Rachel Pano

Following a civil jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the judge considered whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed the accident exacerbated his pre-existing severe osteoarthritis in his right shoulder.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he suffered a permanent, serious impairment caused by the accident, noting his pre-existing condition, return to work, and lack of immediate injury complaints.

The plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages was dismissed.

In a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to have the jury consider several heads of damages, including future housekeeping costs, future care costs, past loss of income, future loss of income, and loss of competitive advantage.

The defendant opposed putting these questions to the jury, arguing a lack of evidentiary foundation.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence and determined that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient economic, accounting, or medical evidence to support the claims for future housekeeping, future care, past loss of income, and future loss of income.

Consequently, those questions were not put to the jury.

However, the court found sufficient evidence, including expert medical testimony, to allow the jury to consider the claim for loss of competitive advantage.

During a civil jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff closed his case without entering his income tax returns into evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to re-open his case to introduce the returns to support a claim for loss of competitive work capacity.

The court found the omission was due to counsel's inadvertence, not tactical advantage, and that the defendant would not be irreparably prejudiced as the documents had been previously produced.

The motion was granted, allowing the plaintiff to be recalled solely to identify the tax returns.

The defendant brought a motion at the outset of a personal injury jury trial to preclude the plaintiff from adducing evidence contrary to a prior guilty plea for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The plaintiff had pled guilty through a paralegal to disobeying a lane light following the motor vehicle accident.

The court held a voir dire and found that the guilty plea was not voluntary, unequivocal, or fully informed, as the plaintiff consistently maintained he had a green light and pled guilty only for convenience due to a new job.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling that permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence to the contrary would not constitute an abuse of process.

The appellant, TD Home and Auto Insurance Company, appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action against the vehicle owner and granting a rule 21 motion determining that a passenger was not entitled to indemnity under the owner's insurance policy.

The passenger had seized control of the vehicle's steering wheel during an argument, causing a collision that injured one of the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the rule 20 appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the vehicle owner was not negligent and was not vicariously liable under the Highway Traffic Act because the passenger took control of the vehicle without consent.

However, the Court allowed the rule 21 appeal, setting aside the determination regarding insurance coverage due to insufficient reasoning and procedural defects.

The Court reduced the costs award accordingly.

The defendant Sarah Park, through her insurer State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action and crossclaim against her, arguing she was not liable for a car accident caused by her passenger, Giancarlo Hnatiuk, who grabbed the steering wheel without her consent.

State Farm also sought a determination under Rule 21.01(a) that Hnatiuk was not covered by Park's insurance.

The plaintiffs and co-defendant TD Home and Auto Insurance Company (TD) opposed the motions, alleging bad faith, inappropriateness of partial summary judgment, and contributory negligence by Park.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, as Hnatiuk took control of the vehicle without Park's consent, and his actions were not reasonably foreseeable.

The court also determined that Hnatiuk was not covered by Park's insurance.

Costs were fixed against TD.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence claim, arguing issue estoppel, abuse of process, and collateral attack based on a prior Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The Board had found the landlord breached maintenance obligations but did not find that the lack of a handrail caused the plaintiff's fall.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding it would be unjust to apply issue estoppel or abuse of process due to scant evidence, unrepresented parties, and lack of detailed reasoning at the Board.

The court also determined that the action was not a collateral attack, as the application of the Occupiers' Liability Act was a new issue not before the Board, and the Board's jurisdiction over that matter was questionable.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to include a bad faith claim against the defendant insurer.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendments were not legally tenable and did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court applied the test under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the proposed amendments disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their statement of claim and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.