ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
Toronto Region
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
K. Rogozinski, for the prosecution
- and -
MARVIN LATTIF
R. Fedorowicz, for the defence
HEARD: March 2 – 4, 2015
Nordheimer J.:
[1] There are a series of pre-trial motions in this prosecution that seek rulings as to what evidence the prosecution can introduce at the trial of Mr. Lattif. At the conclusion of the pre-trial motions, and in order to allow the trial proper to proceed, I provided counsel with my “bottom line” conclusions on the applications with reasons to follow. I now provide those reasons.
[2] Mr. Lattif faces weapons and other offences. Mr. Lattif seeks a ruling that the police improperly obtained contact information from him through the social services department of the City of Toronto. He also seeks to exclude his cell phone records that the police obtained in relation to an unrelated investigation into a series of bank robberies in which Mr. Lattif was believed to have been involved. He further seeks to exclude certain items that were seized from his home after a search warrant was executed regarding the same robbery offences. The Crown, on the other hand, seeks a ruling that certain items seized during the course of the execution of that search warrant, but that were not covered by the terms of the search warrant, are nonetheless admissible under s. 489 of the Criminal Code. The Crown also seeks a ruling that one of those items in particular is admissible notwithstanding that it would be characterized as discreditable conduct evidence. All of this arises in the following circumstances.
[3] In August 2012, the police were investigating a series of bank robberies. Mr. Lattif had been convicted of bank robbery in the past. The police connected another individual, Junior Obanor, to these bank robberies. They obtained Mr. Obanor’s cell phone records. Those records showed contact between Mr. Obanor’s phone and a particular telephone number in the hours prior to three separate bank robberies that had occurred within a two week period. The police connected that telephone number to Mr. Lattif. They did so by contacting the City of Toronto social services authorities and enquiring whether Mr. Lattif was registered with them and, if so, what contact information (address and phone number) Mr. Lattif had given them. The City responded by giving them the address and phone number that they had on file for Mr. Lattif. That phone number matched to the phone number that appeared in Mr. Obanor’s cell phone records. As I have said, prior to each of these three bank robberies there were a number of contacts between those two phone numbers. The police used this information, along with other information, to obtain a production order for the cell phone records for Mr. Lattif’s phone. Those records showed Mr. Lattif’s phone to be in the area of at least two of the three banks when they were robbed.
[4] The police then obtained a search warrant for two residences associated with Mr. Lattif along with one motor vehicle. The police obtained the search warrant based on a combination of the following facts: that Mr. Obanor’s phone was in the area of each of the three bank robberies; that Mr. Lattif’s phone was in the area of two of the three bank robberies; that there was a series of communications between the two phones before each of the three bank robberies occurred; that both Mr. Obanor and Mr. Lattif had prior records for bank robberies; that in two of the three bank robberies two males were involved (only one male was involved in the other robbery) and that there was a similarity in the “modus operandi” of the robberies to robberies that both Mr. Obanor and Mr. Lattif had previously been convicted of, albeit at different times. Mr. Lattif was convicted in 2009 whereas Mr. Obanor was convicted in early 2012. The search warrant was granted for the purpose of seizing proceeds of the robberies (if they still existed), distinctive clothing that one of the robbers had worn and Mr. Lattif’s cell phone.
[5] In the course of the execution of the search warrant, however, the police located a box of .40 calibre ammunition. They also found some gloves. In the current charges that Mr. Lattif faces, one issue is the identity of a person who possessed a .40 calibre handgun. Another issue is the identity of the driver of a stolen car, who may have discarded a pair of gloves as he fled from the police. Thus the connection between the robbery offences and the weapons and other offences that are before me for trial.
Information from Social Services
[6] I deal first with the defence assertion that the police breached Mr. Lattif’s s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure by obtaining his contact information from the City’s social services authorities without a warrant.
[7] I do not agree that there was any such breach because I do not accept that Mr. Lattif had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his address and telephone number in these particular circumstances.
[8] I first note that I do not have any evidence from Mr. Lattif that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in this information once he put it in the hands of the City’s social services authorities. There is, consequently, no evidence of any subjective expectation of privacy from Mr. Lattif. I also do not find any objective basis for such an expectation of privacy. Information regarding a person’s address and telephone number was, until the recent decline of telephone books, readily available to any person who simply looked up someone’s name in those books. Even today, web based services such as Canada 411 still provide such information. It is also a fact that nowadays we routinely provide our telephone numbers and addresses to an almost unlimited number of businesses and government entities. To suggest that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information is belied by the breadth of our release of that information to others.
[9] Further, such information does not meet the established test for personal information that warrants privacy protection. The type of personal information that does attract such protection was set out in R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 where Sopinka J. said, at para. 20(QL):
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.
[10] In this situation, the address and telephone number for Mr. Lattif did not “reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices” of Mr. Lattif. It is this reality that distinguishes this case from a case such as R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212 upon which Mr. Lattif relies. In Spencer, the police already had the IP address for a computer that they knew was linked to child pornography. Obtaining the connection between Mr. Spencer’s name and address and that IP address thus revealed a great deal about the activities of Mr. Spencer. In those circumstances, it is easy to understand why the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the police needed a search warrant to obtain the subscriber information for that IP address. But that is not this case. In this case, obtaining Mr. Lattif’s address and phone number did not tell the police anything about the activities of Mr. Lattif. It was only after the police obtained a judicially authorized production order for his cell phone records, that any information regarding the activities of Mr. Lattif were revealed. As Cromwell J. pointed out in Spencer, it is important to properly define the subject matter of the request for information before determining if privacy interests are engaged by it.
[11] Mr. Lattif complains, however, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact that he was receiving social assistance. Again, I note that I do not have any evidence from Mr. Lattif on that point. In particular, I do not have any evidence that Mr. Lattif reasonably expected that he would remain anonymous with respect to his receipt of social assistance. However, accepting that he did, the fact that Mr. Lattif is receiving social assistance was not the information that the police sought nor was it information that the police used for any purpose. That information was simply a by-product of the request for the contact information. Obviously, if Mr. Lattif had not been receiving social assistance, the City’s social services authorities would not have had his contact information.
[12] I do not believe that the police can be faulted if some piece of information happens to be revealed through their request that they neither seek nor intend to use. I also do not believe that the ancillary revelation of information, that the police do not use, necessarily affects the proper analysis as to the privacy interests that are engaged. It might in some instances if, for example, the contact information was obtained from a specialized medical clinic that would, in turn, reveal the fact that the person suffered from a particular illness. However, in such a case, other protections regarding the information would be triggered. Again, that is not this case.
[13] I accept that the City of Toronto represents that it will protect the privacy of persons who utilize the City’s social services. However, as I have already said, I do not consider that an address and phone number fall within that sphere of private information. It is also of some importance to recognize that the City’s social services authorities are governed by the Municipal Freedom of Information and Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56, s. 32(g) of which reads:
An institution shall not disclose personal information in its custody or under its control except,
(g) if disclosure is to an institution or a law enforcement agency in Canada to aid an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result;
[14] The information regarding Mr. Lattif’s address and telephone number was provided by the City’s social services authorities to the Toronto Police expressly under this provision. Mr. Lattif complains that there is no information as to whether the police told the City’s social services authorities what the investigation was about and whether the City satisfied itself that there was a reasonable basis to provide the information – see R. v. Ward (2012), 2012 ONCA 660, 112 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.). The only evidence on this point is the form that the officer filled out to obtain the information. Either side could have called the officer who obtained the information to address this point but neither did so. I believe, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I am entitled to assume that the City’s social services authorities made appropriate inquiries to satisfy themselves that the police request was a reasonable one that properly fell within the exception provided for in s. 32(g). Certainly on the evidence that is before me, the police had reason to want to learn what Mr. Lattif’s phone number was.
[15] Consequently, I do not find any breach of Mr. Lattif’s rights under s. 8 of the Charter in the process by which the police obtained his cell phone number.
The cell phone records
[16] The next issue that arises is the use to which the police put Mr. Lattif’s cell phone number. The police had already obtained the cell phone records for Mr. Obanor. They had reviewed those records which revealed that, on the three days in July 2012 when three bank robberies occurred within a two week period, Mr. Obanor’s phone had contact with Mr. Lattif’s phone on multiple occasions in the hours leading up to each of the bank robberies. They also knew that Mr. Obanor’s phone was in the area of the bank robberies. The police also knew that both Mr. Obanor and Mr. Lattif had criminal records for bank robberies and they knew that the robberies that had been committed by both of them in the past had a similar method or pattern.
[17] The police therefore sought the cell phone records for Mr. Lattif. The police wanted to know where Mr. Lattif’s phone was at the time of the bank robberies and they wanted to know if there were any text messages or other information in the records that might help to identify any other persons who may have been involved in these robberies. In that regard, it should be known that the number of persons who were involved in the string of robberies ranged from a low of one person to a high of five persons. In almost all instances, there was a getaway car and getaway driver.
[18] In order to obtain a production order, the police needed to satisfy s. 487.012(3) of the Criminal Code that reads:
Before making an order, the justice or judge must be satisfied, on the basis of an ex parte application containing information on oath in writing, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
(a) an offence against this Act or any other Act of Parliament has been or is suspected to have been committed;
(b) the documents or data will afford evidence respecting the commission of the offence; and
(c) the person who is subject to the order has possession or control of the documents or data.
[19] Mr. Lattif asserts that the ITO for the production order failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe that his cell phone records would afford evidence respecting the commission of the offence. I do not agree. The police had sufficient information to sustain a reasonable belief that both Mr. Lattif and Mr. Obanor were involved in these bank robberies. Mr. Obanor’s cell phone records suggested that he was in the area of the bank robberies at the time that they occurred. Mr. Lattif’s cell phone records would supply similarly relevant evidence regarding the offences in the sense that they would either put Mr. Lattif in the area of the bank robberies or they would not. If the former, then that would provide additional circumstantial evidence that Mr. Lattif was involved with Mr. Obanor in these bank robberies. If the latter, the records would tend to discount that theory for the offences. In either event, the information would assist the investigation.
[20] There appears to be a premise in Mr. Lattif’s position on this application that information can only afford evidence respecting the commission of the offence if that information would tend to incriminate Mr. Lattif. That is not what the section requires. All that the section requires is that the information “will afford evidence respecting the commission” of the offence. The information may inculpate the person or it may exculpate the person. In either event, the information provides evidence respecting the commission of the offence.
[21] Mr. Lattif also complains that certain portions of the ITO do not accurately state what the cell phone records of Mr. Obanor revealed. In particular, Mr. Lattif complains about the statement in the ITO where the officer said that there were contacts between Mr. Obanor’s cell phone and Mr. Lattif’s cell phone “just prior” to the robberies and “for long durations of time”. The cell phone records actually show that the contacts between the two phones ended between half an hour before one of the robberies up to two hours and forty-five minutes before in the case of one of the other robberies. Further, the telephone contact encompassed mere seconds in some instances to six and one-half minutes at the longest contact. Mr. Lattif says that these calls are not fairly characterized as “just prior” to the robberies nor are they fairly characterized as having lasted for “long durations” of time.
[22] This complaint respecting the contents of the ITO represents the type of “wordsmithing” exercise that too often purports to offer the substantive challenge to an ITO. If the affiant attempts to summarize the evidence in the interests of being concise, the affiant is accused of misleading the reader. If the affiant goes into excruciating detail regarding the available evidence, then the affiant is accused of overwhelming, and thus confusing, the reader with unnecessary detail. No matter which route an affiant attempts, s/he is criticized.
[23] Had the affiant in this case, instead of saying what he did, simply said that there were multiple contacts between Mr. Obanor’s phone and Mr. Lattif’s phone in the hours prior to the robberies, some of which were many minutes in length, there could have been no reasonable criticism of those characterizations as being unfair or untrue and yet the result would be the same. The fact would remain that there was a pattern in each of these three robberies of contact between Mr. Obanor and Mr. Lattif prior to the robberies. Coupled with other information regarding these two individuals, and the information that the police had connecting Mr. Obanor to the bank robberies, there were perfectly reasonable grounds for a belief that Mr. Lattif’s cell phone records would be relevant to the investigation. Consequently, even discounting the particular words used by the affiant in the ITO, there is still no basis for any conclusion that the police did not have reasonable grounds to obtain a production order for Mr. Lattif’s cell phone records.
The search warrant
[24] Next in the line of progression of the pre-trial applications is the search warrant, that was obtained by the police, to search two residences associated with Mr. Lattif and a motor vehicle associated to him. The stated purpose of the search warrant was to locate clothing that was worn by one of the bank robbers (other than the bank robber believed to be Mr. Obanor); any currency that might be left over from the robberies and any cell phones.
[25] In this instance, I have concluded that the police did violate Mr. Lattif’s s. 8 Charter rights.
[26] In order to justify the obtaining of a search warrant in an effort to locate clothing worn by one of the bank robbers, the police had to establish that they had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Lattif was one of the bank robbers. In other words, the police had to go beyond simply having reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Lattif was involved in these robberies in some fashion. They had to establish that Mr. Lattif was reasonably believed to be one of the persons who went into the banks and participated in the actual robberies. In that regard, the police had surveillance videos from each of the bank robberies that showed the perpetrators and the clothing that they were wearing.
[27] However, when one reviews the ITO that was used to obtain the search warrant, it fails to reveal much more of substance than did the ITO that was used to obtain the cell phone records. While that information provided sufficient grounds to believe that Mr. Lattif might be involved in the robberies in some fashion, it did not provide grounds for a reasonable belief that Mr. Lattif was one of the persons who actually went inside the banks. In that regard, I repeat that, in almost all of these robberies, there was a getaway car and getaway driver waiting outside of the banks. Also, in one of the robberies, there was only one male who entered the bank and that male was believed by the police to be Mr. Obanor. Further, Mr. Lattif might have performed any number of other roles in association with these robberies including, for example, simply providing advice and direction as to how the robberies should be committed, or acting as the person who would receive the proceeds of the robbery and arrange for their disposal, or someone who simply acted as a lookout while the robberies were undertaken.
[28] There are twelve grounds set out in the ITO for the affiant’s belief that Mr. Lattif “is responsible for a series of bank robberies”. I first note that, even in this instance, the affiant does not expressly say that he has a reasonable belief that Mr. Lattif participated in the actual robberies inside the banks. In any event, the twelve grounds either relate to Mr. Obanor and not to Mr. Lattif, or they do not add anything to the information that was set out in the ITO for the cell phone records – with one exception. In the second to last ground, the affiant says:
Further, it was learned that a phone number purported to be used by Mr. Lattif was in constant contact with Obanor during the robberies.
[29] While I am inclined to provide a fair amount of leeway to affiants in the choice of words that they use in ITOs, the above statement, on any fair reading, is simply factually incorrect. As I earlier indicated, Mr. Lattif’s cell phone was not in “constant contact” with Mr. Obanor’s cell phone “during” the robberies. The two phones were in contact before the robberies (and in one instance after the robbery) and that contact occurred some period of time before the robberies. Worse than the factual inaccuracies, however, is the fact that the language used by the affiant (especially the use of the word “during”) is one of those instances where the language serves to trick or mislead the reader. It is language that suggests an almost immediate proximity between Mr. Lattif and Mr. Obanor as the robberies play out. The cell phone records do not substantiate any such suggestion.
[30] In my view, on the evidence available to them, the police did not have a reasonable basis to believe that Mr. Lattif was one of the persons who had actually carried out the bank robberies such that his presence would have been caught by the surveillance videos thus allowing for a comparison of clothing that might be found in Mr. Lattif’s home or vehicle with clothing worn by one of the robbers. There was therefore an insufficient evidentiary foundation for the issuance of a warrant to search the residences or the motor vehicle for the purpose of locating such clothing.
[31] The search warrant was therefore not properly granted.
The items found in the search
[32] The issue then becomes whether the items that were found in the course of the improper search ought to be ruled inadmissible as evidence at this trial. This issue takes on a different complexion in this case because it is not the items that were covered by the search warrant that the Crown wishes to place into evidence. Rather, for the purposes of the offences that are at issue in this trial, what the Crown wishes to place into evidence are other items that were discovered and seized during the course of the search. The first item consists of five gloves found in a kitchen drawer in Mr. Lattif’s residence and two further gloves found in his vehicle. The other item is a box of .40 calibre ammunition that was found in a hall closet in Mr. Lattif’s residence.
[33] As may be obvious, neither of the items were listed in the search warrant. Rather, the Crown relies solely on s. 489(1)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code as providing authority for the seizure of these items. Section 489(1) reads:
Every person who executes a warrant may seize, in addition to the things mentioned in the warrant, any thing that the person believes on reasonable grounds
(a) has been obtained by the commission of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament;
(b) has been used in the commission of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament.
[34] After I raised what appeared to be the lack of an evidentiary record for this application, the Crown was permitted (with the agreement of the defence quite fairly given) to lead some evidence as to the manner in which the search had been carried out. The two officers who seized the respective items gave evidence. The officer who seized the gloves said that he did so because he had been shown still photographs from the bank surveillance videos that showed the robbers wearing gloves. The officer surmised that these gloves could have been used in the robberies and therefore he seized them.
[35] Two problems arise from this evidence. First, the photographs that the officer says that he reviewed were not introduced as evidence on this application.[^1] Indeed, I was advised that the photographs no longer exist because they were not kept as part of the investigative file on the robbery charges that were completed over a year ago. Neither I nor counsel can therefore look at the photographs to see how they might have informed the officer’s view as to why he should seize the gloves. I note that the gloves are not special gloves of some type. Rather, they appear to be normal winter or work gloves. The Crown does not suggest that there is anything special about them in terms of identifiers or the like.
[36] The second problem is that the wording of s. 489(1)(b) requires an officer to have reasonable grounds to believe that the item being seized “has been” used in the commission of an offence. I contrast that language with the language in s. 487(1)(a), for example, that refers to an offence that “has been or is suspected to have been” committed. The requirement in s. 489(1)(b) must mean something more than just a possibility or mere suspicion that the item has been used. It must mean that the officer is required to have a reasonable ground to believe that the item was actually used in an offence. The evidence of the officer who seized the gloves in this case does not rise to that level. Rather, the officer’s evidence is, at best, that he thought there was a prospect that the gloves could have been used in the robberies. His evidence does not satisfy the requirements of s. 489(1)(b) nor, perforce, does it satisfy the requirements of s. 489(1)(c).
[37] In terms of the box of ammunition, the officer who seized that item acknowledged that there is nothing per se illegal in the possession of ammunition. Rather, the officer, quite fairly, said that, after she found the box of ammunition, she consulted with one of the detectives who were in charge of the robbery investigation and asked him if she should seize the box of ammunition. The detective said yes. The officer did not ask why the box should be seized and the detective did not explain why.
[38] The Crown asserts that the seizure of the box of ammunition was justified on the basis of s. 489(1)(c) because the detective knew that Mr. Lattiff was subject to a weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code and, consequently, it would be an offence for Mr. Lattiff to possess ammunition. Indeed, the Crown points to the fact that, after the search, Mr. Lattiff was charged with a variety of offences including breach of a weapons prohibition order.
[39] While the Crown is theoretically correct in her analysis, the problem is that the detective involved was not called as a witness on this application. As a consequence, I do not know whether the reason that the Crown theorizes was the reason that the detective told the officer to seize the box of ammunition is, in fact, the real reason. It follows as well, of course, that the defence did not have the opportunity to test any such evidence. In those circumstances, I do not believe that I can make a positive finding based solely on the Crown’s theory. Consequently, the evidence does not rise to the level necessary to satisfy the requirements of s. 489(1)(c).
Discreditable conduct
[40] While the above conclusion is sufficient to deal with the issue of the box of ammunition, I believe that it would be prudent to go on and deal with the Crown’s discreditable conduct application by which it separately sought to lead evidence regarding the presence of the box of .40 calibre ammunition found in Mr. Lattif’s residence. As I earlier mentioned, one critical issue in this prosecution is the identity of the driver of the stolen vehicle. Another is the identity of the person who possessed the .40 calibre handgun and magazine that were found at the scene.
[41] The starting point for this analysis is, of course, the fact that evidence of discreditable conduct is presumptively inadmissible. The policy basis for that presumption was set out by Binnie J. in R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 at para. 37:
The policy basis for the exclusion is that while in some cases propensity inferred from similar facts may be relevant, it may also capture the attention of the trier of fact to an unwarranted degree. Its potential for prejudice, distraction and time consumption is very great and these disadvantages will almost always outweigh its probative value. It ought, in general, to form no part of the case which the accused is called on to answer.
Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it is “highly relevant and cogent” – Handy at para. 41.
[42] The Crown submits that the box of .40 calibre ammunition is evidence that will assist the trier of fact in determining the identity of the driver. The Crown says that this is so because the .40 calibre handgun, and the fully loaded magazine for that handgun, were found outside of, but near, the vehicle and along the path that the person, who fled from the driver’s side of the vehicle, took. If one assumes that, as a consequence, the driver of the stolen vehicle must also be the person who had the .40 calibre handgun and magazine, then the likelihood of that person being Mr. Lattif increases if it is known that Mr. Lattif possessed a box of .40 calibre ammunition. The Crown likens this situation to evidence that the accused was in the habit of smoking a particular brand of cigarette that was found at the scene of a crime – a particular scenario that is referred to by Charron J.A. in R. v. L.B. (1997), 1997 CanLII 3187 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (3d) 35 (C.A.) at para. 21.
[43] In my view, the comparison of guns and ammunition to cigarettes is not an apt one. There is nothing either illegal or necessarily discreditable in a person possessing cigarettes. The opposite is true with respect to the possession of a handgun and, in the case of Mr. Lattif, in his possession of ammunition. Indeed, it is not clear how the Crown would intend to introduce the evidence of the seizure of the box of ammunition without at least having to reveal that the police executed a search warrant on Mr. Lattif’s home and that they were only able to seize the box of ammunition because it was illegal for Mr. Lattif to possess it. However, even if those issues could be overcome, a larger problem is presented by this evidence.
[44] The nature of this evidence invites a jury to jump from the conclusion that because Mr. Lattif possessed a box of .40 calibre ammunition, the .40 calibre handgun and related magazine found at the scene must belong to Mr. Lattif and therefore he must also be the driver of the stolen vehicle. While the Crown acknowledges that that it would be improper for a jury to use the fact that Mr. Lattif had a box of .40 calibre ammunition to conclude that he possessed the .40 calibre handgun and magazine, the fact remains that this evidence allows for just such an improper use. Indeed, it is almost inherent in the goal that the Crown seeks to achieve by this evidence, that such a line of reasoning would have to be followed. It is precisely the concern over the possible misuse of such evidence that is referred to in L.B., where Charron J.A., at para. 22, quoted from Professor Delisle as follows:
Prejudice in this context, of course, does not mean that the evidence might increase the chances of conviction but rather that the evidence might be improperly used by the trier of fact. It is one thing for evidence to operate unfortunately for an accused but it is quite another matter for the evidence to operate unfairly.
[45] Therefore, even if the issues regarding the search warrant could have been overcome, I would not have allowed the Crown to present this evidence at the trial. In my view, the prejudicial effect of the box of ammunition greatly outweighs any probative value. As Charron J.A. said in L.B. at para. 21:
Because evidence of discreditable conduct other than that which forms the subject-matter of the charge presents a serious risk of prejudice to the accused, it must not only be relevant and material to gain admission at trial, but must be subject to further screening to ensure that it is worth receiving.
Simply put, for the reasons that I have outlined, this evidence is not worth receiving.
[46] It is for these reasons that I reached the conclusions that I did on the various pre-trial applications.
NORDHEIMER J.
Released: March 10, 2015
CITATION: R. v. Lattif, 2015 ONSC 1580
COURT FILE NO.: 5-511-14
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
- and -
MARVIN LATTIF
REASONS FOR DECISION
NORDHEIMER J.
RELEASED:
[^1]: I note that the other officer who participated in this search did not say that she was shown any such photographs.