Mario Delgado

The College alleged that the registrant engaged in professional misconduct by submitting improper claims under the Interim Federal Health Program and failing to maintain adequate clinical records.

The registrant admitted to the misconduct, acknowledging that she billed for services provided by interns and double-booked patients.

The Tribunal found that the registrant's actions constituted professional misconduct.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Tribunal ordered a reprimand, a four-month suspension (with a possible two-month remission), and specified terms, conditions, and limitations on her certificate of registration, along with $4,700 in costs.

The court dismissed Smitten Baby Products Inc.'s action against FirstOnSite Restoration Limited (FOS), holding that FOS, as an insurance investigator retained by the insurer, did not owe a duty of care to the insured, Smitten Baby.

The decision reviews the requirements for establishing a duty of care in cases of pure economic loss, finding that Smitten Baby failed to plead facts establishing a proximate relationship or reasonable reliance.

The court also found that the statement of claim did not adequately plead causation.

Even if a prima facie duty of care could be established, policy considerations would negate it.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed as moot.

The individual defendants in an action brought by a self-represented plaintiff, Michael Frank Kuttschrutter, moved to strike the claims against them.

The claims arose from the Town of St. Marys' COVID-19 vaccine policy, which led to the plaintiff's termination.

The moving defendants argued for dismissal based on immunity under s.448(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, and the plaintiff's failure to plead independent tortious conduct.

The court found that the plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants fell within the statutory immunity, particularly as the plaintiff's reply pleading effectively admitted the defendants acted in good faith.

Additionally, the plaintiff failed to plead any independent tortious conduct or actions outside the scope of employment for the individual defendants.

The motion to strike the claims against all individual defendants was granted, and leave to amend the pleadings was denied.

Costs were awarded to the successful moving defendants.

Following the successful certification of a class proceeding arising from a residential high-rise fire, the court determined the costs of the certification motion.

The plaintiffs sought over $435,000 in costs from the defendant, while the third parties sought their costs from the plaintiffs.

Applying the Pearson factors, the court awarded the plaintiffs $348,056.04 in costs against the defendant.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had drawn the third parties into the certification motion by amending the common issues, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay $45,200 in costs to the third parties.

This decision concerns a motion for certification of a class action following a fire in an apartment building.

The court addressed preliminary issues of jurisdiction (Superior Court vs. Landlord and Tenant Board), admissibility of an expert report, and the involvement of third parties.

The court found that the Superior Court had jurisdiction because the total amount claimed exceeded the LTB's monetary limit, even if individual claims might be smaller.

The expert report was deemed admissible for certification purposes.

The class action was certified, with modifications to the proposed class definition and common issues.

Specifically, the court removed references to "contractors" and "subcontractors" from common issues related to the Third Parties, as no direct cause of action was pleaded against them by the plaintiffs.

The court emphasized access to justice and behaviour modification as key factors favoring certification.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision refusing leave to amend his statement of claim to add third parties as defendants.

The Master found that the two-year limitation period had expired, as the appellant knew or ought to have known of the cause of action against the third parties when the original defendants delivered their statement of defence and third party claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no contested issue of fact or credibility regarding discoverability that required a trial, and the Master correctly decided the limitation issue on the pleadings motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add third parties (an engineering firm and an engineer) as defendants to the main action, alleging negligence in renovation work.

The third parties resisted, arguing the proposed claim was statute-barred.

The court found that the plaintiff had sufficient information to discover the claim against the third parties much earlier than asserted, specifically by August 10, 2016, when the municipality served its third-party claim detailing the alleged negligence.

The plaintiff's motion to add the third parties was dismissed as being outside the two-year limitation period, emphasizing that due diligence requires acting on available information rather than waiting for certainty from discoveries.

The self-represented appellant commenced a dental malpractice action against the respondent dentists.

The respondents moved for summary judgment on the basis that the appellant had not delivered an expert report supporting her claim, but the respondents themselves did not file any expert evidence regarding the standard of care.

The motion judge granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the moving party defendants failed to discharge their evidentiary burden under Rule 20 to put their best foot forward by adducing evidence on the merits of their defence.

The moving party dentist sought leave to appeal an order refusing partial summary judgment to dismiss the responding party's claim for damages arising out of an alleged geographic tongue injury.

The moving party argued there was no evidence linking his treatment to the injury.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision or matter of general importance.

The court noted that the responding party's expert had previously opined that the geographic tongue injury stemmed from the pain following the dental work, creating a genuine issue for trial.

The applicant filed an application on behalf of his son, alleging that the respondents discriminated against him on the basis of race and disability by denying his long-term disability claim due to a pre-existing condition.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to propose any evidence linking the denial of benefits or the alleged unfair treatment to the prohibited grounds of race or disability.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured jaw and permanent nerve damage during the extraction of a wisdom tooth by the defendant oral surgeon.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the surgery was unnecessary, lack of informed consent, and negligence in the extraction procedure.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the extraction was necessary, the defendant adequately disclosed the risks, and the defendant met the standard of care during the surgery.

The court preferred the evidence of the defendant's expert and found that a jaw fracture can occur even with the use of minimal force.

The plaintiff school board sued multiple defendants, including the appellant engineering firm, for damages arising from a collapsed gymnasium wall.

The plaintiff's claim against the appellant was statute-barred under the Professional Engineering Act.

However, the other defendants brought cross-claims for contribution and indemnity against the appellant within the two-year limitation period under the new Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the cross-claims, arguing they could not survive if the main claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 preserves the right to claim contribution and indemnity even if the plaintiff's direct claim against the concurrent tortfeasor is statute-barred.