Rachel Pano

Following a civil jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the judge considered whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed the accident exacerbated his pre-existing severe osteoarthritis in his right shoulder.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he suffered a permanent, serious impairment caused by the accident, noting his pre-existing condition, return to work, and lack of immediate injury complaints.

The plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages was dismissed.

In a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to have the jury consider several heads of damages, including future housekeeping costs, future care costs, past loss of income, future loss of income, and loss of competitive advantage.

The defendant opposed putting these questions to the jury, arguing a lack of evidentiary foundation.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence and determined that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient economic, accounting, or medical evidence to support the claims for future housekeeping, future care, past loss of income, and future loss of income.

Consequently, those questions were not put to the jury.

However, the court found sufficient evidence, including expert medical testimony, to allow the jury to consider the claim for loss of competitive advantage.

During a civil jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff closed his case without entering his income tax returns into evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to re-open his case to introduce the returns to support a claim for loss of competitive work capacity.

The court found the omission was due to counsel's inadvertence, not tactical advantage, and that the defendant would not be irreparably prejudiced as the documents had been previously produced.

The motion was granted, allowing the plaintiff to be recalled solely to identify the tax returns.

The defendant brought a motion at the outset of a personal injury jury trial to preclude the plaintiff from adducing evidence contrary to a prior guilty plea for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The plaintiff had pled guilty through a paralegal to disobeying a lane light following the motor vehicle accident.

The court held a voir dire and found that the guilty plea was not voluntary, unequivocal, or fully informed, as the plaintiff consistently maintained he had a green light and pled guilty only for convenience due to a new job.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling that permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence to the contrary would not constitute an abuse of process.

The appellant, TD Home and Auto Insurance Company, appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action against the vehicle owner and granting a rule 21 motion determining that a passenger was not entitled to indemnity under the owner's insurance policy.

The passenger had seized control of the vehicle's steering wheel during an argument, causing a collision that injured one of the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the rule 20 appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the vehicle owner was not negligent and was not vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act because the passenger took control of the vehicle without consent.

However, the Court allowed the rule 21 appeal, setting aside the determination regarding insurance coverage due to insufficient reasoning and procedural defects.

The Court reduced the costs award accordingly.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2004 and sought statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied claims for attendant care and housekeeping benefits in 2005, issuing an Explanation of Benefits (OCF-9) indicating a refusal to pay.

The applicant did not appeal this denial until 2017, after being deemed catastrophically impaired.

The insurer raised a preliminary issue that the appeal was statute-barred under s. 51 of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the 2005 denial was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period.

Consequently, the applicant's appeal was dismissed as statute-barred.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an interlocutory decision that denied an adjournment of a preliminary issue hearing.

The applicant had requested the adjournment pending the outcome of an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in a similar case regarding limitation periods.

The Tribunal dismissed the reconsideration request, finding no error of law or breach of procedural fairness in the original decision.

The Tribunal emphasized the need for fair, efficient, and timely conduct of proceedings, noting that delaying hearings to await potential outcomes in unrelated civil actions is impractical and unfair.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a motion decision that dismissed its request to dismiss the application.

The insurer had conceded all issues in dispute (entitlement and quantum of benefits) and argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hold a hearing when there was no live dispute.

The Vice-Chair found that while the Tribunal did not lose jurisdiction, the original adjudicator made a significant error of law in interpreting section 281 of the Insurance Act.

Section 281 provides procedural protection after a decision is made but does not require the Tribunal to hold a hearing when all issues are resolved.

The reconsideration was granted, and the application was dismissed, save for the issue of costs.

The respondent insurer requested reconsideration of an interlocutory order that combined two applications and adjourned hearing dates.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the request, noting that under the amended Rule 18.1 of the Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, requests for reconsideration are only accepted for decisions that finally dispose of an appeal.

The defendant Sarah Park, through her insurer State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action and crossclaim against her, arguing she was not liable for a car accident caused by her passenger, Giancarlo Hnatiuk, who grabbed the steering wheel without her consent.

State Farm also sought a determination under Rule 21.01(a) that Hnatiuk was not covered by Park's insurance.

The plaintiffs and co-defendant TD Home and Auto Insurance Company (TD) opposed the motions, alleging bad faith, inappropriateness of partial summary judgment, and contributory negligence by Park.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, as Hnatiuk took control of the vehicle without Park's consent, and his actions were not reasonably foreseeable.

The court also determined that Hnatiuk was not covered by Park's insurance.

Costs were fixed against TD.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision confirming an Arbitrator's finding that he was not catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant argued the Arbitrator erred in law by relying on surveillance evidence, the applicant's presentation at the hearing, and a psychiatrist's report.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the issues raised were questions of fact and the weighing of evidence, not errors of law, and that the Director's Delegate's decision was reasonable.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim, arguing issue estoppel, abuse of process, and collateral attack based on a prior Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The Board had found the landlord breached maintenance obligations but did not find that the lack of a handrail caused the plaintiff's fall.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding it would be unjust to apply issue estoppel or abuse of process due to scant evidence, unrepresented parties, and lack of detailed reasoning at the Board.

The court also determined that the action was not a collateral attack, as the application of the Occupiers' Liability Act was a new issue not before the Board, and the Board's jurisdiction over that matter was questionable.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to include a bad faith claim against the defendant insurer.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendments were not legally tenable and did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court applied the test under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the proposed amendments disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their statement of claim and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits, including income replacement and housekeeping benefits, following a motor vehicle accident.

At the outset of the hearing before the Licence Appeal Tribunal, the parties entered into settlement negotiations and resolved all outstanding issues.

The Tribunal closed its file.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) and non-earner benefits (NEBs) following two motor vehicle accidents.

The insurer denied the benefits and sought repayment of $42,402.58 in IRBs previously paid, alleging material misrepresentation regarding the applicant's employment and income.

The arbitrator dismissed the applicant's claims, finding that his pain complaints were long-standing and pre-existing, and he failed to prove a substantial inability to perform his employment tasks or a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

The arbitrator also dismissed the insurer's claim for repayment, concluding there was insufficient evidence to prove the applicant wilfully misrepresented his employment or committed fraud.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action for delay after the matter was not set down for trial following a status notice.

The court applied the contextual approach endorsed in Scaini v. Prochnicki and considered the four Reid v. Dow Corning criteria: explanation for delay, intention to proceed, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the litigation had experienced significant delay largely attributable to plaintiff’s counsel, the court found the failures resulted from inadvertence rather than deliberate disregard of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants failed to demonstrate meaningful actual prejudice beyond generic concerns about faded memories, particularly because examinations for discovery had already occurred.

Balancing the interests of the parties, the court set aside the dismissal, dispensed with mandatory mediation to avoid further delay, and ordered the plaintiff to set the action down for trial within 30 days while paying costs to several defendants.

An insurer appealed a loss transfer arbitration decision that apportioned fault for a snowmobile–automobile collision under the Insurance Act regime.

The arbitrator determined that the Fault Determination Rules did not apply to the circumstances and instead assessed liability using ordinary negligence principles, finding the snowmobile operator primarily responsible and the automobile driver partially responsible.

On appeal, the insurer argued the arbitrator erred in law by concluding the collision fell outside the regulatory fault rules.

The court held that the arbitrator’s determination involved questions of mixed fact and law and was therefore outside the limited right of appeal restricted to questions of law.

Applying a deferential standard of reasonableness, the court found no reviewable error and upheld the arbitration award.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict and a trial judge's ruling on a threshold motion following a motor vehicle accident.

The jury found the appellant 10% liable and awarded $4,000, which was reduced to zero due to income replacement benefits.

The trial judge dismissed the claim for non-pecuniary damages, finding the appellant did not sustain a permanent serious impairment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial accommodations, evidentiary rulings, the threshold decision, the jury charge, the verdict, and alleged trial judge bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's rulings and ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.