Katherine Rogozinski

This decision concerns a 90-day review of a detention order under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Mohammad Khodadad, previously denied bail, sought release.

The court, applying R. v. Myers, confirmed that the onus is not on the accused at this stage, even if a reverse onus applied initially.

Despite this, the court found the accused's continued detention justified on both secondary (public safety due to substantial likelihood of re-offending, strong Crown case, and unreliable surety) and tertiary grounds (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the firearm-related charges, strong Crown case, and significant criminal record).

The application for release was dismissed.

Following a trial, the accused, Arif Ali Versi, was found guilty of five counts of fraud over $5000, resulting in total losses of $338,400 to five victims through a real estate scheme.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3.5 to 4 years and ancillary orders, including a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The defence sought a conditional sentence and probation.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the deliberate and sophisticated nature of the fraud, significant losses, multiple victims, and the accused's prior fraud convictions and failure to pay restitution.

Mitigating factors included family support and positive steps taken since arrest.

The court determined that a penitentiary term was required, imposing a sentence of 3 years imprisonment, along with a restitution order for $338,400 and a fine in lieu of forfeiture for the same amount.

Ancillary orders included a no-contact order with victims and a DNA order.

The accused were charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences after police executed a search warrant at their residence and seized cocaine, a loaded handgun, and cash.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant was deliberately misleading and lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that the ITO contained numerous inaccurate, exaggerated, and unsupported statements by the affiant officer, which were excised.

After excising the misleading information, the court concluded that the remaining evidence from a confidential informant was insufficiently corroborated, resulting in breaches of the accused's rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police conduct in drafting a deliberately misleading ITO.

As the Crown called no further evidence, all charges were dismissed.

The accused was convicted of internet child luring, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and breach of probation after responding to an undercover police sting.

The court found the appropriate range for internet child luring to be three to five years.

Weighing the aggravating factors, including the accused's prior record and breach of probation, against the limited mitigating factors, the court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years imprisonment.

The conviction for making sexually explicit material available was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused, A.M., charged with non-consensual distribution of intimate images under s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code, brought a motion for direction regarding the admissibility of the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The defence argued that neither the statutory regime under s. 276 nor the common law regime from R. v. Seaboyer applied.

The Crown contended that s. 276 applied, or alternatively, Seaboyer.

The court ruled that s. 276 did not apply in the particular circumstances of this case, as the images depicted consensual activity and thus did not implicate an enumerated offence.

However, the court found that the common law Seaboyer regime did apply to the offence of distributing intimate images, requiring the defence to file a written application, supported by affidavit or testimony, detailing and justifying the proposed evidence.

The applicant, Andre Cunningham, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges including attempted murder and firearms offences.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace made two material errors in principle during the initial bail hearing: misapprehending evidence regarding the applicant's alleged gang affiliation and misinterpreting the mother's testimony about identifying her son in surveillance video.

Despite these errors warranting a new de novo bail hearing, the court conducted its own assessment of the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong, the proposed surety plan inadequate given the applicant's history of non-compliance while living with sureties, and the gravity of the offences.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic but found it did not override the primary considerations for detention, especially without evidence of an outbreak in the facility or the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities.

Consequently, the applicant was ordered detained on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant, Phoenix Panton-Sawyers, sought a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus to quash an assessment order made under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code.

The assessment was ordered after her conviction for assault and breach of probation, to determine if she was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

The applicant argued the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to make the order due to insufficient evidence.

The court first addressed a preliminary procedural issue regarding virtual presence for habeas corpus applications during the COVID-19 pandemic, finding virtual presence sufficient under s. 774.1 of the Criminal Code.

On the merits, the court found that the trial judge had jurisdiction, as there was a significant body of evidence—including the irrational nature of the assault, the applicant's history of violent conduct, and her ongoing diagnosis of schizophrenia with non-compliance with medication—to reasonably doubt her criminal responsibility and necessitate an assessment.

The application was dismissed.

A young person was found guilty after trial of three firearm-related offences: possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a motor vehicle containing a prohibited firearm, and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The offences arose from a single occurrence on September 23, 2016, involving a loaded Mossberg 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun found in a vehicle.

The Crown sought 6 to 9 months in custody followed by probation.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish that the offences met the "exceptional case" threshold under section 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which is required to impose custody on a non-violent offence.

The court imposed a non-custodial sentence consisting of community service and probation, emphasizing the statutory prohibition against general deterrence in youth sentencing and the requirement to impose the least restrictive sentence capable of achieving rehabilitation.

A young person was charged with three firearm-related offences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act: possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a motor vehicle knowing a prohibited weapon was present, and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Crown's case relied on admissions by defence counsel regarding the accuracy of photographs, surveillance video, and police evidence.

The sole issue at trial was whether the Crown proved the defendant's knowledge and control of the firearm beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance showing the defendant's exclusive control over the vehicle, his placement of the firearm in the car, and his post-offence conduct, compelled only one reasonable inference: that the defendant knew the loaded shotgun was in the vehicle.

The defendant was found guilty on all three counts.

The defendant, Vladimir Hussain-Marca, was found guilty of break and enter and robbery following a home invasion.

The court adopted a joint sentencing submission from the Crown and Defence, imposing a three-year custodial term (less pre-sentence credit), 18 months probation, a 20-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The court considered aggravating factors such as planning, violence, and dwelling house violation, alongside mitigating factors including the defendant's youth, first-time offender status, remorse, and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court also commented on the harsh conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, which were implicitly accounted for in the joint submission.

A young person pleaded guilty to procuring a person under 18 years of age to provide sexual services for consideration, contrary to s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code.

The offender recruited a 12-year-old victim through Facebook and facilitated her exploitation in the sex trade over a 10-day period in Niagara Falls and Toronto.

The Crown and defence jointly proposed a discharge with one year of probation, but the court rejected this as contrary to the public interest and inappropriate given the offender's lack of remorse, minimal engagement in rehabilitation programming while in custody, and serious criminal record including violent offences.

The court imposed 16 months of probation with strict conditions including mandatory counselling, non-association orders, and restrictions on social media access.

The offender was found guilty of aggravated assault after attacking a kinsman from behind with a machete, causing permanent scarring.

The Crown sought 4 to 5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of 18 to 24 months.

The court rejected the defence's proposed sentence, noting the vicious and unprovoked nature of the attack.

The offender was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, less 9 days credit for pre-trial custody, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

During a criminal trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of statements made by the accused and evidence obtained following his arrest for firearms and drug offences.

The accused alleged Charter breaches under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing the arrest lacked reasonable grounds and that police questioned him after he requested counsel.

The court held the arrest was supported by objectively reasonable grounds and the search incident to arrest was lawful, making the seized key admissible.

Spontaneous admissions of ownership of drugs were also admissible, though a statement about residence obtained through questioning after the right to counsel was asserted was excluded.

Responses given to a booking sergeant were excluded to preserve trial fairness, despite being obtained during routine booking procedures.

The defendant was charged with firearm offences after police executed a search warrant at his girlfriend's apartment and found a sawed-off shotgun.

The court held voir dires on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements and the validity of the search warrant.

The court excluded the defendant's confessions, finding they were induced by a police promise to release his girlfriend.

The court also found the search warrant was invalid because the Information to Obtain relied on uncorroborated and insufficient information from a confidential informant.

Applying section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm and ammunition due to the serious impact of the Charter breach on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.