Georgiana Masgras

The plaintiff sued his former employer's group insurer for disability benefits more than four years after leaving his employment due to alleged workplace injuries.

The insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was out of time under both the Limitations Act, 2002 and the policy's contractual limitation period.

The plaintiff argued for relief from forfeiture.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the claim was statute-barred and that relief from forfeiture was unavailable because the plaintiff's failure to file a claim amounted to non-compliance, his delay was unexplained and unreasonable, and the insurer suffered significant prejudice.

The plaintiff sought long-term disability (LTD) benefits and general damages for breach of contract, claiming total disability due to chronic back and leg pain, anxiety, and depression.

The plaintiff had not submitted a formal LTD application, seeking relief from forfeiture.

The court granted relief from forfeiture, finding imperfect compliance.

However, the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's claim for LTD benefits and general damages, finding that he failed to prove total disability as defined by the policy, largely due to inconsistencies between his subjective complaints, objective medical evidence, video surveillance, and his work history.

Following a nine-day jury trial where no damages were awarded to the plaintiffs for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court ruled on the threshold issue and costs.

The jury found the accident did not cause or contribute to the plaintiffs' ongoing pain and impairments.

The court, granting the defendants' motion, determined that the plaintiffs' claims for non-pecuniary loss were barred under section 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, as their injuries did not meet the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" exception.

The court emphasized that the jury's finding on causation was binding.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, totaling $111,614.65, despite the plaintiffs' adverse cost policy and financial hardship claims, due to their failure to make an offer to settle.

Following a personal injury jury trial where the plaintiff established liability but recovered zero damages due to the statutory threshold, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant also sought an order under Rule 57.07 that the plaintiff's lawyers personally pay the costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs, finding no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court dismissed the request for costs against the plaintiff's lawyers, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances.

The court significantly reduced the defendant's claimed fees and disbursements, including expert witness fees and counsel's hotel expenses, ultimately fixing costs at $189,298.68.

The court issued an amended ruling on costs following a personal injury civil jury trial.

The plaintiff succeeded on liability but was awarded only $10,000 in general damages, falling below the statutory threshold, and his claim for loss of earning capacity was dismissed.

Neither party's Rule 49 offer triggered cost consequences.

The defendant was substantially successful and was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court assessed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing trial preparation hours and expert witness fees, and adjusting accommodation and meal expenses.

The defendant's motion for the plaintiff's lawyers to personally pay costs under Rule 57.07 was dismissed, as their conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court also addressed the suspension of the plaintiff's third-party costs insurance policy.

Following a civil jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the judge considered whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed the accident exacerbated his pre-existing severe osteoarthritis in his right shoulder.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he suffered a permanent, serious impairment caused by the accident, noting his pre-existing condition, return to work, and lack of immediate injury complaints.

The plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages was dismissed.

In a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to have the jury consider several heads of damages, including future housekeeping costs, future care costs, past loss of income, future loss of income, and loss of competitive advantage.

The defendant opposed putting these questions to the jury, arguing a lack of evidentiary foundation.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence and determined that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient economic, accounting, or medical evidence to support the claims for future housekeeping, future care, past loss of income, and future loss of income.

Consequently, those questions were not put to the jury.

However, the court found sufficient evidence, including expert medical testimony, to allow the jury to consider the claim for loss of competitive advantage.

During a civil jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff closed his case without entering his income tax returns into evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to re-open his case to introduce the returns to support a claim for loss of competitive work capacity.

The court found the omission was due to counsel's inadvertence, not tactical advantage, and that the defendant would not be irreparably prejudiced as the documents had been previously produced.

The motion was granted, allowing the plaintiff to be recalled solely to identify the tax returns.

The defendant brought a motion at the outset of a personal injury jury trial to preclude the plaintiff from adducing evidence contrary to a prior guilty plea for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The plaintiff had pled guilty through a paralegal to disobeying a lane light following the motor vehicle accident.

The court held a voir dire and found that the guilty plea was not voluntary, unequivocal, or fully informed, as the plaintiff consistently maintained he had a green light and pled guilty only for convenience due to a new job.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling that permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence to the contrary would not constitute an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, having settled a slip and fall claim for $7,500 after 75% contributory negligence, sought costs of over $43,000.

The defendant argued the claim was disproportionate.

The court disallowed several disbursements, including ATE insurance and various treatment costs, and significantly reduced the claimed legal fees, fixing total costs at $14,926.57.

The court also declined to intervene on the prejudgment interest calculation previously set by another judge.

The applicant's lawyer brought an emergency ex parte application to enjoin a hospital from withdrawing life support from a patient.

The court initially granted the order but rescinded it the next day after the hospital and treating physician provided evidence that the patient was brain dead and the family had consented to withdrawing support.

The hospital and physician sought costs personally against the applicant's lawyer.

The court found the lawyer brought the application without instructions, submitted misleading material, and caused costs to be incurred unnecessarily.

The court ordered the lawyer to personally pay $15,000 in costs to the respondents.

The plaintiff insurer brought a motion to enforce a settlement reached during a Financial Services Commission of Ontario arbitration regarding statutory accident benefits.

The defendant insured had rescinded the settlement within two days, relying on the cooling-off period set out in section 9.1 of Ontario Regulation 664 and explicitly included in the settlement release drafted by the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that because the cooling-off clause was attached to and formed part of the signed settlement documentation, the defendant was entitled to rely on it to rescind the agreement.

The court heard an urgent motion to vary an interlocutory order that had prohibited the withdrawal of life support for Fernando Ferreira.

Mr. Ferreira had suffered a cardiac arrest, leading to brain death.

His wife, as substitute decision-maker, and family had agreed to discontinue life support and proceed with organ donation.

An ex parte order prohibiting withdrawal of life support had been obtained by Mr. Ferreira's motor vehicle accident lawyer.

The court, treating the matter as a motion to vary, found that given the patient's brain-dead status and family consensus, the previous order should be set aside.

The application to prohibit life support withdrawal was dismissed.

The Plaintiffs' former solicitors sought leave to appeal an $800 costs award made against them personally by Barnes J. The costs were awarded due to the solicitors' failure to properly serve an order removing themselves from the record, leading to an unnecessary adjournment of a summary judgment motion.

The court considered the two-part test for awarding costs against a solicitor personally, which requires a clear dereliction of duty causing unnecessary costs and the exercise of discretion sparingly and with extreme caution.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, as the court found no strong grounds to believe Barnes J. erred in principle or was plainly wrong, implicitly addressing the required test.