Paul Lindsay

The appellant, a lawyer, initiated a fee-for-referral scheme with police officers.

When the Law Society investigated the allegations, the appellant submitted false statutory declarations from the officers and clients to conceal the scheme.

He was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice.

On appeal, he argued that a Law Society investigation does not constitute the 'course of justice' under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the admission of wiretap evidence and the statutory declarations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'course of justice' includes investigations by statutory disciplinary tribunals, the wiretap evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the false declarations were not protected by solicitor-client privilege as they were created to further a crime.

The appellant and two co-accused pleaded guilty to attempted robbery while armed with a shotgun.

They were acquitted at trial of a second charge of using a firearm while attempting to commit an indictable offence, based on the rule against multiple convictions (the Kienapple principle).

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued he did not personally use the firearm and that the Kienapple principle barred the second conviction.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 21 of the Criminal Code applies to make a party liable under section 83, and that Parliament clearly intended section 83 to create a distinct offence with consecutive sentencing, thereby ousting the Kienapple principle.