ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
Central West Region
At Orangeville
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
sarabjit saini
Heard Before Mr. Justice Richard H.K. Schwarzl
on June 4 and December 16, 2025
Reasons released on January 21, 2026
Mr. Ayoub Ansari for the Crown
Mr. Richard Fedorowicz for the Offender
SCHWARZL, J.:
REASONS FOR SENTNCE
1.0: INTRODUCTION
[1.] On June 4, 2025, the offender, Sarabjit Saini, was found guilty to one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following an uncontested trial that was tantamount to a guilty plea.
[2.] On December 16, 2025, a sentencing hearing took place. The prosecution recommended a sentence of not less than one year in prison, a driving prohibition of two years, and a DNA order. The offender submitted that they agreed with the ancillary orders recommended by the Crown, but they sought a very strict Conditional Sentence Order (CSO) of 18 months.
[3.] What follows are my reasons for sentence.
2.0: CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE
[4.] On April 23, 2023, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the offender was driving his sedan southbound on Highway 10 at erratic speeds and drifting between the two southbound lanes. He then suddenly did a U-turn, proceeded north and sped up to about 135 km/h in an 80 zone. While travelling at that speed, the offender crossed into the southbound lanes and struck a Ford Escape operated by Mr. Raymond Smith. The impact of the collision caused Smith’s car to veer and strike an automobile driven by Ms. Michaela Robbins.
[5.] Neither weather nor road conditions were factors in the collision.
[6.] At the time of the collision, the offender had been experiencing significant sleep deficits for a couple of months and was under a doctor’s care for that condition. It appears that the offender fell asleep prior to, and during, the collision. The offender was aware of his sleep deprived fatigue when he drove that day. He was not deliberately driving badly, but his degree of responsibility is high because he recklessly chose to drive when he knew, or ought to have known, that he was vulnerable to dangerous inattention while operating a very powerful and potentially lethal machine.
[7.] All three vehicles were destroyed, and all three drivers were injured.
[8.] The offender was air-lifted to hospital with life-threatening injuries. His injuries included a broken nose, a broken clavicle, broken sternum, seven broken ribs, a torn liver, and a brain clot. At the time of sentencing, his health had been restored after a long and difficult journey of recovery.
[9.] Ms. Robbins suffered a bruised and cut shin, burns to her face, and some chest pain.
[10.] Mr. Smith’s injuries were catastrophic and life-altering. He received the following broken bones: right ankle and foot, ten ribs, spine, sternum, and left ulna. He also received contusions to his lungs and internal bleeding to his thorax, neck, and spine. Mr. Smith sustained a serious head injury. All of his injuries required surgery and have resulted in permanent injuries. He must sleep in a hospital bed at home, his mobility is very limited, and he suffers chronic pain. Routine daily activities are very difficult. He continues to access medical specialists, occupational therapy and physiotherapy. He can no longer drive nor walk properly and has suffered an acute loss of independence. Mr. Smith continues to be traumatized by the experience which has strained many relationships, including with those closest to him.
3.0: CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER
[11.] At the time of sentencing, the offender was 48 years old. He is married and has three teenaged children. He has a university education and has worked fulltime with the same company for the past twenty years. He volunteers as a soccer referee and has strong community support.
[12.] The offender has no criminal record but does have a short and old Highway Traffic record. He accepts full responsibility for his actions.
[13.] The presentence report, filed, is generally positive. The offender is remorseful, and the offence appears to be out of character for him. Due to the sleep issues that he was suffering from at the time, he has no memory of the incident. This factor led to the uncontested trial which was very brief as no witnesses were required.
4.0: APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[14.] Both parties agree that a significant sentence is necessary and appropriate in the circumstances of this offence and of this offender. Where they differ is on the nature of that sentence: the Crown submits immediate incarceration is warranted, whereas the defence submits that the sentence ought to be served in the community by way of a very strict CSO.
[15.] R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 is the landmark case on conditional sentences and provides direction when balancing a conditional sentence with the principles and objectives of sentencing. An integral step in this balancing is to consider which sentencing objectives figure most prominently in the facts before me, such as deterrence and rehabilitation to name but two.
[16.] In Proulx, the court stated at paragraph 127:
A conditional sentence will be better than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and the community, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harm done to the victim and the community.
[17.] On the other hand, however, the court also stated the following at paragraph 100:
Where the need for punishment is particularly pressing, and there is little opportunity to achieve any restorative objectives, incarceration will likely be the more attractive sanction.
[18.] A CSO can achieve both punitive and restorative objectives. For example, sufficiently punitive conditions imposed by a conditional sentence order could provide significant deterrence: Proulx at pp. 107. In addition, detrimental effects of the circumstances of the case upon an offender can also achieve objectives of deterrence and denunciation: R. v. Bunn, 2000 SCC 9, [2000] 1 SCR 183; R. v. Bremner, 2000 BCCA 345, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1096 (C.A.). In such cases a CSO is a better sanction than incarceration: Proulx at para. 100. Where the offender's risk of recidivism is low, consideration should be given to avoiding a sentence with immediate incarceration: R. v. Hargreaves, [1999] O.J. No. 5171 (S.C.J.) at para. 36.
[19.] Additionally, if a conditional sentence can achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence as effectively as incarceration and restorative objectives cannot be readily satisfied, a conditional sentence is still preferable: Proulx at para. 100.
[20.] The restraint principle requires a sentencing judge to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration, especially for first offenders. It is an error, especially when sentencing a first offender, to focus exclusively on general deterrence and to fail to consider individual deterrence and rehabilitation: R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, at paras. 32, 34; R. v. Disher, [2020] O.J. No. 4849 (Ont. C.A) at para 59; R. v. Ali, 2022 ONCA 736, [2022] O.J. No. 4754 (C.A.) at para. 40. The application of the restraint principle engages consideration of a CSO where it is legally available. In addition, collateral consequences such as separation of primary breadwinner from his family can be a mitigating factor on sentence: R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] S.C.J. No. 34 at para. 47 to 49.
[21.] The range of sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm is very broad, being anywhere from a CSO to two years less a day: R. v. Goudreault, 2004 34503 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4307 (C.A.); R. v. Van Puyenbroek, 2007 ONCA 824, [2007] O.J. No. 4689 (C.A.); R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, [2012] O.J. No. 3096 (C.A.).
[22.] Sentencing for every kind of offence involves the exercise of discretion and requires the sentencing judge to consider the individual circumstances of the offender, the circumstances of the offence and the need for the sentence to meet the sentencing objectives outlined by Parliament. The goal of sentencing is to impose a just and fit sentence, responsive to the facts of the individual offender and the unique circumstances of the commission of the offence: R. v. Wust, 2000 SCC 18, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455 at para. 44.
[23.] Whatever the range, courts have consistently held that the primary focus in driving cases where people are injured or killed is deterrence and denunciation. Most courts have ordinarily imposed custodial sentences for dangerous driving causing bodily harm: Proulx, at para. 129; R. v. Nusrat, 2009 ONCA 31; R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487 at para 33; R. v. Singh, 2018 ONSC 4598 at paragraphs 22 to 25, affirmed 2019 ONCA 872.; R. v. Saunders, 2021 ONSC 6149 at para. 42; R. v. Balcha, [2003] O.J. No. 4721 (SCJ), aff'd 2004 396 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 1217 (C.A.); R. v. Currie, 2018 ONCA 218 at para. 15; R. v. Markos, 2019 ONCA 80 at para. 26; R. v. Berto, [2018] O.J. No. 5884 (SCJ); R. v. Panchal, [2019] O.J. No. 6878 (SCJ); R. v. Brighton, [2020] O.J. No. 4499 (OCJ); R. v. Lindsay, 2020 ONCJ 467; R. v. Yogeswaran, 2021 ONSC 5920; R. v. Menezes, 2023 ONCJ 457; R. v. Georgopoulos, 2024 ONSC 5922; R. v. Gomez, 2025 ONSC 2039; R. v. Ross, 2025 ONSC 7314 at para. 55
[24.] However, some courts have held that a CSO can achieve deterrence and denunciation in such cases: R. v. Vanleishout, 2008 ONCJ 320, [2008] O.J. No. 2828 (OCJ); R. v. Wright, [2020] O.J. No. 4865 (OCJ); R. v. Linton, 2022 ONCJ 197, [2022] O.J. No. 2013 (OCJ); R. v. He, [2022] O.J. No. 1809 (SCJ); R. v. Hutchinson, [2022] O.J. No. 2756 (OCJ); R. v. Creft, 2022 ONCJ 572, [2022] O.J. No. 5481 (OCJ); R. v. Ferguson-Kellum, 2023 ONCJ 119; R. v. Khan, [2023] O.J. No. 5300 (SCJ); R. v. Boutrous, 2023 ONCJ 266.
[25.] While prior good character and good prospects of rehabilitation are important, it is wrong to place too much emphasis on these when assessing the appropriate sentence in driving cases involving bodily harm or death. In Yogeswaran, the court observed at para. 67:
Unfortunately, it is often people of otherwise good character who inexplicably choose to drive recklessly on our roadways, behaving in an utterly selfish manner that is not in keeping with their behaviour in other facets of their lives. Accordingly, an offender's previous good character must be considered in context when sentencing for a driving-related offence….
5.0: MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS
5.1: Mitigating Factors
[26.] The following mitigating factors in this case include the following:
(a) Mr. Saini is a first time offender;
(b) Although he has a prior highway traffic record, it is minimal;
(c) While his criminal culpability is beyond any doubt, his moral responsibility is somewhat diminished by his sleep disorder;
(d) He effectively pled guilty;
(e) He is the primary breadwinner for his wife and three children. Incarceration will have a negative impact on his family;
(f) The offender is sincerely remorseful;
(g) He is a man of otherwise good character;
(h) The offender has strong family and community support;
(i) He was badly injured as a result of this offence; and
(j) His risk of recidivism is very low.
5.2: Aggravating Factors
[27.] Several aggravating factors are also present, including:
(a) Mr. Saini was driving erratically on a four lane highway;
(b) He drove badly for quite a distance;
(c) At the time of the collision, he was driving at a very high speed (135 km/h in an 80 zone);
(d) Two other people were injured because of his actions: Ms. Robbins, and Mr. Smith: s.320.22(a);
(e) The injuries to Mr. Smith were life-threatening, numerous, debilitating, permanent, and life-altering. The Victim Impact Statement revealed the devastating effect the offender’s conduct will have on his life for years to come;
(f) The gravity of the offence is significant; and
(g) The moral responsibility of the offender is still quite high because he chose to drive knowing that he was suffering from severe sleep deprivation.
6.0: ANALYSIS
[28.] Both parties agree that a sentence of less than two years is appropriate, thereby engaging the applicability of s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code. In addition, I am satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger public safety. In this case, the issue is whether a CSO is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2, Criminal Code.
[29.] Having carefully considered the circumstances of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, the submissions of counsel, and the authorities they provided for my review, I find that a CSO in this case does not adequately address the overarching need to deter and denounce the conduct of the offender in this case.
[30.] The cumulative effect of the aggravating factors in this case outweighs the many mitigating factors present. Driving is a complex task requiring the full and alert attention of the operator. When one is fatigued or, as here, well aware of a significant pre-existing problem with staying awake, driving in this condition creates unacceptable risks of harm or worse. This case is a tragic example of what can happen when good people decide to drive when they know, or ought to know, that they are not fit to do so. Mr. Saini breached his public duty to drive with his facilities intact, his mind clear, and his attention undivided.
[31.] Section 320.12(a) of the Criminal Code states that
operating a conveyance is a privilege that is subject to certain limits in the interests of public safety that include licensing, the observance of rules and sobriety….
[32.] In R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, the Court of Appeal observed at para. 41:
41The offence of dangerous driving causing bodily harm has been described as among the more serious of crimes…. Dangerous driving puts the public at great risk of harm. The crime is all the more egregious when people, often innocent members of the public, are injured.
[33.] As the Supreme Court of Canada explained in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 6, in cases where deterrence and denunciation require emphasis,
…courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and law‑abiding society.
[34.] A strong message must be sent to all drivers that the risks and consequences of driving dangerously, especially when that driving ruins the life of a wholly innocent person will be dealt with severely. This message can only be achieved in this case by an immediate and real loss of liberty.
7.0: THE SENTENCE
[35.] Taking all things into account and on applying judicial restraint, there will be a sentence of one year in jail.
[36.] I make the following ancillary orders.
[37.] First, there will be an in-custody DNA Order.
[38.] Second, there will be a victim surcharge of $100, payable within 30 days of today.
[39.] Finally, there will be a driving prohibition of three years from today. This reflects a driving prohibition of two years, plus the entire one year period of incarceration to which the offender is sentenced: ss.320.24(2) and (5), Criminal Code.
Richard H.K. Schwarzl,
Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice