requirement of a second specialist for category 3 applicants was an arbitrary barrier.

Those defects were not justified under s. 1.

Rather than invalidate the entire regime, the court struck down only the second specialist requirement and three production restrictions, thereby preserving a constitutionally valid medical exemption and restoring the validity of the possession prohibition.

The separate appeals seeking broader relief were dismissed.

The Crown requested a stay of the order of Lederman J. pending the release of the Court of Appeal's reasons on the main appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant the stay, finding that the Crown had not demonstrated sufficient potential prejudice to warrant it.

The Court relied on the Crown's stated intention to operate under its interim policy pending the decision, with leave for any party to apply for interim relief if circumstances change.